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Abstract 
 
This dissertation argues that insects provided a crucial lens through which 
Enlightenment thinkers could reimagine and represent their societies. It demomstrates 
that the understanding of the functioning of their individual bodies, the close 
observation of their collective behaviour, and its manipulation and management, 
helped eighteenth-century scholars to conceptualise, and root in nature, their social 
orders and the changes that they wished to see in them. While insect collectives such 
as bee swarms or ant colonies that had long been used to metaphorically model human 
societies, in the eighteenth century, these metaphors were reformulated and given an 
empirical basis.  
Investigating writings on insects on the part of natural historians, agronomists, 
philosophes and physicians, the thesis contributes to the growing literature on the role 
of animals in human history in general and in the Enlightenment in particular. It builds 
on two scholarly traditions: French studies and the cultural history of scientific, 
economic and political knowledge (mainly written after the 1980s). I take from French 
studies methods for the close reading of texts and more recent ideas on how ‘to bridge’ 
different fields of knowledge; the latter discipline will be useful in providing ideas 
about the history of observation and experimentation, theories of the animal and 
human body as well as eighteenth-century understanding of political econonmy. 
As this dissertation demonstrates, insects helped conceptualise new ideas of the human 
individual and his or her passions (chapters 1 and 2), of how human collectives are 
formed (chapter 3) and how governments can manipulate and regulate them in the 
most profitable ways possible (chapters 4 and 5). By investigating Enlightenment 
writings on insects, this thesis shows, we can recover part of the rich history of our 
modern understanding of our own ways of living together.
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
In his assessment of the recent transformations of the modern city, media theorist Eric 
Kluitenberg borrowed an analogy from the animal world to describe human social 
urban life. He argues that human urban life is best represented as a swarm: ‘Today, we 
are witnessing the rise of swarm publics, highly unstable constellations of temporary 
alliances that resemble a public sphere in constant flux; globally mediated flash mobs 
that never meet, fuelled by sentiment and affect, escaping fixed capture.’1 The modern 
city is here figured as a swarm, a collection of billions of individuals who form no real 
or lasting relationships. Kluitenberg is by no means the only contemporary thinker to 
conceptualise modern collectivities by using reference to insect life such as ‘swarms’ 
or ‘hives’; philosophers, social scientists and geographers have all sought to 
conceptualise modern human life through metaphors of insect societies. Swarms too 
have been shown to capture, and shape, the problems of modern human life. According 
to a recent report by the United Nations Environment Programme, declining honeybee 
populations and ‘colony collapse disorder’ present a significant threat to food security 
for humans around the globe, as bees pollinate one third of global crops.2 The 
problems facing honeybee colonies are directly attributable to human interventions 
such as industrialised agriculture, engineering projects or urban development, which 
affect, as biologists have shown, the very genetic code of the bee.3  
This dissertation investigates a central period in European history in which the 
understanding of the relationships between insects and human collective lives 
underwent fundamental changes: the Enlightenment. Taking its cue from a growing 
concern among humanities scholars with human-animal relationships, this thesis 
shows how observations of individual and collective insect bodies contributed to 
                                                 
1 Eric Kluitenberg, Delusive Spaces: Essays on Culture, Media and Technology (NAi, 2008), p. 287. 
2 Stéphanie Kluser, Marie-Pierre Chauzat, and Jeffrey S. Pettis, UNEP Emerging Issues: Global Honey 
Bee Colony Disorder and Other Threats to Insect Pollinators (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2010) 
<http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Global_Cee_Colony_Disorder_and_Threats_insect_pollin
ators.pdf.> [accessed 28 July 2017]. 
3 Jake Kosek, ‘Ecologies of Empire: On the New Uses of the Honeybee’, Cultural Anthropology, 25.4 
(2010), 650–78. 
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debates about how to conceptualise – and govern – large numbers of individuals living, 
moving and working in a given space. What we now call ‘social’ insects were 
particularly useful for this endeavour, as they appeared in large groups that, as in the 
case of harmful pests or useful bees, often proved challenging to control. Like 
contemporary media theorists, eighteenth-century savants frequently had recourse to 
metaphors or observations of insect collectivities to make sense of their own societies, 
and to construct new conceptualisations of their social order. Insects, and in particular 
social insects, have of course long been used as figures for humanity; in the fast-
changing world of Enlightenment France, however, they did so with particular 
frequency and intensity.  
While insect collectives such as bee swarms or ant colonies that had long been 
used to metaphorically model human societies, in the eighteenth century these 
metaphors were reformulated and given an empirical basis. The Enlightenment was a 
period of intense discussions around the nature of animals, and their differences from 
and similarities to humans.4 As Pierre Serna has recently argued in his history of 
animals during the French Revolution, ‘dans cette mutation du monde que constituent 
les années 1750-1830, jamais peut être, dans l’histoire de la modernité et de l’ère 
contemporaine, l’histoire des hommes n’a été autant été mêlée à celle des animaux.’5 
This dissertation analyses texts from the middle decades of the eighteenth century, 
when, as the chapters that follow will demonstrate, insects such as bees, ants, and 
polyps (considered to be insects at the time) were at the heart of some of the most 
important debates of the Enlightenment. The eighteenth century was, famously, a 
period of intense debates around what it means to be human, both in the singular and 
                                                 
4 Anita Guerrini, The Courtiers’ Anatomists: Animals and Humans in Louis XIV’s Paris (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015); ‘L’animal des lumières’, ed. by Jacques Berchtold and Jean-Luc 
Guichet, Dix-huitième siècle, 42.1 (2010); Laura Brown, Homeless Dogs & Melancholy Apes: Humans 
and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); Tobias 
Cheung, ‘Transitions and Borders between Animals, Humans and Machines 1600-1800: Introduction’, 
Early Science & Medicine, 15.1/2 (2010), 1–2; ‘Special Issue: Animals in the Eighteenth Century’, ed. 
by Glynis Ridley, Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 33.4 (2010), iv; 427-683; Matthew Senior, 
‘The Souls of Men and Beasts, 1630-1764’, in A Cultural History of Animals in the Age of 
Enlightenment (Oxford: Berg, 2007), IV, 23–45. 
5 Pierre Serna, Comme des bêtes: Histoire politique de l’animal en révolution (1750-1840) (Paris: 
Fayard, 2017), p. 12. 
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in the collective.6 As this dissertation demonstrates, insects helped conceptualise new 
ideas of the human individual and his or her passions (chapters 1 and 2), of how human 
collectives are formed (chapter 3) and how governments can manipulate and regulate 
them in the most profitable ways possible (chapters 4 and 5). Discussions of insect 
bodies, that is, were also discussion of human individual and political bodies. 
By looking at literary, natural historical, and agronomic discourses of insects, 
this thesis shows, we can recover part of the rich history of our modern understanding 
of our own ways of living together. In the introduction, I first set out the literatures on 
which this dissertation builds: French studies and the cultural history of scientific, 
economic and political knowledge (mainly written after the 1980s). As the thesis 
located in the discipline of French studies, I take from French studies methods for the 
close reading of texts and more recent ideas on how ‘to bridge’ different fields of 
knowledge; the latter disciplines will be useful in providing ideas about the history of 
observation and experimentation, theories of the animal and human body as well as 
eighteenth-century understanding of political economy. Building on the insights from 
these literatures, it becomes apparent that the study of eighteenth-century insects is 
firmly situated within an interdisciplinarity context of eighteenth-century forms of 
knowledge. Using ‘bridging concepts’ such as that of population which came into 
increasing use in all of these different fields of knowledge I show how insect were 
central to the understanding of new forms of human social order in the Age of 
Enlightenment.  
Investigating writings on insects on the part of natural historians (in the 
eighteenth-century sense as outlined by historians of science discussed above), 
agronomists, philosophes and physicians, the thesis thus contributes to the growing 
literature on the role of animals in human history in general and in the Enlightenment 
in particular. As this is a dissertation contributing to the field of French studies, it 
analyses texts, and focuses on textual, rather than experimental or observational 
practices. Nevertheless, because insects crossed so many modern disciplinary 
                                                 
6 For a recent overview, see Yves Citton and Laurent Loty, ‘Penser ensemble les rapports entre individus 
et communautés à l’époque des lumières’, Dix-huitième siècle, 2009, 4–26. 
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boundaries, the work by historians of science, medicine and political economy who 
have shown that all these different fields shared methods, concerns and languages has 
been particularly useful. This dissertation thus expands the argument that histories of 
nature in the age of Enlightenment were, at the same time, histories of human societies. 
The chapters that follow show, in short, that investigations of human and animal 
bodies were used to make, and think through, claims about political economy and the 
functioning of individual and collective behaviours. It shows that authors and 
observers always understood insects through the lens of their own concerns and 
assumptions.  
 
 
2. French Studies: The Literary History of Humans and Animals in the 
Enlightenment 
This thesis originates from a fascination with the role of animals in French literature: 
animals have long been a subject of study for scholars of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The following section briefly sketches out important 
methodological changes in literary studies over roughly the last four decades, 
important to this thesis because they moved animals (amongst other non-human 
actors) to the forefront of interest in French literary studies and fundamentally changed 
the ways scholars understood the role and function of animals in literary texts. This 
thesis’ focus on insects as a window onto political and conceptual changes in the 
period builds on this literature and its argument that animals have been fundamental 
in the development of human cultural and political life.  
The study of animals in literature is not, of course, an invention of the 1980s. 
Important works by George Boas and Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, written in the 1930s 
and 1960s, for example, offered extensive accounts of human attitudes towards 
animals.7 They thus investigated what authors in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
                                                 
7 Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters 
from Descartes to La Mettrie (New York: Octagon Books, 1968); George Boas, The Happy Beast: In 
French Thought of the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933); Henri Busson, 
‘La Fontaine et l’âme des bêtes’, Revue d’Histoire littéraire de la France, 43.2 (1936), 257–86; Hester 
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centuries had to say about animals and related themes such the animal soul or animal 
mechanism, and the way in which writers of all literary genres represented these 
themes. Others explored the use of animals as symbols. Georges May, for instance, in 
an article on Denis Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste, in 1961 analyses the dog as an image 
for human liberty and loyalty, assuming that the dog’s status as ‘symbole universel’ 
makes the animal instantly recognisable to its readers as a reminder of man’s unique 
and inalienable liberty.8  
More recent literary scholarship has approached ‘the animal’ in eighteenth-
century French literature from a new perspective, owing much to theoretical 
discussions over ‘structuralism’ and ‘poststructuralism’ that were first formulated in 
France during the 1960s and 70s and took a hold on the Anglo-American academic 
world during the 1980s.9 The claims of poststructuralist scholars as to the overriding 
importance of the underlying structures of language fundamentally subverted the 
traditional approach adopted by scholars in the humanities, centred around the human 
subject as the sole agent of meaning and as actively shaping the world around him or 
her. With (post)structuralism, meaning was no longer considered the product of a 
                                                 
Hastings, Man and Animals in French Literature of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University, 1934). 
8 Georges May, ‘Le maître, la chaîne et le chien dans “Jacques le Fataliste”, Cahiers de l’Association 
internationale des études francaises, 13.1 (1961), 269–82; See also Leon Schwartz, ‘“Jacques Le 
Fataliste” and Diderot’s Equine Symbolism’, Diderot Studies, 16 (1973), 241–51. 
9 The distinction between structuralism and poststructuralism is a difficult one to make and cannot be 
reduced to temporality (‘post’ because it comes after), especially since thinkers such as Roland 
Barthes or Jacques Lacan are sometimes considered to belong to both; Jonathan Culler has thus 
argued that these distinctions are unhelpful; see Jonathan D. Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and 
Criticism after Structuralism, Twenty-fifth anniversary edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2007). For overviews of poststructuralist thought, see James Williams, Understanding 
Poststructuralism (Chesham: Acumen, 2005); Colin Davis, After Poststructuralism: Reading, Stories 
and Theory (London: Routledge, 2004); Stefan Münker and Alexander Roesler, Poststrukturalismus. 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000); The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Volume 8: From Formalism 
to Poststructuralism, ed. by Raman Selden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). A short 
definition is of course hard to give for such a diverse body of theories; Catherine Belsey provides a 
useful definition: ‘Poststructuralism names a theory, or a group of theories, concerning the 
relationship between human beings, the world, and the practice of making and reproducing meanings. 
On the one hand, poststructuralists affirm, consciousness is not the origin of the language we speak 
and the images we recognize, so much as the product of the meanings we learn to reproduce. On the 
other hand, communication changes all the time, with or without intervention from us, and we can 
choose to intervene with a view to altering the meanings – that is to say the norms and values – our 
culture takes for granted.’ Catherine Belsey, Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 5.  
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rational and creative thinker, but of underlying linguistic structures. As an important 
consequence, structuralists and poststructuralists thus cast doubt on, or ‘decentred’, 
the notion of the rational human subject, capable of discovering the ‘truth’, both about 
him- or herself and about the external world.10 The idea of the human self as 
increasingly ‘rationalising’, self-reflected and in confident possession of his or her 
own thoughts came to be decried as an illusion originating in the belief of the 
Enlightenment.11 The notions of ‘rational man’, but also of the genius author, 
celebrated by previous generations of literary scholars, for many now became a 
‘myth’12.  
Given that the supposedly rational subject of the Enlightenment had been 
unmasked as a myth, scholars also began to question the traditional distinction 
between between rational man and animals, the latter supposedly lacking rationality. 
A key text for the emerging new field of animal studies from the 1990s onwards was 
Jacques Derrida’s L’animal que donc je suis (à suivre) (published posthumously in 
2006), an essay in which the poststructuralist philosopher prompted by his cat’s gaze, 
interrogates the relationship and boundaries between man and animal.13 In L’animal, 
Derrida throws into radical doubt the idea of a fixed boundary between the human 
subject and the ‘animal world’, which he decries as a foundational error of Western 
philosophy. Derrida argues that the contrast between the categories of rational man 
                                                 
 
11 Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century England 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Charly J. Coleman, ‘The Value of Dispossession: 
Rethinking Discourses of Selfhood in Eighteenth-Century France’, Modern Intellectual History, 2.3 
(2005), 299–326; Jan Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self : Politics and Psyche in France, 1750-
1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Jonathan Lamb, Preserving the Self in the 
South Seas, 1680-1840 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Andrew Curran, ‘Monsters and 
the Self in the Rêve de d’Alembert’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 21.2 (1997), 48–69. 
12 In the same breath that Barthes declared the ‘death of the author’, he also announced the ‘birth of the 
reader’. Overviews and critiques of postmodern literary criticism with further bibliographies, include 
The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. by Sim Stuart, 3rd edn (London: Routledge, 2011); 
Nicola Bran, The Cambridge Introduction to Postmodern Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Michael Greaney, Contemporary Fiction and the Uses of Theory: The Novel from 
Structuralism to Postmodernism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Terry Eagleton, The 
Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Stephen Connor, ‘Postmodernism and 
Literature’, in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. by Stephen Connor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 62–81. 
13 Derrida, L’animal. 
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and irrational ‘animal’ made possible the long tradition of Western metaphysics, 
reaching from the philosophies of Plato, to those of Descartes and Heidegger. Derrida 
instead aligns himself with what he deems ‘pre- or anti-Caretesian’ philosphers, 
chiefly Montagine, who, in his ‘Apologie de Raymond Sebond’, used the description 
of a cat to denounce man’s arrogant assumption of being able to know ‘les branles 
internes et secrets des animaux’.14 According to Derrida, Cartesian philosophers 
defined the rational human subject on the back of the falsely homogenous category of 
‘the animal’ that does not distinguish oysters from apes, let alone Derrida’s cat from 
any other cat. Derrida, by contrast, wishes to emphasise the multiplicity of animals as 
well as of humans: ‘Au-delà du bord soi-disant humain, au-delà de lui mais nullement 
sur un seul bord oppose, au lieu de ‘L’Animal’ ou de ‘La-Vie-Animale’, il y a, déjà 
là, une multiplicité hétérogène de vivants’.15 It should also be noted that Derrida and 
his followers reject the rights-based notion of animal ethics developed mainly by 
American thinkers such as Peter Singer.16 The idea of an animal endowed with rights, 
Derrida argued, is no more but the continuation of the very liberal subject of the 
Enlightenment that his work denounces. 
Inspirational for scholars in animal studies looking for how we came to think 
of animals as ‘different’ from humans were the many literary and historical studies 
which have emerged since the 1990s on the question of the ‘socio-cultural’ 
construction of the Enlightenment understandings of the human ‘self’, human 
sociability and of society. Enlightenment protagonists themselves considered their age 
as one in which the understanding of the individual and of society underwent 
significant changes and attributed this to the rise of reason and rationality over human 
                                                 
14 Michel de Montaigne, Apologie de Raimond Sebond, ed. by Robert Aulotte (Paris: Société 
d’enseignement supérieur, 1979), p. 331. For a critical comparison of Derrida’s and Montaigne’s cats, 
and the argument that the two projects are in fact diametrically opposed, see Thierry Gontier, 
‘Montaigne on Animals’, in The Oxford Handbook on Montaigne, ed. by Philippe Desan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 732–49. 
15 Derrida, L’animal, p. 53. 
16 Paola Cavalieri, The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); 
In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave, ed. by Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Animal Rights 
and Human Obligations, ed. by Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1989); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (London: Routledge, 1988); Peter Singer, Animal 
Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (London: Cape, 1976). 
 8 
 
passions in their time. Postmodern scholarship, in an attempt to expand the canon of 
eighteenth-century literature, constructed on the basis of ‘cold reason’, began to 
investigate more carefully the understandings of human passions, of ‘sensibility’ and 
‘sentiment’ which had been central to discourse of the ‘rational’ self in the 
Enlightenment. Crucial studies such as George Barker-Benfield’s The Culture of 
Sensibility (1992) and Janet Todd’s Sensibility: An Introduction (1986); or, for the 
French context, Anne Vila’s Enlightenment and Pathology (1998), David Denby’s, 
Sentimental Narrative and the Social Order in France, 1760-1820 (1994), for 
instance, fundamentally revised the picture of the Enlightenment as based on reason 
and mathematical and empirical approaches to nature.17 These scholars have 
emphasised that sentiment and sensibility were considered crucial to a number of 
scholarly fields; sentiment, they argue, dominated medical discourses, political 
economy and even experimental physics. They also demonstrated that sensibility was 
a crucial component in attempts to redefine the social order, and the relationship 
between individuals and their societies in a more secular age.18 At a moment in 
scholarship that is, when the rational, liberal subject was increasingly thought of as a 
socio-cultural construction, scholars showed that alongside rationality, Enlightenment 
savants also insisted on the importance of feeling and sensations in the formation of 
the modern ‘self’. This aspect of the Enlightenment discourse has been taken up by 
those interested in revising the idea of a purely instrumental relationship between men 
and animals, emphasising instead its affective dimension.  
                                                 
17 G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility 
in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998); David J. Denby, Sentimental Narrative and the Social Order in France, 1760-1820 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: 
Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Janet 
M. Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction (London: Methuen, 1986); On history of science, see, among 
others: Sean M. Quinlan, ‘Sensibility and Human Science in the Enlightenment’, ed. by David J. Denby 
and others, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 37.2 (2004), 296–301; Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of 
Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002); E. C. Spary, Utopia’s Garden: French Natural History from Old Regime to Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), ch. 5. 
18 See the introduction to Animals and Humans: Sensibility and Representation, 1650-1820, ed. by 
Katherine M. Quinsey (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2017). 
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Based predominantly in English literature departments, these scholars have 
focused on the role of animals in discourses around rationality and, just as importantly, 
sensibility. One of the most recent contributions to the field, a collection of essays on 
animals and humans in the period between 1650 and 1820, characteristically sets out 
‘to recontextualise the key eighteenth-century concepts of “sentiment” and 
“sensibility” in regard to animal-human relations’.19 Contributors explore a range of 
genres and themes, ranging from descriptive nature poetry as a genre which allows 
natural phenomena an ‘independent voice’ or the way which the writings of Alexander 
Pope propose notions of ‘animal subjectivity’ and ‘animal welfare’. This edited 
volume follows a range of studies that have, similarly, dealt with ‘affective’ relations 
between animals and humans.20 Thomas Menely’s study of eighteenth-century animals 
and sensibility argues that poetry provided a space where animals were given a voice, 
and eighteenth-century ideas about sympathy and its virtues put into practice.21 Ingrid 
Tague has discussed the significant rise in petkeeping in eighteenth-century Britain, 
basing her analysis also on literary sources such as children’s stories or elegies and 
epitaphs for lapdogs or house cats.22 Pet-keeping, she argues, ‘offered a unique 
opportunity for eighteenth-century Britons to articulate their view of what it meant to 
be human and what their society ought to look like’; pets thus allow Tague to discuss 
the ways in which the new intimacy between human and non-human animals 
destabilised categories of race, gender and social status. 
Tague’s study also intersects with a third concern of studies on eighteenth-
century animals in recent years, namely their role as commodities in the expanding 
consumer societies of the time.23 The theme of sensibility, was, as scholars such as 
                                                 
19 Quinsey, Animals and Humans.  
20 For perspectives on the so-called ‘affective turn’ from a range of disciplines, se The Affective Turn: 
Theorizing the Social, ed. by Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean O’Malley Halley (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2007). 
21 Tobias Menely, The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015). 
22 Ingrid H. Tague, Animal Companions: Pets and Social Change in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2015). 
23 Significant studies on the rise of consumerism include Michael Kwass, ‘Ordering the World of Goods: 
Consumer Revolution and the Classification of Objects in Eighteenth-Century France’, 
Representations, 82.1 (2003), 87–116; Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and 
Delectable Goods, ed. by Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); 
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Barker-Benfield have pointed out, intimately connected to the rise of consumerism in 
the eighteenth-century, which required individuals to ‘indulge’ in ‘the luxury of 
feeling’ just as they ‘indulged’ their appetites for the newest consumer goods.24 Pets 
were consumer goods too, and the affections felt for them by their owners expressed 
a new consumerist sensibility, as well as anxieties regarding its dangers for the old 
social order. Eighteenth-century Europeans purchased not only pets, but also a 
growing number of exotic animals and animal products. As Louise Robbins has 
demonstrated for eighteenth-century Parisian culture, animals such as elephants, 
parrots or exotic birds became items for the luxury trade, and thus implicated in the 
eighteenth-century ‘consumer revolution’.25  
Not all literary scholars interested in animals, of course, abandoned the 
traditional venues of literary scholarship. However, even studies dealing with 
individual French authors were now reread in the light of the new interest in topics 
such as sensibility. For scholars in French studies, the most obvious candidate for an 
examination of animals, sensibility and compassion is the work of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. Jean-Luc Guichet, for example, has extensively discussed the centrality of 
the animal for Rousseau’s thought.26 Guichet argues that the important presence of 
animals in Rousseau’s oeuvre needs to be explained in the context of Enlightenment 
anthropology and its redefinition of the human subject. Guichet presents those aspects 
in Rousseau that emphasise the new closeness between human and animal; the 
Rousseauist concept of pity, for example, which has long been known to lie heart of 
Rousseau’s conception of society, is now shown to be rooted in natural man’s 
                                                 
The Consumption of Culture, 1600-1800: Image, Object, Text, ed. by Ann Bermingham and John 
Brewer (London: Routledge, 1995); Consumption and the World of Goods, ed. by John Brewer 
(London: Routledge, 1993); Lorna Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 
1660-1760 (London: Routledge, 1988). 
24 Barker-Benfield, Culture of Sensibility. 
25 Louise E. Robbins, Elephant Slaves and Pampered Parrots: Exotic Animals in Eighteenth-Century 
Paris, Animals, History, Culture (Baltimore, Md. ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
For the British context, see ‘Guns, Ivory and Elephant Graveyards: The Biopolitics of Elephants’ 
Teeth’, in Animals and Humans: Sensibility and Representation, 1650-1820, ed. by Katherine M. 
Quinsey (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2017), pp. 35–55; Christopher Plumb, The Georgian 
Menagerie: Exotic Animals in Eighteenth-Century London (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015). 
26 Jean-Luc Guichet, Rousseau, l’animal et l’homme: L’animalité dans l’horizon anthropologique des 
Lumières (Paris: Cerf, 2006). 
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connection to, and civilised man’s difference from, animals.27 Women writers, as 
Jeanne Bloch and Stéphanie Miech have shown, used animal fables or animal 
characters in novels to figure the relations between not only rational man and his 
animal other, but also between man and (less rational) woman, another crucial aspect 
of Enlightenment thought.28 Eighteenth-century women writers, Bloch and Miech 
argue, employed animal figures both to represent the human individual and his or her 
capacity to feel sympathy for others, and to illustrate models of patriarchal domination.  
The works of other famous philosophes, in addition to Rousseau, have been 
reexamined from the specific angle of the animal question. This is true especially of 
Diderot, who frequently employed animal images in his speculative texts. Kate 
Tunstall has recently shown how Diderot (and Laurence Sterne) used the image of the 
bee swarm to figure the theory that the mind is material and embodied.29 She thus 
closely analyses literary figures for what they can tell us about Enlightenment 
materialists, and their attempt to understand human thought as the product of the 
sensitive body. Caroline Jacot-Grapa has explored how the author mobilises different 
animal (including many insects) figures in order to represent the ‘animality’ within 
man which, for Diderot, determines so much of his or her volition.30 Unlike May’s 
description of Diderot’s figure of the dog, that is, these animal figures are not 
reminders of human uniqueness, but rather of the unstable boundaries between man 
and animal. Animals have also been shown to be central to the thought of Voltaire, 
                                                 
27 Guichet, Rousseau, p. 432. The argument on Rousseauist pity elaborates an argument made by Lévi-
Strauss; see Claude Lévi-Strauss, Le totémisme aujourd’hui (Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 
pp. 143–45. 
28 Stéphanie Miech, ‘Romans féminins et œuvres picturales : analyse du bestiaire et approche de la 
société des Lumières’, Sociétés & Représentations, 29 (2009), 67–90; Stéphanie Miech, ‘Nature et 
fonctions du bestiaire dans les romans de femmes auteurs au siècle des lumières’, Dix-huitième siècle, 
42 (2010), 139–59; Jeanne Bloch, ‘Le héros animal dans les contes de fées de Mme d’Aulnoy’, Dix-
huitième siècle, 42 (2010), 119–38. 
29 Kate E. Tunstall, ‘The Early Modern Embodied Mind and the Entomological Imaginary’, in Mind, 
Body, Motion, Matter: Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives, ed. by Mary 
Helen McMurran and Alison Conway (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), pp. 202–29. 
30 Caroline Jacot Grapa, ‘Des huîtres aux grands animaux’, Dix-huitième siècle, 2010, 99–118; Caroline 
Jacot Grapa, Dans le vif du sujet - Diderot, corps et âme, L’Europe des Lumières (Paris: Classiques 
Garnier, 2009); Caroline Jacot Grapa, ‘Le Moi-Araignée du “Rêve de d’Alembert” de Diderot’, in 
Littérature et médecine: approches et perspectives (XVIe-XIXe siècle), ed. by Andrea Carlino and 
Alexandre Wenger (Geneva: Droz, 2007), pp. 177–98. See also Annie Ibrahim, ‘Diderot et les 
métaphores de l’animal : pour un antispécisme ?’, Dix-huitième siècle, 2010, 83–98. 
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who used animals to argue against both materialism (he defended the immaterial 
animal soul) and the overly devout or tyrannical (he advocated vegetarianism, at least 
in theory).31  
These studies of literary uses of animal and insect figures in the works of 
particular authors or in various genres offer fascinating insights into the way in which 
animals were used metaphorically to discuss assumptions about what it means to be 
human, to live in a human body, or how men and women changed the way they related 
to one another. The animal figures used by Diderot, Rousseau or Voltaire, that is, were 
used to interrogate knowledge about what it means to be animal and, by implication, 
human. This thesis, similarly, pays attention to the ways in which conceptions of 
‘reason’ and ‘sensiblity’ are constructed on the basis of engagement with animals. 
Unlike the studies mentioned above, however, I do not trace sentimental relationships. 
Instead, the chapters that make up this thesis show how animals – both real and 
imagined – served as tools for the construction of political communities.  
In these analyses, it becomes clear that the category of the animal can include 
many different beings. Following Derrida’s complaint that philosophers tend to use 
‘the animal’ as a homogenous category of which all members can be opposed to man, 
scholars have drawn attention to the fact that the category of ‘animal’, as well its many 
subcategories, is a historical construction. This can be illustrated with definitions of 
the kinds of animals that this thesis discusses: insects. Eighteenth-century writers did 
not yet understand insects to mean small invertebrates. As this thesis shows, they 
agreed, however, that insects were ‘animals’, that is living, sentient beings that were 
neither plants (because they could move) nor humans (because they could, supposedly, 
not think),32 and that they could be used just as well, or even better, than animals that 
                                                 
31 Renan Larue, ‘Voltaire, laboureur et naturaliste. Ferney et la genèse des Singularités de la nature’, 
Dix-huitième siècle, 2013, 167–80; Christiane Mervaud, ‘Bestiaires de Voltaire’, in Bestiaires de 
Voltaire, Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2006), pp. 5–
200. 
32  See the definition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie (1787) : ‘ANIMAL, s. m. Être, composé d' un 
corps organisé et d' une âme sensitive. Acad. Tout ce qui a vie, sentiment et mouvement. Trév. Être qui 
a du sentiment, et qui est capable d' exercer les fonctions de la vie. Rich. Port. De ces trois définitions, 
celle de l' Acad. est sans contredit la meilleûre. Animal terrestre, animal aquatique, animal amphibie, 
etc. "L' homme est un animal raisonable.’ 
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we might now consider much closer to us on the evolutionary ladder for thinking about 
the differences between man and animal, or between the rational soul and the 
passionate body. The animals included under this category in the eighteenth century 
do not necessarily correspond to modern entomological classifications; arthropods and 
even reptiles were thus unproblematically classed as insects.33 Contemporary 
dictionaries were, accordingly, not overly concerned with classificatory precision. For 
instance, the Dictionnaire de l’Académie of 1768 used the following definition of 
insects to distinguish different varieties according to their movements (a definition 
which only changed in 1835 to reflect new divisions based on the lack of vertebrae): 
 
INSECTE. s.m. Petit animal dont le corps est coupé comme par anneaux. Il y 
en a de plusieurs sortes; les uns rampent comme les vers, les autres marchent 
comme les fourmis, & les autres volent comme les mouches, les hannetons, les 
papillons.  
 
The Encyclopédie article ‘Insectes’ defines them as animals that don’t fit the 
categories of fish, bird or quadruped and follows the Aristotelian notion that insects 
are bloodless:34 
 
INSECTE, (Hist. nat.) petit animal qui n'a point de sang. On a distingué les 
animaux de cette nature en grands & en petits; les grands sont les animaux 
mous, les crustacés & les testacés; les petits sont les insectes. Il y a plus 
d'especes d'insectes que d'especes de poissons, d'oiseaux, ou de quadrupedes. 
Il y a aussi plus de différences de conformation parmi les insectes, que dans 
tout autre genre d'animaux. 
                                                 
33 As noted by Tunstall in a footnote; see Tunstall, ‘Embodied Mind’, p. 220, fn.8. Denis Diderot and 
Louis Jean-Marie Daubenton, ‘Animal, Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts 
et des métiers, ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, (University of Chicago:  ARTFL 
Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe) 
<http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu>  
34 Even though, as Liliane Bodson points out, Aristotle had qualified that insects lack red blood, the 
idea of insects as bloodless animals was widespread until the nineteenth century: Liliane Bodson, ‘The 
Beginnings of Entomology in Anient Greece’, The Classical Outlook, 61.1 (1983), 3–6. 
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This definition of insects was echoed that of Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur (1683-
1757), whose Mémoires pour server à l’histoire des insectes made him undoubtedly 
the leading authority on insects, both in France and beyond. Réaumur was generous in 
placing creatures into the category of insect. He argued that any animal that could not 
be classified as either mammal, fish or bird should be an insect, regardless of size or 
the number of incisions (previously, for Aristotle, an insect or ‘entoma’ was an animal 
with a body divided into segments).35 Réaumur admitted that he had no problem with 
that and this meant that he had no problem with classifying crocodiles as insects, 
though of course they did not meet his criterion of being easily encountered by a 
Frenchman. Unlike the Swedish naturalist and classifier Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), 
the French naturalist was not particularly interested in offering a comprehensive 
system that would enable naturalists to identify all classes of insects.36 These 
naturalists were not, as we will see, concerned merely with the subtleties of insect 
anatomy; instead, they used their histories of insects to write about human society. It 
is well-known, of course, that Parisian literary authors, naturalists, and political 
economists moved in many of the same spaces, where they could share and debate 
ideas. Famous naturalists such as Réaumur and his rival Georges-Louis Leclerc de 
Buffon (1707–1788) attended the weekly meetings of the Academy of Sciences, where 
they would have heard (and given) papers about a whole range of subjects that we 
would now classify as, say, chemistry, biology or engineering.37 Outside the Academy, 
Réaumur attended the salon of Mme de Tencin, whose other regular attendees included 
the academician Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, the famous theorist and novelist 
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1698-1755), the political writer Charles-
                                                 
35 Harry B. Weiss, ‘The Entomology of Aristotle’, Journal of the New York Entomological Society, 37.2 
(1929), 101–9. 
36 Brian W. Ogilvie, ‘Order of Insects’, in The Life Sciences in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. by Ohad 
Nachtomy and Justin E. H. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 222–45. 
37 Mary Terrall, ‘Salon, Academy, and Boudoir: Generation and Desire in Maupertuis’s Science of 
Life’, Isis, 87.2 (1996), 217–29; Alice Stroup, A Company of Scientists: Botany, Patronage, and 
Community at the Seventeenth-Century Parisian Royal Academy of Sciences (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990); Roger Hahn, ‘Scientific Research as an Occupation in Eighteenth-Century 
Paris’, Minerva, 13.4 (1975), 501–13; Roger Hahn, The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris 
Academy of Sciences, 1666-1803 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). 
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Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), and the novelist and dramatist Pierre de 
Marivaux (1688-1763); Buffon, on the other hand, was a regular guest at the famous 
salons of Mlle de L’Espinasse and Mme Geoffrin, frequented by famous freethinkers 
such as Diderot, Jean le Rond D’Alembert or Maupertuis.38 
While literary scholars acknowledge the importance of empirical observations 
of animals alongside their use as metaphors, and underline the closeness of naturalists 
and philosophes,39 they rarely engage directly with how the new knowledge of animals 
emerging in the Enlightenment was produced, nor how it was used to mediate between 
different areas of knowledge such as natural history and political economic pursuits 
which in the eighteenth century were inextricably linked. They are less interested, that 
is, in understanding how the overlap between different writings on animals and 
writings on humans in the Enlightenment was possible in the first place. In order to 
understand the connections between the natural and the social, we need to study texts 
from different genres and identify the common themes and objects of knowledge.  
The work of Joseph Vogl, an influential German scholar of European 
literature, provides such an attempt at analysing texts in the light of the realisation that 
eighteenth-century knowledge was produced across what we now see as different 
genres and modes of writing. In his monograph Kalkül und Leidenschaft, Vogl 
analyses the history of ‘homo economicus’ in European writings as it emerges in the 
period from the baroque to the nineteenth century with the help of a method he terms 
‘poetology of knowledge’.40 Following poststructuralist theorists such as Michel 
                                                 
38 Virginia Parker Dawson, Nature’s Enigma: The Problem of the Polyp in the Letters of Bonnet, 
Trembley and Réaumur (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987), p. 19; Gilles Bresson, 
Réaumur: le savant qui osa croiser une poule avec un lapin (Saint-Sébastien-sur-Loire: D’Orbestier, 
2001), p. 198; Pierre-Maurice Masson, Une Vie de femme au XVIIIe siècle: Mme de Tencin (1862-1749) 
(Paris: Hachette, 1909). On salon culture more generally, see Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: 
A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jolanta T. 
Pekacz, Conservative Tradition in Pre-Revolutionary France: Parisian Salon Women (Peter Lang, 
1999); Antoine Lilti, The World of the Salons: Sociability and Worldliness in Eighteenth-Century Paris 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
39 On Diderot and the natural history of Buffon, see Jacot-Grapa, ‘Des huîtres’. On Rousseau and 
botany, see Alexandra Cook, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Botany: The Salutary Science, SVEC, 
2012:12 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2012). 
40 Joseph Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft: Poetik des ökonomischen Menschen (Zurich: Diaphanes, 
2004). 
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Foucault, Vogl assumes that ‘the economic’ is not a timeless category that was 
gradually ‘discovered’ by economists, but that it was actively produced in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries across different fields of knowledge; literature, 
he argues, mediated these new economic ideas and practices. The representatives of 
Enlightenment political economy thus created not only a field of knowledge but also 
the very objects they purported to know, as well as the subjects who could know them. 
Based on this argument, Vogl’s poetology of knowledge sets out to study these new 
objects as and how they were constituted, whether in fictional or non-fictional texts. 
The term ‘poetology’ thereby emphasises that fields such as political economy or the 
natural sciences rely on literary techniques, while literary genres are capable of 
producing knowledge equivalent to that developed in other disciplines. Because 
objects of knowledge (such as ‘the economy’) have not always already existed, 
awaiting modern empiricists to discover them, Vogl argues that we need to pay 
attention not only to the objects themselves, but also to the themes, genres and figures 
of speech that subtend their descriptions. Knowledge becomes less about what is 
explicitly said than about themes and forms, which express the values and codes of a 
given time and place, or what Vogl calls a ‘substrate’ or ‘milieu’ of knowledge. 
Because knowledge is less about the ‘scientific truth-value’ of a proposition, fictional 
and scientific or political economic texts equally produce and represent knowledge, 
although this does not mean, of course, that they produce it in identical ways or that 
literary text always confirm or agree with the knowledge produced by other genres. 
As a consequence, this approach allows the crossing of modern disciplinary 
boundaries; Vogl himself studies a wide range of genres, from baroque plays to 
cameralist treatises from different European countries. While most studies in what has 
been called ‘literary economic anthropology’ using an approach similar to Vogl’s have 
focused on different episodes of German nineteenth-century history, they share the 
common assumption that all genres can contribute to the production of economic 
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knowledge.41 These works, by showing how (economic) knowledge can be produced 
in different fields, provide an inspiration also to think about knowledge of the ‘animal’.  
First, however, to make sense of the way in which animals connected different 
spheres of knowledge in the eighteenth century, we need to turn to the histories of 
disciplines which were directly concerned with the production of knowledge and 
categories to represent society 
 
3. The Cultural History of Knowledge: Eighteenth-Century Intersections 
Between Natural History, Medicine and Political Economy  
The second half of the twentieth century saw fundamental methodological changes not 
only in literary scholarship, but also in the way that historians of science, medicine 
and political economy thought about the production of knowledge. Most importantly, 
a number of historians have convincingly demonstrated that eighteenth-century 
naturalists were not ‘merely’ studying nature, for at the time the study of nature was 
always simultaneously a study of human society. The inverse logic applied to 
eighteenth-century political economists, who understood the ‘oeconomy’ of nature 
and the ‘oeconomy’ of society to be inseparable from one another. The extensive 
literature historicising the eighteenth-century intersections between natural history, 
medicine and political economy is another important pillar of this thesis.  
Partly as a result of the influence of poststructuralist theories traced above, 
partly as a result of new methodological and theoretical approaches on knowledge 
                                                 
41 Poetology of knowledge has heavily influenced the study of German literature; works sharing Vogl’s 
approach have focused above all on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; see, for example,  Manuel 
Bauer, Ökonomische Menschen: Literarische Wirtschaftsanthropologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, 1st edn 
(Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016); Alexander Košenina, Literarische Anthropologie: Die 
Neuentdeckung des Menschen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016); Ökonomie des Glücks. Muße, Müßiggang 
und Faulheit in der Literatur, ed. by Mirko Gemmel and Claudia Löschner (Berlin: Ripperger & 
Kremers, 2014); Rüdiger Campe, The Game of Probability: Literature and Calculation from Pascal to 
Kleist, trans. by Ellwood H. Wiggins Jr. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013); 
Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek, ‘Vom Grübeln: Ein Beitrag Zur »Poetologie Des Wissens«’, 
KulturPoetik, 10.2 (2010), 264–75; Petra Renneke, Poesie Und Wissen: Poetologie Des Wissens Der 
Moderne, Beiträge Zur Neueren Literaturgeschichte ;Bd. 261 (Heidelberg: Winter, 2008); Fritz 
Breithaupt, ‘Urszenen Der Ökonomie’, in Singularitäten, ed. by Marianne Schuller and Elisabeth 
Strowick (Freiburg: Rombach, 2001), pp. 185–205; Joseph Vogl, Poetologien des Wissens um 1800 
(Fink, 1999). 
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production from within the history of science and medicine and partly as a result of 
new developments in scientific research itself, historians of science and medicine 
began to abandon the view of the sciences of the past as the work of ‘great men’. With 
the so-called ‘cultural turn’ of the 1980s, historians of science and medicine set out to 
rewrite the history of Enlightenment. One of the most important results of the cultural 
turn for this thesis was the shift of focus away from the ‘hard’ sciences (such as physics 
or mathematics), the traditional subjects of historians of science, to the ‘soft sciences’ 
such as chemistry and, crucially, the life sciences. The essays published in the 
collection Cultures of Natural History (1996) marked a turning point in this regard, as 
they not only made visible the latest works in this new area but also underlined the 
crucial importance of a field which had become, from the 1960s onwards, one of the 
most successful scientific disciplines: the life sciences.42  
In restoring natural history from the sixteenth to the twentieth century to the 
historical and geographical contexts in which it was practised, Cultures of Natural 
History brought to fruition a number of developments and influences. These incldued the 
work on the production of scientific knowledge by the philosopher, physicist and historian 
of science Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996); of French philosopher Michel Foucault the 
overall ordering grids of knowledge (theories, rules and principles, values and morals, 
for example) in Les mots et les choses (1966); and of anthropologists such as Clifford 
Geertz (1926-2006).  
Because of the influence of these different methodological traditions, scientific 
and medical knowledge was no longer seen as neutral or universal but as a reflection 
of the wider concerns of a given society; science and society were no longer seen as 
autonomous spheres, but as inextricably entangled with one another. The focus of 
Cultures of Natural History, accordingly, was less on the merits or achievements of 
past naturalists, than on their material, social, literary, bodily and even sartorial 
practices, with the aim of showing, in the editors’ words, ‘how various are the 
frameworks that have structured and informed natural historians’ dealings with nature, 
                                                 
42 N. Jardine, J. A. Secord, and E. C. Spary, Cultures of Natural History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
 19 
 
how the boundaries between the natural and the conventional, artificial and social have 
been continually contested and relocated’.43  
Scientific and medical thinking and practices as a contested, changing space 
has been also underlined by the medical historian Roy Porter and literary and literary 
historian George S. Rousseau.44 They have remarked on the subject of eighteenth-
century science and medicine in general, the overlap between different fields of 
knowledge before the nineteenth century makes it almost impossible to translate them 
into our modern scientific disciplines.45 Self-proclaimed naturalists thus studied 
subjects as diverse as shells, insects, antique artefacts or even, in the case of David 
Hume, religions.46 Some focused their energies on developing systems of classification 
that could encompass the entire world (most famous among them was, of course the 
Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778));47 others, like Réaumur, understood 
their task to be attentive observation and detailed descriptions;48 others again, like 
Dezallier d’Argenville, collected naturalia according to mainly aesthetic and 
commercial criteria.49 The diverse concerns uniting those we now classify as 
naturalists, medical writers or political economists have recently been subsumed under 
the heading of ‘useful knowledge’.50 Historians of economics as well historians of 
                                                 
43 Jardine et al, Cultures, p. 12. 
44 G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, eds. The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of 
Eighteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
45 G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, ‘Introduction’, in The Ferment of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), pp. 6–7. 
46 Rhoda Rappaport, ‘The Earth Sciences’, in The Cambridge History of Science Volume 4: Eighteenth-
Century Science, ed. by Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 417–35 (pp. 
417–18). 
47 Lisbet Koerner, Linnaeus: Nature and Nation (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
48 Lorraine Daston, ‘Attention and the Values of Nature in the Enlightenment’, in The Moral Authority 
of Nature (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 100–126. 
49 Bettina Dietz, ‘Mobile Objects: The Space of Shells in Eighteenth-Century France’, The British 
Journal for the History of Science, 39.3 (2006), 363–82. 
50 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); See also the responses to Mokyr collected in Maxine Berg, ‘The Genesis of 
“Useful Knowledge”’, History of Science, 45 (2007), 123–133; Liliane Hilaire-Pérez, ‘Technology as 
a Public Culture in the Eighteenth Century: The Artisans’ Legacy’, History of Science, 45.2 (2007), 
135–53; Larry Stewart, ‘Experimental Spaces and the Knowledge Economy’, History of Science, 45.2 
(2007), 155–77; Kristine Bruland, ‘Technology Selection and Useful Knowledge: A Comment’, 
History of Science, 45.2 (2007), 179–83; Joel Mokyr, ‘Knowledge, Enlightenment, and the Industrial 
Revolution: Reflections on The Gifts of Athena’, History of Science, 45.2 (2007), 185–96; Margaret C. 
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science or technology have thus argued that savants and other agents such as artisans 
were engaged in the production not just of knowledge, but of ‘useful knowledge’, that 
is in the production of knowledge of manipulable and useable natural objects as well 
as in the invention and application of new technologies. While the economic historian 
Joel Mokyr defines ‘useful knowledge’ as knowledge that has the potential to create 
new technologies, historians of natural history have taken a broader view, linking it to 
global commerce. Medicine, unlike natural history, was a long-established university 
subject leading to one the three traditional professions (with law and theology) and 
with its own university faculties, textbooks and curricula.51 Nevertheless, as historians 
have shown, there were many overlaps with natural history and medical experts were 
similarly engaged in the production of ‘useful knowledge’. Many naturalists had 
originally trained as doctors; Linnaeus, for instance, had written his dissertation on 
malaria, and Bernard de Jussieu was a physician before he became an influential 
botanist.52 Botany, in particular, was part of the medical curriculum, as well as serving 
increase the kingdom’s riches through, for example, the introduction of new 
specimens. As Emma Spary has shown, medicine and natural history (as well as 
agriculture) shared a concern with improving, or critiquing, France’s political 
economy, and their practitioners were involved in various national projects of 
improvement both before and after the Revolution.53 The overlaps between different 
fields of knowledge is evident also, as Spary has argued in her study on the Jardin du 
roi, at the level of institutions. The concern with improvement, and the relationship 
between medicine and natural history is exemplified, as Spary shows, in the history of 
the Jardin, transformed by Buffon from a medical garden used to train physicians and 
apothecaries into a fully-fledged natural historical institution.54  
                                                 
Jacob, ‘Mechanical Science on the Factory Floor: The Early Industrial Revolution in Leeds’, History 
of Science, 45.2 (2007), 197–221. 
51 Good overviews are Thomas Broman, ‘The Medical Sciences’, in The Cambridge History of Science, 
ed. by Roy Porter, Cambridge Histories Online (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 
463–84; L. W. B. Brockliss and Colin Jones, The Medical World of Early Modern France (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997). 
52 Spary, Utopia’s Garden, p. 20. 
53 Spary, Utopia’s Garden, p. 8. See also Gillispie, Science and Polity. 
54 Spary, Utopia’s Garden. 
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These studies of natural history and medicine, emphasising the fluidity and 
flexibility of scientific/medical identities in the seventeenth and eighteenth century not 
only demonstrated that their practitioners should not be compared with the laboratory-
based and specialised ‘scientists’ of later ages. They have also shown that they were 
contributing to another, then emerging field of knowledge: political economy. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this field aimed to contribute to the wealth and 
order of their societies and what political economists, then called ‘the happiness’ of 
their people. The concern of Enlightenment savants with increasing the prosperity of 
their state thus clearly united writings on political economic and on natural historic 
matters.55 As the academician and most famous observer of insects Antoine Ferchault 
de Réaumur (1683-1757) put it in an unpublished memoir written in order to convince 
the monarch to increase the funds given to the Academy of Sciences: ‘[l’Académie] 
pourroit contribuer à augmenter la gloire et les richesses du royaume, si le royaume en 
revanche donnoit une subsistence honneste à ceux qui travaillent utillement’.56 
Knowledge, Réaumur claimed, or at least the knowledge produced by well-paid 
academicians, would increase the wealth and prosperity of the state.57 The spheres of 
knowledge of nature and knowledge of government were not, in other words, distinct 
in eighteenth-century France. Hence, in order to fully understand the enlightened 
pursuit of knowledge, we also need to understand how it intersected, or overlapped 
with, political and economic concerns.   
Historians of economics have long been interested in this area of eighteenth 
century knowledge, often interpreting some of the developments as the beginning of 
modern individual-based economic thinking. The Austrian-born American economist 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), for instance, in his influential and exhaustive History 
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of Economic Analysis (1954), attempts to track ‘the filiation of ideas’ from the past to 
the present, thus judging the writings of Adam Smith or François Quesnay according 
to their contributions to the development of modern liberal economic theory.58 Most 
studies in the history of political economy of the first half of the twentieth century 
sought to understand the contribution – or failure to contribute – of ‘mercantilist’ and 
‘cameralist’ state economic thinking to the rise of the modern administrative and fiscal 
state during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.59 While they disagreed as to 
whether these two groups of writers, mainly in Germany and France, were merely 
mouthpieces or puppets for economic formulating theories in support of their 
absolutist governments, or whether they followed an independent and more 
entrepreneurial agenda as independent advisors on how to achieve happiness for the 
people, these scholars agreed that the central question in regard to these economic 
theories revolves around their contribution to the rise of the modern state and its 
administrative and bureaucratic apparatus.60  
Influenced by the culture turn of the 1980s, however, historians of economics 
too increasingly abandoned the study of ‘great economists’ and their contributions to 
the ‘progress’ of economics and of the nation-state. Keith Tribe, in his influential 
history of the works German Cameralists, for example, argued that these were not, as 
previous historians had claimed, straightforward instructors for the administrations of 
rising states. Tribe, instead, pays close attention to the discursive strategies and 
concepts used by the Cameralists in order to construct the idea economic order. 
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Expanding his analysis to other European countries, Tribe has thus begun to seriously 
historicise the notion of the ‘economy’. He demonstrates that the concept as we 
understand it now would have made little sense to seventeenth- or eighteenth-century 
political economists, who did not separate ‘politics’, or theories of good government, 
and ‘economics’ as the production and distribution of wealth.61 As Tribe has shown, 
the notion of ‘oeconomy’ was in a period of transition during the course of the 
eighteenth century.62 It no longer merely referred to the Aristotelian notion of 
oikonomia, understood as the art of managing the people and objects of a household 
and sometimes also used as a model for the regulation of the royal household. At the 
same time, however, the term did not yet refer to the ‘economy’ as we understand it 
now, that is, as an autonomous system based on exchange of goods and capital. While 
political economists thus treated subjects that we now categorise as belonging to 
‘economics’, they did so without having the notion of an overarching system existing 
separately from the natural world. In eighteenth-century France, of course, the most 
famous formulation of a system of political economy was that of the physiocrats. 
Earlier historians of economics, such as the already mentioned Schumpeter or the 
Marxist Ronald Meek,63 considered them as early theorists of liberal industrial 
capitalism, writing at a time when the modern nation-state was in the process of being 
born.64 More recently, scholars have attempted to place the physiocrats in their cultural 
context, rather than view them as precursors to the capitalist ideology or classical 
                                                 
61 Keith Tribe, The Economy of the Word: Language, History, and Economics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015); Keith Tribe, ‘Continental Political Economy From the Physiocrats to the 
Marginal Revolution’, in The Cambridge History of Science Volume 7: The Modern Social Sciences, 
ed. by Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 154–
70; Keith Tribe, Land, Labour and Economic Discourse (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 
Other important studies historicising the concept of ‘the economy’ or ‘mercantilism’ include 
Finkelstein, Harmony and Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
62 For a concise overview of the history of the term, see Tribe, Economy of the Word, chapter 2: ‘The 
Word: Economy’, pp. 21-88. 
63 Ronald L. Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations, 2 vols (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1963). 
64 In addition to Schumpeter, History; and Meek, Economics see also Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The 
Origins of Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Cornell 
University Press, 1976). 
 24 
 
economics.65 Historians have thus underlined that they had no conception of the 
‘economy’ as a product of human labour or institutions, stressing instead the roles of 
‘nature’, God, and the feudal order in their theories.66 For the physiocrats, wealth was 
the ‘natural’ product of the land, recurring every year as long as human agents heeded 
to the natural order created by God. This explains their claim – puzzling to those who 
seek to understand physiocracy from the vantage point of modern economic science – 
that agriculture is the only productive sector. Despite his critique of the physiocrats’ 
emphasis on agriculture, as historians have recently shown, Adam Smith’s view of 
political economy was also closely tied to notions of natural bodies and their moral 
economies. Catherine Packham has thus argued, for example, that Smith owed a great 
deal to new physiological theories of the human body.67 Combining the argument that 
pre-nineteenth-century political economy encompassed not distinct spheres, but all 
aspects of ‘economic life’ with the new attention paid by cultural historians to 
sentiment and sensibility, Emma Rothschild has argued for the importance of moral 
sentiments in all of Smith’s works, not just his moral philosophy.68 Most importantly 
for the purposes of this dissertation, Margaret Schabas has investigated the 
particularity of ‘classical political economy’ by studying its close connection to nature 
and her laws.69 Building on Foucault’s claim in Les mots et les choses that political 
economy ‘invented’ new categories in the early nineteenth century,70 she thus 
demonstrates that ‘until the mid-nineteenth century, economic theorists regarded the 
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phenomena of their discourse as part of the same natural world studied by natural 
philosophers.’71  
An important attempt to overcome modern disciplinary boundaries and study 
eighteenth-century savants in the light of their own concerns is the publication in 2003 
of a collected volume in the journal History of Political Economy on the intersections 
between natural history and political economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. This volume brought together some of the scholars of early-modern science 
who had studied the contribution of natural history to European and colonial 
commerce, as well as historians of political economy.72 The essays collected in the 
volume argue for a ‘double seepage’ between ‘political economy and physiology, or 
botanical oeconomy, public benessere, or mineral riches’.73 Building on Foucault and 
Tribe’s work on eighteenth-century political economy and its reliance on natural 
resources,74 the essays are linked by the idea that natural history came to be seen as 
useful for generating ‘wealth’ – increasingly understood also as including natural 
resources – for the state, while political economic considerations came to define the 
study of nature.  
Influenced by the rapid globalisation of markets and the economic expansion 
of the 1990s and 2000s, historians turned to studying the increasingly global networks 
of commerce in the eighteenth century, an age that saw both the creation and exchange 
of new commodities and efforts to form and expand European empire. Staffan Müller-
Wille, for example, argues that Linnaeus’ science of classification arose from the need 
to name plants so that they could then be exchanged in the global commodities trade.75 
The essays collected in History of Political Economy were thus at the forefront of a 
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series of historiographical trends: a focus on commercial exchange, on the global 
connections spun by European naturalists, and on practices such as observation and 
collection; their emphases enabled contributors to see continuities on the level of 
practices that had remained invisible in more traditional histories focused purely on 
ideas. Harold Cook, in a monograph that also exemplifies these trends, has argued that 
the emergence of global trade was an important stimulant for the rise of natural history 
since it was able to produce what Cook calls ‘matters of fact’ – natural objects that 
could be not only known but also profitably exchanged and which could supposedly 
circulate around the globe without needing translation.76   
Most recent studies on the links between natural history and political economy, 
including contributions to the 2003 issue of History of Political Economy, focus on 
botany. Partly, this is also justified by the interests of the eighteenth-century savants 
themselves. Foucault had already argued that the goal of eighteenth-century savants 
was to reduce the gap between words and things by naming them and thus making 
them visible.77 More recently, this emphasis on the visible structure of ‘things’ – or 
‘matters of fact’ – has been linked to the goal of commercial and imperial expansion 
and the values of the ever-more prosperous merchants and financiers.78 This is 
particularly true of the man who, at least since Foucault made the case in The Order 
of Things for the connection between natural history and political economy as related 
by their tendency to classify, has been the most intensely studied eighteenth-century 
naturalist: the Swedish savant Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778). In her influential studies of 
Linnaeus’ project of classifying the entire natural world, Lisbet Koerner (Rausing) has 
persuasively argued for a close interrelation between his natural history and his 
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political-economic model of a cameralist society based on self-sufficiency.79 Though 
Linnaeus did write on insects too, he did so mostly in relation to the plants they fed 
on; as he asserted, ‘The knowledge of plants is the basis of all oeconomie.’80 Botany, 
according to Koerner, was crucial to Linnaeus’ vision of the political organisation of 
Sweden, as the knowledge it provided could help discover and acclimatise new plants 
or improve crop yields.81 For Linnaeus, natural history and political economy were 
closely linked; both were, he wrote, the most essential of all the sciences ‘since all 
people’s well-being is based on it’.82 Natural history, for Linnaeus, meant above all 
exploitation of resources for the benefit of the state.83 For the French context, Emma 
Spary has shown how botanists, often directly sponsored by the Crown, promoted their 
science as a means to efficiently manage and increase the natural resources of their 
country.84 They worked to acclimatise exotic plants if they had medicinal value or 
could be used as foodstuff, thus successfully establishing themselves as useful and 
necessary contributors to royal power from the early decades of the eighteenth century 
onwards. 
Building on recent histories of political economy, this dissertation treats 
eighteenth-century political economy as the knowledge of how to govern the body 
politic conceived of as a whole that is more than the sum of its (interrelated) parts. 
This definition of the body politic applied to natural bodies too, of course; as we will 
see in more detail in chapter three, investigations of the natural bodies of insects also 
pursued the question of how the body’s interrelated parts could form (new) wholes. 
As we will see in chapter four, one increasingly common conception of the body 
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politic was that of the population, a body of people living on, and interacting, with a 
given territory, the natural laws which need to be respected and managed.  
Due to this new conception of scientific knowledge and the inclusion of new 
actors in the production of knowledge, several historians of science and medicine have 
recently investigated seventeenth- and eighteenth-century research on animals, 
focusing on experimental and observational practices. Anita Guerrini, for instance, has 
argued for the importance of anatomical work in the early years of the Academy of 
Science in Paris to demonstrate the importance of (dead) animal bodies in the 
development of experimental science.85 Insects, too, feature in recent works on 
Enlightenment natural history. Brian Ogilvie, in a series of essays, has shown how 
both artists and naturalists became interested in insects in the period between the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment; through their observations and descriptions of 
insects, they developed, Ogilvie shows, new methods for knowledge production. 86 
Attempts to make sense of and discover an order among the immense variety of ‘little 
animals’, as many of the early modern and Enlightenment naturalists discussed by 
Ogilvie called them, eventually led to the formation of entomology as a discipline in 
the early nineteenth century.87 In her cultural biography of Réaumur, Mary Terrall 
reconstructs the practices of observation used and developed by eighteenth-century 
naturalists as they struggled to understand animal life.88 Marc Ratcliff has 
reconstructed the history of eighteenth-century microscopy, much of which relied on 
insects (or at least on the tiny creatures that were then classified as such).89  
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In sum, these works have made it very clear that eighteenth-century naturalists 
were not ‘merely’ studying nature; the study of nature was always, simultaneously, a 
study of human society. The same is true for political economists who, as Schabas has 
shown, understood the oeconomy of nature and the oeconomy of society to be 
inseparable from one another. As Spary demonstrates in her contribution to Cultures 
of Natural History, the concept of the ‘oeconomy’ linked investigations of animal, 
plant and human bodies, with the wider conceptualisation of ‘nature’ as well as of 
society.90 The study of natural bodies was thus used to understand and illustrate 
different versions of the social body. While more conservative savants explored the 
intricate structures of living beings or Newtonian forces such as electricity or gravity, 
to prove God’s handicraft and ordering of both the natural and social worlds, others 
produced provocative accounts of natural bodies based solely on physical laws. 
Natural historians were concerned, too, with change; they thus looked to animals to 
discover ‘natural man’ untainted by social mores. This, in turn, led to a concern with 
how human individual and social bodies could be changed and improved.    
 
4. The Concept of Population: An Example of a Bridging Concept 
Echoing the insights of historians of science and medicine on the shifting boundaries 
of disciplinary knowledge, historians as well as literary scholars have investigated 
practices, ideas or metaphors that touch on several fields. Literary historian Anne Vila, 
for instance, has argued that ‘sensibility’ functioned as a ‘bridging concept’ during the 
Enlightenment. Eighteenth-century bridging concepts, according to Vila, ‘blended 
biological, psychological, and social interests’, and, in the case of sensibility at least, 
‘created intriguing alignments between diverse discursive fields – for example, 
philosophical medicine and the philosophical novel’.91 Joseph Vogl, in his reflection 
on the emergence of ‘homo economicus’, has identified ‘population’ as an object of 
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knowledge – or, we might say, a bridging concept – that lies at the heart of several 
eighteenth-century fields of knowledge, from political economy, to the life sciences, 
to medicine.92 The concept of ‘population’, of particular importance in the second half 
of this dissertation, constitutes a good example of the ways in which eighteenth 
century fields of knowledge traverse contemporary disciplinary boundaries and of the 
way in which scholars have dealt with this problem. 
Vogl’s insights into the concept of ‘population’ follow Foucault’s important 
lectures only recently published in English as Security, Territory, Population.93 
Foucault argued that the concept of the ‘population’ as we understand now emerged 
in the late seventeenth century as both an object of knowledge and of political power. 
Foucault theorised this shift as a shift from ‘sovereign power’ to ‘biopower’; he argued 
that older technologies of government based on sovereign power and thus the right of 
the ruler to determine the details of his subjects’ lives (and, in extreme cases, to decide 
their death) was replaced by a theory and practice of government based on the ‘natural’ 
body of the population.94 This natural body designated a specific kind of collective, 
defined not by, say, a social contract or a feudal hierarchy, but by its ‘naturalness’; the 
population, Foucault argued, was no longer considered simply a collection of people 
who had to obey the sovereign, but a collection of bodies with their own desires and 
their own natural laws. The ‘discovery’ of the population in this period was essential 
to allow for a transition from older forms of governmental rule (based on the power of 
the sovereign) to modern liberal forms which target the biological life of subjects 
through individual disciplinary measures. At the same time, through various new 
regulatory technologies – the rise of statistics being the most obvious one – this 
disciplined individual is bound to a collective whole in need of constant observation, 
adjustment and regulations.95 The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ‘discoverers’ 
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of the population were aware, of course, that individuals differed from one another in 
significant ways; however, Foucault argues, they identified one constant that united 
all individual subjects: desire, understood as the individual’s pursuit of self-interest 
rather than as the mark of spiritual corruption.96 Desire – or what eighteenth-century 
writers called the passions – came to be seen as a ‘natural’, and inevitable, constituent 
factor of the human being; if the sovereign ensured that this desire could be played 
out, it would ‘naturally’ lead to the production of the collective interest. While desire 
itself was a natural given, the techniques governments adopted in order to allow for 
the productive, free play of desire were not. For Foucault, this notion of the naturalness 
of desire (and of the population) gave rise to a notion of government that was radically 
new. Whereas the sovereign according to the old ‘ethico-juridical’ conception was 
seen to have to supress the passions, now the task of government was to allow the 
passions to be channelled in productive ways. 
Foucault’s approach to population seen as concept contrasts with the works of 
scholars who seek to understand the reasons for the so-called ‘demographic 
revolution;’ of the eighteenth century. In contrast to Foucault and those who follow 
his understanding of ‘population’ (which is part of his theory of biopower) as a 
problem and technology of new form of government during the eighteenth century, 
much scholarship has taken the notion of ‘population’ as given. Demography – a 
discipline which only emerged through the acceptance of population as a ‘natural’ 
concept – is a case in point here. Thus, (mostly French) historical demographers apply 
the methods of modern demography to study populations of the past, calculating the 
size of the population in the eighteenth century.97 Other scholars seeking the reasons 
for eighteenth-century population growth are more accurately described as historians 
of demography, such as James C. Riley who concludes his study on Population 
Thought in the Age of the Demographic Revolution (1985) by proposing that a new 
emphasis on the part of eighteenth-century ‘demographers’ and physicians on people’s 
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environment led to reduced mortality and new attitudes towards nuptiality and 
fertility.98  
Historians of eighteenth-century thought and literary scholars, influenced by 
the cultural turn, have begun to focus not on empirical reasons for population growth, 
but on what for eighteenth-century observers themselves was the central problem of 
their century: depopulation. As Sylvana Tomaselli remarked in an essay on the views 
of Hume and Montesquieu on population growth and decline, population ‘impinges 
on nearly every important aspect of the Enlightenment's evaluation of the morality, 
manners, and mores of the Ancien Régime and of modern commercial society more 
generally speaking.’99 Even though historical demographers have since demonstrated 
that France’s populations number actually increased over the course of the century, 
philosophes, state administrators and other thinkers were convinced that the French 
population was in decline, which they associated with a decline in France’s prosperity 
as a whole. As literary scholar Carol Blum has shown, these thinkers deplored, often 
in fictional form, what they considered France’s fatally flawed policies in areas such 
as marriage and fertility, blaming, for instance, the Church’s celibacy laws for the 
country’s assumed depopulation.100  
Both historical demographers and historians of ideas as well as literary 
scholars agree that one area where knowledge of populations was both developed and 
applied was medicine. Historians of medicine have thus investigated how doctors’ care 
for the health and longevity of individual bodies developed into what we now know 
as public health: medicine turned from caring for (often privileged) individual bodies 
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122. See also the older account of Joseph John Spengler, French Predecessors of Malthus: A Study in 
Eighteenth-Century Wage and Population Theory (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1942). 
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100 Blum, Strength ; Tomaselli, ‘Moral Philosophy’.. 
 33 
 
to a concern with the population and all its strata.101 As Sean Quinlan has shown in 
particular, the issue of depopulation greatly concerned medical writers, as they became 
convinced that population growth would lead to increased national wealth and the 
well-being of its inhabitants.102 Physicians viewed health and sickness no longer just 
as a matter of individual constitution, and began to turn to what we now call 
demography in order to understand the condition of the body politic.103 
Historians of science have focused also on the development of statistical 
methods for counting populations.104 Andrea Rusnock, for instance, has analysed the 
development of numerical methods for counting populations in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century France and England. On the basis of her discussion of the 
comparative development of medical and political statistics, developed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as ‘political arithmetic’, she thus argues that ‘the 
modern concept of the population and its measurement were mutually constitutive.’105 
Eric Brian, in a monograph focusing primarily on Condorcet, has shown how 
mathematicians working at the Academy of Sciences in the late eighteenth century 
                                                 
101 Useful overviews of the historiography of population health can be found in Dorothy Porter, Health, 
Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health from Ancient to Modern Times (London: 
Routledge, 1999), especially 1-8; Olivier Faure, ‘The Social History of Health in France: A Survey of 
Recent Developments’, Social History of Medicine, 3.3 (1990), 437–451. 
102 Quinlan, Great Nation.  
103 Riley, Population. 
104 In addition to Rusnock’s work, quoted above, see Ted McCormick, ‘Population’, in Mercantilism 
Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire, ed. by Philip J. Stern and Carl 
Wennerlind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 25–45; Jean-Marc Rohrbasser, ‘Comment 
compter la population ? La méthode du multiplicateur aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles’, Population et 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 343–61; Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability 
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‘Towards the History of the Origins of Statistics: France, 1789-1815’, in State and Society in France, 
1789-1815, ed. by Stuart J. Woolfe and Jean-Claude Perrot (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1984); Fernand Faure, ‘The Development and Progress of Statistics in France’, in The History of 
Statistics: Memoirs to Commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the American Statistical Society (New 
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developed methods that could be used to count populations. Particularly when 
compared to modern demographers, however, eighteenth-century thinkers were rather 
uninterested in counting people, a preoccupation that would develop more fully in the 
nineteenth century.106 As scholars have shown, in the period that concerns us here, 
writers struggled to define the concept, as much as to develop numerical methods for 
representing it; the ‘population’ was not a given, but a concept that was constructed in 
the Enlightenment across different fields of knowledge and practices. 
While historians of science and medicine have analysed the importance of 
mathematical methods for population statistics, this dissertation looks at strategies for 
governing living bodies, rather than the submissive souls found in pre-Enlightenment 
treatises on the politics of absolutism.107 The notion of the population was, however, 
still new and rather abstract in the eighteenth century. Writers and readers were still 
struggling to fill it with meaning and put it into practice. Social insects were 
particularly useful for this endeavour, as they appeared in large groups that, as in the 
case of harmful pests or useful bees, often proved challenging to control. Ideas about 
government of collectives, as well as the notion of population, once it became current 
in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, belong to what we would now 
consider political economy, but in the period of the Enlightenment they were not 
confined to writings that might be classified as such. This does not mean that political 
economists were necessarily indebted to observers of insects or that one field exerted 
a linear influence on the other; rather, by looking at the question of population in texts 
where they are not commonly sought, we can identify a common set of concerns that 
transcend modern disciplinary boundaries.  
 
5. Paramaters of the Study 
                                                 
106 Philip Kreager, ‘Population and the Making of the Human Sciences: A Historical Outline’, in 
Population in the Human Sciences : Concepts, Models, Evidence, ed. by Philip Kreager and others 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 55–85 (pp. 59–60). 
107 A good overview is given by Peter R. Campbell, ‘Absolute Monarchy’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
the Ancien Régime, ed. by William Doyle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 11–28. 
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Building on the literatures outlined above, this dissertation argues that ‘insects’, 
understood in the vague eighteenth-century definition given by Réaumur and 
eighteenth-century dictionary entries, provided a crucial lens through which 
Enlightenment savants could reimagine and represent their societies. The 
understanding of the functioning of their individual bodies, the close observation of 
their collective behaviour, and its manipulation and management, helped eighteenth-
century scholars, I argue, to conceptualise, and root in nature, their social orders and 
the changes that they wished to see in them. 
I take from scholars in human-animal studies the assertion that animals have 
had a special role to play in the understanding of human individual and collective self-
definition because they seem both very distant and strangely close to us. At a time 
when the functioning of the physical body, and its passions, was increasingly taken to 
be the foundation for human individual and collective identity, writers frequently 
observed, described and represented animal bodies in order to understand the workings 
of their own societies. The Enlightenment was a period of intense discussions around 
the nature of animals, and their differences from and similarities to humans.108 As 
Cartesian, mechanist conceptions of animals as well as older Scholastic models, based 
on the powers of the soul, lost their validity, thinkers struggled to understand what 
made a living being different from the non-living, and what distinguished man from 
other living creatures. These debates on animals in general and insects in particular, 
as the chapters that follow will demonstrate, were an important arena for thinking 
through hotly contested notions of human nature and how it should be organised in the 
collective. While insect collectives such as bee swarms or ant colonies that had long 
been used to metaphorically model human societies, in the eighteenth century, these 
metaphors were reformulated and given an empirical basis. As historians of science 
have recently pointed out, insects were a particularly popular object of investigation; 
these scholars have thus shown that these small animals played an important role in 
the development of new scientific empirical methods.  
                                                 
108 Guerrini, Courtiers’ Anatomist; Berchtold and Guichet, ‘L’animal’; Brown, Homeless Dogs; 
Cheung, ‘Transitions’; Ridley, ‘Animals’; Senior, ‘Soul’. 
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Though this thesis is greatly indebted to these studies, its focus is different. 
Anatomy, microscopy or even the experiments on, for example, the mating patterns of 
frogs described by Terrall account for individual animal bodies. Instead, this 
dissertation discusses how observations of animals were used to not only understand 
particular bodies, but also how these bodies came to form collectives that could be 
managed and regulated so as to prosper. Hence, its focus on what we now understand 
as ‘social’ insects, and bees in particular: no other insect was more obsessively used 
to think through and represent collective behaviours. Other insects were either 
observed or used as figures of thought in the eighteenth century. The thesis offers 
selective readings of texts and groups of texts concerned with insect life in order to 
show how they related to the broader concern with knowledge, and government, of 
human individuals and collectives. In doing so, it sheds light on both the history of 
animals in the Enlightenment and on concerns with redefining the social order.  
It is not, however, the aim of this dissertation to provide a comprehensive 
survey of all writings on insects, let alone animals, in eighteenth-century France. Such 
a history would have had to include many more species, and ‘species’ of texts, than 
could be accommodated in the space of a dissertation. Spiders, for instance, had a 
history of being used to represent the idea of the ‘world soul’ and Diderot used them 
to figure the relationship between body and brain.109 The term ‘parasite’ was used to 
refer to non-productive freeloaders before it was applied to animals (from the late 
eighteenth century onwards) and as such made memorable appearances in texts such 
as Diderot’s Neveu de Rameau.110 Silkworms, on the other hand, were important 
contributors to one of France’s (or, rather, Lyon’s) most competitive industries 
(although, as Daniel Roche has argued, consumers increasingly replaced silk with 
                                                 
109 Isabelle Moreau, ‘L’araignée dans sa toile. Mise en images de l’âme du monde de François Bernier 
et Pierre Bayle à l’Encyclopédie’, in Les Lumières en mouvement. La circulation des idées au XVIII e 
siècle, ed. by Isabelle Moreau (Paris : ENS, 2009), pp. 199–228; Roland Mortier, ‘Un Dieu-Araignée?’, 
in Enlightenment Essays in Memory of Robert Shackleton, ed. by Giles Barber and Cecil Patrick 
Courtney (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1988), pp. 223–29; Jacot Grapa, ‘Le Moi-Araignée du “Rêve 
de d’Alembert” de Diderot’. 
110 Myriam Roman and Anne Tomiche, Figures du parasite (Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires 
Blaise Pascal, 2001); Michel Serres, Le parasite (Paris: Grasset, 1980). 
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cotton).111 Unlike bees, ants or even insect pests, however, silkworms, parasitic insects 
and spiders live relatively solitary lives. Parasitism describes relations between 
individuals. Silkworms might have conceivably formed part of a complete history of 
insects’ role in eighteenth-century political economy; as Erika Mae Olbricht has 
shown, however, they were not used to figure social wholes, but rather individual, idle 
and aristocratic consumers.112 I am also not arguing that investigations of other non-
solitary animals could not be connected to the question of population or of political 
economy more broadly; a history of breeding practices aimed at improving the 
population would certainly have to include them. Domestic animals, however, do not 
appear in the large numbers that insects do, lending themselves less readily to 
population thinking. Furthermore, herd animals such as cows or sheep had very 
different literary and political connotations. As Thomas Macho analyses in detail, the 
image of the herd was extensively used in Christian writings to figure the relationship 
of the pastor with his ‘sheep’, whom he knows and cares for individually.113 In short, 
this is not a complete textual history of eighteenth-century insects; this dissertation, 
instead, gives an overview of the different ways in which insect bodies were used to 
think through the relationship between both natural and social parts and whole. Instead 
of aiming at comprehensiveness, then, I have selected texts that fulfil two criteria. The 
first criterion is that ‘social’ insects, understood insects which appear in great numbers 
and as a group, play a central. The second criterion is that political economic concerns 
– in the eighteenth-century sense of concerning the social order, wealth and prosperity 
of the body politic – can be discerned. As we shall see, these criteria apply to a range 
of texts on natural history, agronomy or literature.  
                                                 
111 Daniel Roche, The Culture of Clothing: Dress and Fashion in the Ancien Régime, trans. by Jean 
Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
112 Erika Mae Olbricht, ‘Made Without Hands’, in Insect Poetics, ed. by Eric C. Brown (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2006), pp. 223–41. 
113 See especially Thomas Macho, ‘Gute Hirten, Schlechte Hirten. Zu Einem Leitmotiv Politischer 
Zoologie’, in Politische Zoologie, ed. by Anne Von der Heiden and Joseph Vogl (Zürich: Diaphanes, 
2007), pp. 71–88; Thomas Macho, ‘Lust auf Fleisch? Kulturhistorische Überlegungen zu einem 
ambivalenten Genuss’, in Mythos Neanderthal, ed. by Dirk Matejovski, Dietmar Kamper, and Gerd-
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Given that the ‘oeconomy’ was not, like our modern ‘economy’, understood 
as an autonomous sphere, but as spanning the natural world, natural bodies as well as 
all forms of social and moral relations, both human and animal life were objects for 
those trying to and govern the ‘oeconomy’.114 This thesis shows that in the second half 
of the eighteenth century, insects, in particular the kind of insects that appeared in 
great numbers, were also thought of in terms of ‘population’, a concept that connected 
knowledge of animals and of humans in the eighteenth century. Population, in this 
dissertation, will be understood as a conceptualisation of a collective of individuals as 
an entity in itself, living on a given territory and producing its own interests and 
passions and its own patterns of birth, death, and health. Writings on insects formed 
part of this growing interest in populations, and, as this thesis shows, contributed to 
debates about how to conceptualise – and govern – large numbers of individuals living, 
moving and working in a given space. While historians of science and medicine have 
analysed the importance of mathematical methods for population statistics, this 
dissertation looks at strategies for governing living bodies, rather than the submissive 
souls found in pre-Enlightenment treatises on the politics of absolutism.115 The notion 
of the population was, however, still new and rather abstract in the eighteenth century. 
Writers and readers were still struggling to fill it with meaning and put it into practice. 
Social insects were particularly useful for this endeavour, as they appeared in large 
groups that, as in the case of harmful pests or useful bees, often proved challenging to 
control. Ideas about government of collectives, as well as the notion of population, 
once it became current in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, belong to what 
we would now consider political economy, but in the period of the Enlightenment they 
were not confined to writings that might be classified as such. This does not mean that 
political economists were necessarily indebted to observers of insects or that one field 
exerted a linear influence on the other; rather, by looking at the question of population 
                                                 
114 Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, p. 54; pp. 78-79; Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 1–21; Schabas and De Marchi; Emma 
Spary, ‘Political, Natural and Bodily Economies’. 
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in texts where they are not commonly sought, we can identify a common set of 
concerns that transcend modern disciplinary boundaries.  
 
6. Chapter Overview 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Each chapter interrogates different texts 
on insects, showing how they are concerned with not only the ‘oeconomy’ of the 
animal body, but also understandings of the human, both as an individual and in the 
collective. The chapters are arranged in rough chronological order, with texts ranging 
from the early decades of the eighteenth century to texts written in the years before 
the Revolution. The bulk of the dissertation, however, focuses on the years between 
the 1740s and the 1760s. It was then that discussions of insects were used particularly 
frequently to define the nature of animal, and, almost always simultaneously human 
nature, at a time when older definitions came under attack and newer ones were being 
formulated and debated.  
The first chapter, ‘Animal Life should be the Foundation of Laws of nature’: 
Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees and its Receptions by Emilie Du Châtelet’, 
uses perhaps the most famous eighteenth-century text to link insects, political 
economy and the role of the passions in human (and animal) life, Mandeville’s 
controversial Fable of the Bees and Emilie Du Châtelet’s translation and 
reinterpretation in order to introduce some of the dissertation’s key themes. 
Mandeville, a Dutch exile in England, and Du Châtelet, a member of the French high 
nobility, suggest two opposed conceptions of government and its relation to the 
passions which were deeply couched within the different socio-cultural, political and 
economic contexts of their authors. The chapter thus introduces the key themes of the 
dissertation: the question of what it means to be a human being, endowed with passions 
and, presumably, a rational soul; and, secondly, debates around the way in which 
politics might be based on conceptions of the body and that these questions were 
dependent on particular notions of the social existing and struggled over with at a 
particular moment in time. 
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The second chapter, ‘Animal Rationality and the Problem of Human Nature’, 
takes up the first of these concerns. It focuses on a vigorous debate that took place in 
the middle decades of the century, following a mathematician’s calculations of the 
geometry of the cells in the bee hive. This prompted naturalists and philosophers to 
openly reflect on the question of rationality: if bees could perform geometry, the most 
rational task of all, could they, too, be said to be rational? If so, what did this imply 
for humans (particularly, of course, the geometers themselves)? As we will see, this 
concern with rationality of the individual animal or human reflected debates in 
political economy, similarly concerned with defining rational, as well as sensitive, 
man.  
The third chapter, ‘Parts and Wholes in Nature and Society: Polyps and 
Swarms’ introduces the polyp, an ‘insect’ whose remarkable capacity to regenerate 
from severed parts caused a stir in the mid-century Republic of Letters, as well as the 
swarm as a new form taken on by the bee aggregate. It does so in order to explore the 
ways in which they were used to interrogate not only the individual, whether rational 
or ‘merely’ sensitive, but also the way in which particular (animal) bodies came to 
form collectives. The chapter thus continues the preceding discussion of the properties 
of the individual body (and mind), such as sensibility and rationality, in order to show 
how medical, natural historical and literary texts conceived of the way in which 
animal, human and political bodies could come to form harmonious wholes. The 
answer to the questions about insects on which the chapter focuses are not only about 
insect, but also about human bodies: how do the severed parts of the polyp come to 
form whole polyp bodies? What are the roles of sensibility and reason in the coherence 
of the body politic? Should we understand the human body as a bee swarm, with parts 
that together form a new whole, or as a hive, where each part maintains its autonomy? 
And what does this mean for the body politic?  
The fourth chapter, ‘Managing Insect Pests and Governing Human Political 
Economy: The Notion of the Population in Enlightenment France’ moves from the 
question of the constitution of natural and political bodies to the question of how to 
effectively govern them. It is here that the notion of population is introduced, since it 
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was, after all, a term and a concept that served increasingly as an instrument of 
government. The chapter compares political economic and medical discourses on what 
we would now call public health with agronomic writings on controlling insect pests. 
While historians have shown the pervasiveness of population discourse in the first two 
fields, the chapter shows that insects too were conceived of in similar terms.  
The final chapter, ‘Political Economy in Action: The Government of 
Circulation in Beekeeping Manuals, Natural History and Enlightened Agronomy’, 
returns to what were considered ‘useful’, rather than harmful insects to show how the 
concept of population (if not the term) pervaded writings on beekeeping in the second 
half of the century. The hive, as the chapter will show, was conceived of as a whole in 
which bodies and their produce ceaselessly circulated. The task of the beekeeper, 
agronomic treatises increasingly argued, was not to ‘govern’ despotically, but to 
ensure that the circuits allowing the bees to produce were never blocked. The chapter 
thus discussed the importance of ‘circulation’ for conceptions of both natural and 
political bodies. 
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Chapter One. ‘Animal Life should be the Foundation of Laws of nature’: Bernard 
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees and its Reception by Emilie Du Châtelet 
 
1. Introduction 
When discussing the relationship between eighteenth-century theories of political 
economy and the debates about the differences between humans and animals, in 
particular insects, scholars almost always refer to one text: Bernard Mandeville’s 
(1670-1733) infamous The Fable of The Bees: or, Private Vices Publick Benefits 
(1714; 1723; 1729).1 Mandeville’s poem provides one of the most influential 
expressions of a new notion of the social body and its government, one based not on 
the God-given power and will of the sovereign expressed and executed on individual 
subjects through an apparatus of laws and orders, but on the careful observation and 
management of individual and collective bodies. The satirist, an exiled Dutch 
physician who had settled in London in the 1690s, subverted the traditional image of 
loyal, virtuous and monarchical bees when he suggested that prosperity and wealth 
was not a consequence of those who virtuously acted like these insects, but rather an 
outcome of the aggregate vices of all citizens. Much has been written about both 
Mandeville’s continuation of the tradition of seventeenth-century pessimism – the idea 
that all human actions are ultimately the result of egoism and pride – as well as about 
his role as a precursor of Adam Smith and of political economic thought more 
generally. The influence of Mandeville’s medical profession on his views has also 
been pointed out: as Neil de Marchi argues, he developed a model of the legislator as 
‘physician’ to the body politic.2 Catherine Packham, in her study of vitalism across the 
physiology, literature and political economy of the long eighteenth-century, briefly 
but intriguingly suggests that Mandeville proposed a vitalist perception of the body 
politic as a ‘Living Creature’.’3  
This chapter takes Mandeville’s notorious poem as a starting point for an 
investigation into the connections between animal, human and political bodies. While 
philosopher John Callanan has recently underlined the centrality of animals in 
                                                 
1 All citations are from the following edition, unless stated otherwise: Bernard Mandeville, The Fable 
of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits. With a Commentary Critical, Historical, and 
Explanatory, ed. by F. B. Kaye, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). 
2 Neil De Marchi and Peter Groenewegen, ‘Exposure to Strangers and Superfluities: Mandeville’s 
Regimen for Great Wealth and Foreign Treasure’, in Physicians and Political Economy (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 67–92. 
3 Packham, Vitalism, pp. 106–7. 
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Mandeville’s conception of pride – understood as the trait that distinguishes man from 
other living beings – his focus has been the poet’s philosophical sources (including 
Hobbes, Montaigne and La Rochefoucauld) rather than his conception of the animal 
body.4 As we will see, Mandeville’s comparison between men and other animals, 
crucial to understanding his work, did not sit well with his critics and readers in France, 
as it was precisely his treatment of human subjects as animal bodies that Mandeville’s 
French readers (many of whom were members of religious orders) took exception to. 
Arguing that the choice of bees as the poem’s key analogy was not accidental, 
the pages that follow explore more closely the centrality of animals in Mandeville’s 
view of both human and political bodies, and the political reasons for his negative 
reception in France, focusing on the critique mounted by Emilie Du Châtelet (1706-
1749). The chapter will offer a new interpretation of her rather free translation 
(probably undertaken between 1735 and 1738).5 So far, scholars have above all looked 
at her Fable des abeilles to ask whether female savants used translations to enter the 
male worlds of scholarly pursuits, but they have not analysed her reaction to 
Mandeville’s conception of the difference between animality and humanity.6 Though 
she was sympathetic towards some of Mandeville’s daring ideas, such as his stance in 
favour of the consumption of luxuries, the chapter argues that Du Châtelet, as a 
particularly perceptive critic of the Fable, also protested against his animalisation of 
humans. Du Châtelet, who was a privileged member of the high nobility, continued to 
view individuals as rational subjects capable of freely willed actions, who could thus 
assent to the hierarchical laws and the will of the sovereign.7 Yet, this did not mean 
that she argued for an insurmountable gap between humans and all other animals, but 
                                                 
4 John J. Callanan, ‘Mandeville on Pride and Animal Nature’, in Bernard de Mandeville’s Tropology 
of Paradoxes, ed. by Edmundo Balsemão Pires and Joaquim Braga, Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science, 40 (Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing, 2015), pp. 125–36. 
5 Ira O. Wade, Studies on Voltaire with Some Unpublished Papers of Mme Du Châtelet (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1967), pp. 131–87. On eighteenth-century translation practices, see Evelyn L. 
Forget, ‘“At Best an Echo”: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Translation Strategies in the History 
of Economics’, History of Political Economy, 42.4 (2010), 653–77; Marie-Pascale Pieretti, ‘Women 
Writers and Translation in Eighteenth-Century France’, The French Review, 75.3 (2002), 474–88. 
6 The view has been defended by Forget, ‘An Echo’; Pieretti, ‘Women Writers’; Mary Terrall, ‘Émilie 
du Châtelet and the Gendering of Science’, History of Science, 33.3 (1995), 283–310. It has been 
contested by Judith P. Zinsser, ‘Entrepreneur of the “Republic of Letters”: Emilie de Breteuil, Marquise 
Du Châtelet, and Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees’, French Historical Studies, 25.4 (2002), 
595–624. 
7 I thus agree with Erica Harth’s argument that Du Châtelet’s embrace of ‘intellectual autonomy’ goes 
hand in hand with her ‘social and intellectual elitism’. See Erica Harth, Cartesian Women : Versions 
and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 
pp. 189–213.  
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rather that government of self and others should be predicated on understanding the 
individual as a unique mixture of passions governed by his or her reason, rather than 
as representative member of the larger political body, or ‘population’, which 
functioned independently from reason and will.8  
Mandeville’s satire and its reception across the Channel provide a window into 
two themes that will concern us in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. First, 
as the Fable’s critics both in England and in France deplored, Mandeville’s poem 
intervened in contemporary discussions about the nature of the human being as 
opposed to the animal. For Mandeville, humans in their solitary state were nothing but 
animal bodies, driven by their passions: they are ‘untaught Animals […] only 
sollicitous of pleasing themselves’.9 Thus, famously, the Anglo-Dutch physician 
claimed that even the supposed human virtues were merely masks for the desire to be 
flattered. This aspect of his text will serve as a way into some eighteenth-century 
theories of the human faculties – chiefly reason and passions – which will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter two. Second, Mandeville insisted that ‘political bodies’ could 
not be reduced to the self-interested, passionate beings that composed them, taking us 
to the individual living creature that he referred to as ‘the political bodies of civil 
societies’.10 Once individuals come together in large numbers, the new political body 
they formed took on a life of its own, enabling even the most vicious ‘private’ actions 
to be converted into ‘public benefit’, as the poem’s famous subtitle announced. The 
hive, in other words, was more than the mere aggregate of its bees. Mandeville’s 
attempt to think of the social whole as a living body composed of interdependent 
individual parts would be echoed, as we will see from chapter three onwards, in French 
writings of the mid-eighteenth-century. Like Mandeville, French naturalists and 
philosophers attempted to explain how both natural and social bodies could act as a 
harmonious unity, despite being composed of independent parts.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The first half provides some background 
to Mandeville’s work: section 2 addresses the political implications of the Fable 
within Mandeville’s own historical context and section 3 explores the importance of 
animals in Mandeville’s work, fleshing out the debates that were raging in his time 
                                                 
8 For a history of the passions, from Antiquity to the twenty-first century see Noga Arikha, Passions 
and Tempers: A History of the Humours (New York: Ecco, 2007). 
9 Mandeville, Fable I, p. 41. 
10 Mandeville, Fable I, p. iii. 
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and that his work was speaking to. The second half of the chapter will concentrate on 
the Fable’s reception. Section 4 will provide a brief sketch of Mandeville’s critics on 
both sides of the English Channel. Section 5 will concentrate on Emilie Du Châtelet’s 
response, which, it is argued, took issue in particular with the English poet’s 
reconception of the relationship between man and animal, and between human reason 
and the animal passions. 
 
2. Bee-Citizens: The Political Implications of Mandeville’s Fable 
In 1705, the Dutch physician Bernard Mandeville, who had emigrated to London in 
the late 1690s, published a long verse satire called The Grumbling Hive: Or Knaves 
turn’d honest.11 Though it went almost unnoticed by the public, this text would become 
the basis for The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, published for 
the first time in 1714 with a preface, ‘An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue’ and 
twenty prose ‘remarks’. The Fable went through several more versions: it was 
published with added prose remarks in 1723, an additional ‘Defense’ in 1724 and yet 
more comments in prose in 1728. The poem’s breakthrough, so to speak, came with 
the 1723 version, when the Middlesex Grand Jury (one of London’s two Grand Juries 
assessing whether cases were strong enough to put before trial juries) decided to 
present it to the Court of the King’s Bench as a public nuisance. The poem’s main 
thesis, as signalled in its subtitle and considered absolutely scandalous by 
Mandeville’s jurors and contemporary readers, was the idea that what was commonly 
called virtue was no more than a mask for selfish behaviour.12 Not only did 
Mandeville’s poem claim that there was no such thing as a selfless action, but it also 
suggested that the wealth and prosperity of a state depended on the egotism and greed 
of its citizens who should thus not work to restrain them. While the individuals were 
‘full of vice’, the aggregate, thanks to the framework provided by skilful governors, 
prospered: 
                                                 
11 For the Fable’s publication history and what is known about Mandeville’s biography see E. J. 
Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits. 
With a Commentary Critical, Historical, and Explanatory. 
12 Hence why Roy Porter calls Mandeville’s system ‘cynical egoism’: ‘all actually pursue selfish 
pleasure, if hypocritically denying it.’ See Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the 
Modern World (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 260. The gap between supposedly vicious behaviours and 
positive outcomes for all is referred to as ‘the Mandeville problem’ in the history of economics. See 
Marina Bianchi, ‘How to Learn Sociality: True and False Solutions to Mandeville’s Problem’, History 
of Political Economy, 25.2 (1993), 209–240. 
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This was the State’s Craft, that maintain’d 
The Whole of which each Part complain’d: 
This, as in Musick Harmony, 
Made Jarrings in the main agree;13 
 
For Mandeville, that is, the good governor does not suppress vices and passions 
(‘jarrings’), but provides a framework within which their aggregate can create 
harmony. The Fable follows the story of a prosperous hive composed of selfish, 
hypocritical but happy and rich bee-citizens who begin to listen to moralisers and 
decide to live virtuously. The result is a disaster, as many bees die and the hive is 
reduced to a small, uncivilised community; the selfish but civilised ‘spacious Hive 
well stockt with Bees’ of the first line reverts back to ‘a hollow Tree,/ Blest with 
Content and Honesty.’ Mandeville thereby, using the traditional symbolic role of bees 
as models of modesty, virtue and monarchical living, unmasked the supposedly 
virtuous behaviours of his contemporaries as hypocritical, arguing that their wealth 
and prosperity actually depended on their vices. Literary scholar William Farrell has 
argued that Mandeville used the image of the bee hive ‘to exorcise it’.14 We should be 
more precise, however: while the poet rejects the analogy’s traditional meanings, the 
bees are important because they provide an example of an aggregate of natural bodies 
which, though helpless individually, come to form a harmonious political body which 
takes on a life of its own. While traditional uses of the analogy only referred to the 
hives kept by human beekeepers, Mandeville introduced a distinction between the 
flourishing but vicious artificial hives’ and the virtuous ‘hollow Tree’ of wild bees. As 
Mandeville claimed, his contemporaries had to make a choice: either live in poverty 
and virtue, or vice and prosperity. Unlike what Christian moralists liked to believe, he 
argued, to benefit from the riches of contemporary society while claiming to live a 
virtuous life was an act of hypocrisy.15 Starting from the assumptions that human 
beings are essentially self-interested creatures driven to self-preservation and to 
                                                 
13 Mandeville, Fable I, p. 24. 
14 William J. Farrell, ‘The Role of Mandeville’s Bee Analogy in “The Grumbling Hive”’, Studies in 
English Literature, 1500-1900, 25.3 (1985), 511–27. See also Danielle Allen, ‘Burning the Fable of the 
Bees: The Incendiary Authority of Nature’, in The Moral Authority of Nature, ed. by Lorraine Daston 
and Fernando Vidal (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 74–99. 
15 See Roy Porter, Enlightenment, pp. 171–75. 
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increasing their pleasures (as Hobbes had claimed), Mandeville argued that these 
drives become harnessed into socially useful ‘vices’.16 The Earl of Shaftesbury, who 
would become his chief opponent with the 1723 edition and the addition of the essay 
‘A Search into the Nature of Society’, believed that man could ‘govern himself by his 
reason with as much ease and readiness as a good rider manages a well-taught horse 
by the bridle.’17 For Mandeville, on the contrary, solitary men were neither virtuous 
nor rational but rather ‘untaught animals [...] only solicitous of pleasing themselves’, 
which is why words such as ‘appetites’, ‘impulses’, ‘inclinations’ appear repeatedly 
throughout the explanatory notes. Neither individual men nor governors were ‘good 
riders’ controlling their horse by the bridle; harmony, for Mandeville, would only 
come about if the body, whether individual or political, could follow its impulses. Of 
course, the good governor’s task is to ensure that harmful impulses neutralise one 
another. In order to prevent sexual impulses from causing harm, for instance, 
governors invent the rules of manners and politeness to flatter the pride of men and 
women; men are allowed to give their impulses freer rein because 
 
Had equal harshness of discipline been imposed upon both, neither of them 
could have made the first advances, and propagation must have stood still 
among all the fashionable people.18 
 
The true differences between humans and animals, for Mandeville, flowed from the 
emergence of civil society and through the manipulative management of clever 
politicians harnessing people’s passions: ‘Would you render a society of men strong 
and powerful, you must touch their passions.’19 Mandeville’s poem, in other words, 
grappled with the crucial question of the relationship between individuals and the 
communities they formed (this question will be central to chapter three). The Fable 
asks, in other words, how the crowded city of London, populated by what in the 
preface (anticipating the entomological image of the Fable) is described as 
                                                 
16 Hirschman, Passions and Interests, pp. 18-19; Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason (London: Allen 
Lane, 2003), pp. 142–43. 
17 Mandeville makes his polemic with Shaftesbury explicit in his ‘A Search into the Nature of Society’, 
which he appended to the 1723 edition of the Fable; the quote is from Mandeville, ‘A Search into the 
Nature of Society,’, Fable, p. 131. On the debate between Mandeville and Shaftesbury, see Porter, 
Flesh, pp. 130-147 and Callanan, ‘Mandeville on Pride.’ Hont argues that with the 1723 edition, 
Mandeville reshaped his poem into an anti-Shaftesbury polemic; see Hont, ‘Luxury,’ p. 395. 
18 Mandeville, Fable I, pp. 70-71. 
19 Mandeville, Fable I, p. 184. 
 48 
 
‘numberless swarms of people’, could be governed in such a way as to produce 
‘felicity’.20 
Mandeville’s poem has drawn the attention of scholars from a variety fields, 
ranging from literary studies and history to anthropology and political economy. 
Literary scholar E.J. Hundert, arguing that Mandeville should be read as a truly 
‘European’ writer, has given an authoritative account of Mandeville’s (often French) 
sources and his influence on figures such as Adam Smith, Hume or Rousseau.21 
Historians have attended to the poem’s intervention in the contemporary political 
struggle in England between the factions of the Whigs and Tories.22 As Istvan Hont 
has argued, Mandeville satirised the latter in order to support the cause of the former.23 
Upon George I’s succession to the throne in 1714, the long-standing party struggle 
between Tories (supporters of Roman Catholicism and the Stuarts) and Whigs (the 
faction in support of the Hanoverian King) resolved in favour of the latter. 24 As the 
Whigs became the government party, however, they also split into two factions, one 
favourable to the government (the so-called Court Whigs) and one joining the Tories 
in the opposition (Country Whigs).25 In defence of the Court Whigs, Mandeville used 
his poem to argue that the ‘vices’ the government was accused of (particularly the 
political practices of using money and offices to influence political decisions) were, in 
fact, necessary for prosperity.26 Mandeville wrote at a time when the classical debate 
about the effects of luxury on morality was being revived and commentators worried 
about the decline of civic virtue and honour in the face of increasing wealth. As John 
Pocock has argued, defenders of the Hanoverian government claimed that wealth and 
prosperity would foster a new morality based on civility and manners.27 The Fable, of 
                                                 
20 Mandeville,‘Preface,’ Fable I, p. 11.  
21 Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable. 
22 In addition to the discussion below see, in particular, Istvan Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate 
on Commerce and Luxury’, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. by 
Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 379–418. 
23 Hont, ‘Luxury’; Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, p. 1; W. A. Speck, ‘Bernard Mandeville and the 
Middlesex Grand Jury’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 11.3 (1978), 362–74. 
24 The classic account remains J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2nd pbk. edn. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2003). See also Rachel Hammersley, The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth-Century 
France: Between the Ancients and the Moderns (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 
chapter 1 ‘Real Whigs and Huguenots: From English Republicans to British Commonwealthmen’; J. 
A. W. Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of Self-Recognition in Eighteenth-Century 
Political Thought (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), pp. 96–119. On the Middlesex 
Jury and Mandeville’s Whig involvement, see also Speck, Mandeville.  
25 Speck, Mandeville, p.363. 
26 Gunn, Beyond Liberty, p. 104. 
27 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment. 
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course, fed into this debate by arguing that defenders of civic virtue could not have it 
both ways: luxury excluded virtue. At the time when Mandeville was writing his poem, 
Britain was beginning to be perceived as one of the most commercially prosperous 
nations of Europe. Partly, the country’s success was grounded in the formation of new 
financially institutions; the Bank of England and the London Exchange had both been 
founded in the 1690s. As the new role of financial capital led to the formation of new, 
upwardly mobile and non-noble but financially successful elites whose wealth relied 
on mobile capital rather than on land, it has been argued that Mandeville’s poem 
offered a new morality to subtend these new power hierarchies.28 As Istvan Hont has 
shown, the poem served as a defence of the post-1688 regime against the Stuart 
contender to the throne who, it was thought, would introduce precisely the kind of 
anti-luxury measures that lead to the downfall of Mandeville’s hive.29 By contrast, the  
Middlesex Grand Jury, in its condemnation of the poem, argued on the basis of ‘Old 
Whig’ principles, or what scholars have described as ‘civic humanism’.30 Thus, 
according to civic humanists, self-interest, material prosperity and luxury were 
inimical to their core belief in civil liberty, which instead required virtuous self-
restraint.31 Although by the early eighteenth century British civic humanists admitted 
the importance of human passions and of self-interest in men’s actions, they continued 
to insist that these needed to be kept in check, preferably through the mechanisms of 
a ‘mixed constitution’ and, crucially, of landed property.32 For early-eighteenth-
century civic humanists, private land, enabling private armies, would allow citizens to 
remain financially and politically independent and thus to behave virtuously (though 
this did not mean that they were virtuous).33 In short, by defending the pursuit of 
private gain through luxury and commerce, the Dutch physician Mandeville was thus 
also defending the Hanoverian government.34 
In addition to these analyses of the text’s immediate political context, 
Mandeville has long been seen as one of the most important influences on the 
development of modern capitalism. Historians Dror Wahrman and Jonathan Sheehan, 
                                                 
28 Hundert, pp. 20–23. 
29 Hont, ‘Luxury,’ pp. 387-395. Hont also shows that the poem was a response to Fénélon’s Telemachus 
and its aristocratic anti-luxury polemic. 
30 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 463-467. 
31 Hammersley, English Republican Tradition, pp. 19-22. 
32 Hammersley, English Republican Tradition, pp. 20-27. 
33 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 463-464. 
34 Indeed, as Gunn shows, government officials themselves began to use Mandeville’s argument in their 
own defence; see Gunn, Beyond Liberty, pp. 107-109. 
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in their recent overview of eighteenth-century imagery prefiguring Smith’s ‘invisible 
hand’, have used Mandeville’s satire as an example of what they see as the emergence 
of theories of spontaneous order or the ‘self-organizing idiom’; the Fable, for these 
two historians, epitomises a new relationship between selfish individuals and orderly 
social aggregates.35  
While Wahrman and Sheehan do not explicitly argue that the Fable is an early 
expression of capitalism, political economists are less reticent to do so. In this, they 
follow the influential argument of Albert Hirschman, who saw in Mandeville’s poem 
one of the earliest and most important expressions of an idea that would provide the 
basis for development of modern capitalism.36 Capitalism emerges, Hirschman claims, 
when religion is no longer considered capable of keeping men’s passions in check.37 
In response to this development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, political 
theorists suggested two solutions. The first, proposed by Calvin as well as Hobbes, 
was to institute a repressive state. The second, adopted by Mandeville, was to develop 
a government that exercises a ‘civilising’ influences capable of harnessing, rather than 
repressing the passions. According to Hirschman’s reading, Mandeville’s text shows 
that governors need to take ‘men as they really are’ rather than as they ideally should 
be, which means for Mandeville to give free rein to the passion for material good 
instead of appealing to people’s moral conscience.38 In a similar vein, social 
anthropologist Louis Dumont considered the Fable as one of the most cogent 
expressions of the emerging ‘ideology’ of modernity, based on individuality and 
equality: ‘for us, every man is, in principle, an embodiment of humanity at large, and 
as such he is equal to every other man’.39 This contrasts with the ‘holism’ and 
hierarchies of societies such as the Indian caste system, which Dumont had researched 
for earlier works; these societies ‘value, in the first place, order: the conformity of 
every element to its role in society’.40 Similarly to Hirschman, Dumont reads 
Mandeville as a forefather to modern, capitalist ideologies. He emphasises that 
Mandeville’s theory of government is based on the individual, endowed with passions 
                                                 
35 Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman, Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Eighteenth 
Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), esp. pp. 5-10. 
36 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its 
Triumph (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
37 Hirschman, Passions, pp. 14-15. 
38 Hirschman, Passions and Interests, pp. 17-19. 
39 Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology 
(University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 4. 
40 Dumont, Mandeville to Marx, p. 4. 
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and needs and given prior to his or her entry into society. However, Mandeville’s 
emphasis on the necessity of skilled politicians also means for Dumont that 
Mandeville continues to posit a (for Dumont pre-modern) social framework based on 
‘subordination’. This contrast between ideas that continue to structure our modern 
socio-political relations and a monarchical, or absolutist, framework characterises 
most of the texts discussed in the chapters that follow.  
 
3. Mandeville, Medicine and the Animal Oeconomy 
Focusing less on the wider debates over the rise of capitalism based on humans’ 
‘animal nature’ than on Mandeville’s concept of virtue, John Callanan has recently 
drawn attention to the use, function and description of animals and the debates over 
their ‘nature’ in Mandeville’s work.41 The question of the relationship between man 
and animals was clearly central, not only to the Fable, but to Mandeville’s wider 
oeuvre; the poem thus needs to be read – and this will be another central theme of this 
dissertation – against the background of the heated debates on the nature, and possible 
soul, of animals. Leonora Cohen Rosenfield in particular has shown that while the 
question of the animal soul was not an invention of the seventeenth century, this period 
saw particularly vigorous debates on the matter. The key episode in its history 
revolves, of course, around Descartes’ theory of the beast-machine.42 Rejecting the 
Scholastic notion of the tripartite soul, divided into vegetative, sensitive and rational 
(with only the latter being a human prerogative), Descartes declared that all bodies 
were purely machines. Humans, he argued, were the only beings capable of thought 
and its visible manifestation, language. This was so because they had been given a 
soul, which the philosopher reduced to and equated with the rational faculties 
(discursive reasoning and free will).43 Conscious passions and sensations thus became 
operations of the soul.44 Although, Descartes argued, animals sensed, they did so 
                                                 
41 Callanan, ‘Pride’. 
42 The best discussion of the fate of the beast-machine theory in the eighteenth century remains 
Rosenfield. On the fact that Descartes did, indeed, grant sensation to animals, see Cohen Rosenfield, 
Beast-Machine, pp. 17-18. 
43 Cohen Rosenfeld, Beast-Machine, pp. xxiv-xxv. The mind-body relationship in Descartes is complex 
and has been a matter of much scholarly discussion; a good account of the problem is Gary Hatfield, 
‘Descartes’ Physiology and Its Relation to His Psychology’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Descartes, ed. by John Cottingham, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 335–70. 
44 In his treatise on the passions (first edition 1650), Descartes argued that animals could not feel the 
effects of the passions, because these depended on the soul and its interaction with the body: ‘car encore 
qu’elles [les bestes] n’ayent point de raison, ny peut-estre aussi aucune pensée, tous les mouvemens des 
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without being aware of it. Unlike humans, they did not have the will to resist the pull 
of their appetites and sensations; they were purely matter in motion.45  
Mandeville was clearly aware with all these debates. During his medical 
studies at the University of Leiden, he had written a dissertation on the nature of 
animals (Disputatio Philosophica de Brutorum Operationibus, 1689), in which he 
defended the orthodox Cartesian position of an absolute distinction between thought 
and feeling of humans and the machine-like nature of all other animals.46 In his thesis, 
Mandeville argued against the idea of thought in animals, though he did admit that 
that they might sense. The satirist would later reverse his position, instead admitting 
that animals were capable of thought and that all living beings were governed by the 
principle of ‘life’ which distinguished the from inert matter.47 His Disputatio shows, 
in any case, that he had grappled with the question of the animal from early on in his 
career.   
Leiden was, at the time of his studies, one of the most important centres in 
Europe for natural philosophy and medicine. It attracted Cartesian scholars as well as 
their detractors, and was thus rightly considered a hotbed for debates about the nature 
of living bodies, both animal and human.48 Descartes himself had spent some of his 
exile in the Dutch city, where he also published his Discours de la méthode (1638) 
and the city remained famous for Cartesian philosophy and physics long after his 
death.49 To name one illustrious example of a Leiden Cartesian, Florentius Schuyl 
(1619-1669), professor of medicine at Leiden from 1664 onwards, published a Latin 
translation in 1662 of Descartes’ De l’homme, which set out to develop an entirely 
                                                 
esprits & de la glande, qui excitent en nous les passions, ne laissant pas d’estre en elles, & d’y servir à 
entretenir & fortifier, non pas comme en nous les passions, mais les mouvemens des nerfs & des 
muscles, qui ont coustume de les accompagner.’ René Descartes, Les passions de l’âme (Paris: M. 
Bobin, & N. le Gras, 1664), p. 75. See also Cohen Rosenfield, Beast-Machine, p. 17. 
45 As Gary Hatfiel explains, Descartes took earlier physiological theories and provided a ‘translation’ 
into a purely mechanical account; see Hatfield, ‘Descartes’ Physiology,’ p. 353. 
46 Bernard Mandeville, Disputatio philosophica de brutorum operationibus (Leiden: Apud Abrahamum 
Elzevier, 1689). For more on Mandeville’s engagement with ‘the animal question’, see Callanan. 
47 Mandeville, Fable II, p. 166. 
48 For natural philosophy in general, see Ann M. Blair, ‘Natural Philosophy’, in The Cambridge History 
of Science Volume 3: Early Modern Science, ed. by Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 363–406. On Leiden and natural philosophy, see G.A. 
Lindeboom, ‘Dog and Frog - Physiological Experiments’, in Leiden University in the Seventeenth 
Century: An Exchange of Learning, ed. by Theodoor Herman Lunsingh Scheurleer and G.H.M. 
Posthumus Meyjes (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden; Brill, 1975), pp. 279–93. 
49 Harold John Cook, Matters of Exchange, pp. 227–59. 
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mechanistic physiology of the human body.50 Schuyl’s ‘Ad Lectorem’ focused almost 
entirely on the Cartesian doctrine of the beast-machine, despite the fact that this was 
only a minor aspect of Descartes’ original.51 At the hands of some of his followers, 
Descartes’ theory provided a particularly stark way of distinguishing (exclusively 
human) reason from the purely mechanical body, whether in humans or in animals. 
The problem of the animal soul was thus linked to questions about the interaction 
between soul (or mind) and body, the nature of the ‘oeconomy’ of the living body and 
 ̶  by implicit or explicit analogy  ̶  the ‘oeconomy’ of human individual and collective 
bodies. The concept of the animal oeconomy, broadly defined as the ensemble of 
anatomical structures, organs and fluids necessary for the upkeep of the living body, 
spanned all living beings from insect to man and made the study of one kind of body 
relevant to that of another.52 Central to the study of all bodies was the relationship 
between the rational faculties (reason and will) and the passions. As historians of 
medicine have outlined, the most influential theory of the animal oeconomy in the 
early eighteenth century was the iatromechanism of the Leiden physician Herman 
Boerhaave.53 For iatromechanists, organic bodies should be conceived of as hydraulic 
machines, composed of solid and fluid parts representing, respectively, the pulleys, 
levers, vessels and the liquids (most importantly, the blood) circulating through them. 
For Boerhaave and his followers, the machine of the body was set in motion and 
governed by the sensorium commune. While Aristotle had located the sensorium 
commune in the heart, Boerhaave argued that it was to be found in the brain, that it 
gathered all bodily sensations and that it produced all ideas, emotions and voluntary 
movements.54 For iatromechanists, the mechanical laws of the physical interaction of 
bodies were sufficient to explain the body, while the ‘soul’ and its ‘functions’ (such 
                                                 
50 Lindeboom, ‘Dog and Frog,’ pp. 283-284; Cohen Rosenfield, Beast-Machine, pp. 31-32; Cohen 
Rosenfield classifies Schuyl as one of several ‘physiologists’ who, in the decades after Descartes’ death, 
defended the beast-machine theory; see pp. 28-37. 
51 Rosenfield, Beast-Machine, pp. 245-249. 
52 Harro Maas analyses the thought of Thomas Reid to show how his understanding of physiology 
affects his political economic thought: Harro Maas, ‘Where Mechanism Ends: Thomas Reid on the 
Moral and the Animal Oeconomy’, History of Political Economy, 35.Suppl 1 (2003), 338–60. Catherine 
Packham has analysed the influence of vitalist physiology on the work of Adam Smith: Packham. 
53 On Boerhaave, see especially Rina Knoeff, Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738): Calvinist Chemist and 
Physician (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2002). 
54 Knoeff, pp. 193–94; John P. Wright, ‘Boerhaave on Minds, Human Beings, and Mental Diseases’, 
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 20.1 (2010), 289–302. The physiologist Albrecht von Haller 
adopted the notion of the sensorium commune as the ‘corporeal antechamber to the non-corporeal 
soul’, while Charles Bonnet went further, seeking to link all sensations, thoughts and language to 
sensible fibres in the body coordinated by the sensorium commune: see Vila, Enlightenment and 
Pathology, pp. 28–37. 
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as consciousness) had to be bracketed out by the physician. According to the 
Boerhaavian model, then, there was a clear distinction between the ‘soul’ and the rest 
of the body that it set in motion. While the body was to be considered like a machine, 
the immortal soul was beyond the purview of the physician or anatomist.  
The mechanical model of the human-animal difference was contested not only 
by Scholastic thinkers, but also by thinkers in the sceptical tradition. Particularly 
influential for post-Cartesian sceptics was, of course, Michel de Montaigne (1533-
1592), quoted by Mandeville as a model for his own Fable; Du Châtelet, in her effort 
to make Mandeville palatable to her French audience, described him as ‘the English 
Montaigne’.55 Montaigne, in his ‘Apologie de Raymond Sebond’, had argued that 
animals seemed to possess both reason and morality, and possibly even more so than 
humans: ‘Il se trouve plus de difference de tel homme à tel homme que de tel animal 
à tel homme.’56 Montaigne’s goal, not dissimilar to Mandeville’s, was less to provide 
an account of animals than to undermine man’s confidence, or, more accurately, man’s 
pride, in his own rational faculties: ‘Le moyen que je prens pour rabatre cette frenaisie 
et qui me semble le plus propre, c’est de froisser et fouler aux pieds l’orgueil et 
humaine fierté.’ By linking his poem to Montaigne’s work, Mandeville suggested to 
his readers (at least those who were well read in natural philosophy) that he, too, was 
engaged in removing rational man from the throne on which Descartes – Mandeville’s 
erstwhile source on the question of animal nature – had placed him.57  
By contrast, with his claim about the particularity of the living body, be it the 
individual body Mandeville was treating in his medical practice or the body politic, 
the satirist was echoing the theories of the German physician Georg Ernst Stahl (1660–
1734), even though I have been unable to find explicit references. Stahl, one of the 
                                                 
55 ‘It was said of Montaigne, that he was pretty well versed in the defects of mankind, but unacquainted 
with the excellencies of human nature: if I fare no worse, I shall think myself well used.’ Mandeville, 
‘Preface,’ Fable, p. 20. Montaigne, in his ‘Apologie de Raymond Sebond’, argued that ‘Il se trouve 
plus de difference de tel homme à tel homme que de tel animal à tel homme.’ On Montaigne and the 
animal question, see Hassan Melehy, ‘Montaigne and Ethics: The Case of Animals’, L’Esprit Créateur, 
46.1 (2006), 96–107. On how his position got taken up in the seventeenth century, see Peter Harrison, 
‘The Virtues of Animals in Seventeenth-Century Thought’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 59.3 (1998), 
463–84. 
56 ’Apologie de Raymon Sebond’, Michel de Montaigne, Essais de Michel de Montaigne (1580), ed. by 
André Tournon (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, 2003) Livre II, 12. 
57 Descartes tends to omit the names of his sources, he cites Montaigne once, precisely to refute the 
latter’s claims about the intelligence of beasts; see Michael Moriarty, ‘Montaigne and Descartes’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne, ed. by Philippe Desan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
pp. 347–63; Martine Pécharman, ‘Contre le “pensement” et le “parler” des bêtes ou Descartes devenu 
juge de Montaigne’, Montaigne Studies, 25 (2013), 105–17.  
 55 
 
most famous and influential critics of Boerhaaavian theories, proposed instead an 
animist conception of the living body as governed in every movement by a soul.58 He 
asserted that although the body functioned mechanically, life itself could not be 
explained entirely by mechanical forces. Instead, living bodies – radically different 
from inanimate or mechanical objects – were moved by a soul, or anima, which was 
located in the body and directed its motions through mechanical means. Stahl did not 
completely reject the mechanistic study of the body but argued that there were two 
fundamental principles, matter (material) and motion (immaterial). Because the soul 
too was immaterial, it could cause motion, which in turn affected matter.59 Living 
bodies, for Stahl, were composed of mixed matter; the harmony between these 
different compounds, as well as the coordination of parts, was guaranteed by the soul. 
In the second volume Fable, written as a dialogue between two interlocutors called 
Cleomenes (a man with medical training who shared the Fable’s suspicion of 
‘fashionable men’ and their supposed virtues) and Horatio (‘one of the modish 
People’), Mandeville makes the connection between his medical thought and the 
political ideas of the Fable more explicit.60 Mandeville echoes Stahl, for example, in 
his claim that the usefulness of anatomy, or at least dissection, to medical practice is 
limited because it can only reveal the structure but not the function of body parts:  
 
The Structure and Motions of the Body, may, perhaps, be mechanically 
accounted for, and all Fluids are under the Laws of Hydrostaticks: But we can 
have no Help from any Part of the Mechanicks, in the Discovery of things, 
infinitely remote from Sight, and entirely unknown as to their Shapes and 
Bulks.61 
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Though Mandeville admitted that anatomy and mathematics were useful for reaching 
limited knowledge of some body parts, it ultimately could not account for the living 
body as a whole.62 The reason for this was that for Mandeville both animal and human 
bodies are governed by a vital force that radically distinguishes them from inert 
objects.  
 
Hor. The main Spring in us is the Soul, which is immaterial and immortal: But 
what is that to other Creatures that have a Brain like ours, and no such immortal 
Substance distinct from Body? Don’t you believe that Dogs and Horses think? 
Cleo. I believe they do, though in a Degree of Perfection far inferior to us. 
Hor. What is it, that superintends Thought in them? where must we look for 
it? which is the main Spring?  
Cleo. I can answer you no otherwise, than Life. 
Hor. What is Life? 
Cleo. Every body understands the Meaning of the Word, though, perhaps, no 
body knows the Principle of Life, that Part which gives Motion to all the rest.63 
 
For Cleomenes, both animals and human bodies are driven by an immaterial and 
unknowable ‘principle of life’. Even if an anatomist had complete knowledge of each 
of the body’s parts, that is, he would still be unable to understand the living body as a 
whole. The same is true, of course, of Mandeville’s bee swarm: even if citizens, when 
looked at individually, seem vicious and depraved, the well-governed body politic as 
a whole is still harmonious.   
Mandeville’s most important medical work was his Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions (1711), a dialogue between a physician 
called Philopiro, who like Mandeville studied in Leiden and his sick patient. 
Mandeville’s medical dissertation (written two years after his general dissertation on 
animals), like Philopiro’s, had been on the role of chyle in digestion; as De Marchi 
notes, his treatise on hypochondria continued his interest in the stomach and 
emphasised the importance of good digestion in the treatment of melancholic 
                                                 
62 On Mandeville’s sceptical attitude towards mathematics, see Charles T. Wolfe, ‘Vital Anti-
Mathematicism and the Ontology of the Emerging Life Sciences: From Mandeville to Diderot’, 
Synthèse, (2017), 1–22 (online first). 
63 Mandeville, Fable II, p. 166. 
 57 
 
‘diseases’.64  Philopiro insisted that ‘whilst the strict union that is between the Body 
and the Soul lasts, they continue to be, as it were, a mixture, the latter cannot act 
without the assistance of the first’.65 Every man’s or woman’s body, Mandeville 
claimed, was a unique mixture of parts. When, in the Fable, Mandeville made the 
individual as endowed with his or her own passions the basis of society, he was thus 
also echoing his own medical theory and practice. Because of the uniqueness of each 
of his patients, Philopiro/Mandeville insisted that doctors become well acquainted 
with the manner of living of […] Patients’ so as to ‘better to consult the Circumstances 
as well as Idiosyncrasy of every particular Person: Some have strange Aversions as to 
Diet; others peculiar Antipathies against some excellent Remedies; and every 
wholesome Exercise suits not with all People.’66 While this was a fairly conventional 
view of health and disease, Mandeville put it to novel use in his Fable. In the poem, 
the insistence on the ‘idiosyncrasy’ of each man or woman manifests itself in the 
various paragraphs on members of the different trades, who each have their own 
dominant passions. For society to become a harmonious whole, lawgivers should not 
ignore the unique passions or attempt to constrain them through a rigid moral code. 
Society, in short, was a body of mixed composites animated with its own life force.  
Mandeville’s anti-Boerhaavian view of the body and his questioning of 
Descartes’ assumption about man as rational in opposition to animals were central to 
Mandeville’s claims about the body politic in more important ways. In the first line of 
the preface to the 1728 edition, Mandeville relates his understanding of the body 
politic to the study of animal bodies: ‘Laws and government are to the political bodies 
of civil societies what the vital spirits and life itself are to the natural bodies of 
animated creatures’.67 With the very first sentence of his preface, Mandeville thus 
suggested that the bodies of communities, like the bodies of (human) animals, did not 
function mechanically but were instead ‘animated’ by ‘vital spirits’.68 Rejecting the 
Cartesian mechanism he had himself endorsed in his first publication, Mandeville goes 
on to mock those who pretended that ‘the anatomy of dead carcasses’ will yield 
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knowledge of living bodies.69 Boerhaavian anatomy as the taking apart of the 
mechanical body and the construction of automata were two closely related pursuits 
in the period. The famous engineer Jacques Vaucanson (1709–1782), for instance, 
based his machines on the teachings of anatomists and intended them to be used to 
complement their studies.70 Crucially, both anatomists and engineers of automata dealt 
only with what could be seen, whether with the naked or through the microscope. This 
emphasis on the visible meant that the distinctions between animal and machine 
mattered little to the iatromechanist interested only in the visible, material side of 
beings. The anatomist, in other words, though he can perhaps observe the individual 
parts, necessarily misses the vitality of the whole.71 The same Mandeville, argues in 
his poem, is true for society: while each individual might seem vicious and driven by 
selfish passions, the political body as a whole, once ‘animated’ by good government, 
becomes prosperous. 
Mandeville’s definition of ‘society’ is worth quoting full here, firstly because 
it shows very clearly how he conceived of the differences between men (in society) 
and animals, and secondly because it provides one definition of a large human 
communities in the terms that in this dissertation I have summarised under the notion 
of ‘population’. For Mandeville, large societies form a body that, just like an animal 
body, is more than the sum of its parts: 
 
I hope the reader knows that by society I understand a body politic, in which 
man either subdued by superior force, or by persuasion drawn from his savage 
state, is become a disciplined creature, that can find his own ends in laboring 
for others, and where under one head or other form of government each 
member is rendered subservient to the whole, and all of them by cunning 
management are made to act as one. For if by society we only mean a number 
of people, that without rule or government should keep together out of a natural 
affection to their species or love of company, as a herd of cows or a flock of 
sheep, then there is not in the world a more unfit creature for society than man. 
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A hundred of them that should be all equals, under no subjection, or fear of 
any superior upon Earth, could never live together awake two hours without 
quarrelling, and the more knowledge, strength, wit, courage and resolution 
there was among them, the worse it would be.  
 
Like Hobbes and against Shaftesbury, Mandeville argued that man was naturally 
selfish, not virtuous, though unlike Hobbes he claimed that a good governor harnessed, 
rather than repressed people’s passions.72 From the point of the government, at least, 
a large ‘society’ (Mandeville is clear that he is discussing, as he writes in the poem’s 
first line, ‘A spacious hive’ rather than just ‘a hundred’ men) is thus irreducible to the 
passionate, supposedly vicious individuals that compose it. In this, Mandeville was 
echoing the vitalistic conception of the body that he had outlined in his treatise on 
hysteria; in its preface, for example, he had claimed that the body as a whole could 
never be completely observed and understood: ‘That most minute and subtile Texture, 
remote not only from the Senses but likewise from the Reach of human Understanding, 
which the solid as well as fluid Parts are made of in a living Creature, is and will 
eternally be hid from us.’73 Just as the human or animal body was more than the sum 
of its organs, ‘society’ was a ‘body’ or ‘creature’ that had taken on a life of its own. 
For Mandeville, this also means that some of the subjects had to suffer for the benefit 
of the greater good, to which they were ‘subservient’ as soon as they became part of 
the body politic. In the poem, for example, Mandeville describes how those who could 
not afford to pay off the judges might be hanged ‘For Crimes, which not deserv’d that 
Fate,/ But to secure the Rich and Great.’74 ‘[T]he Desp’rate and Poor’, through their 
drive for self-preservation, contributed to the ‘life’ of the body politic, but they did so 
neither through their own volition nor for their own benefit; the creature that was 
society functioned for its own benefit, not for that of its members. 
As we will see in chapter three, the contrast between the swarm of bees that 
‘act as one’ and groups of animals that seemed to remain separate would be used in 
the middle decades of the eighteenth century by both vitalist physicians (most 
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famously Théophile Bordeu) and materialist philosophes (most famously Denis 
Diderot) to think through how bodily organs or particles (in medicine) or individual 
subjects (in political speculations) could come to act in concert. In Mandeville’s text, 
then, we can see an early example of this question of the relationship between 
individuals, endowed with their own mix of passions, and the social whole, the 
paradoxical harmony of which was guaranteed by the selfish pursuit of the passions 
rather than on ‘knowledge, strength, wit, courage and resolution’. It should be noted, 
however, that, unlike Diderot (and, to some extent, Adam Smith) Mandeville placed 
great emphasis on the role of the head, or government in transforming the flock into a 
swarm.75 Although each subject was encouraged to follow his or her own passions, 
they needed to be ‘disciplined’ by skilful politicians in order to for these passions to 
be harnessed for the greater good. 
Mandeville’s Fable, then, provides an example of a theory of government that 
considers what he calls ‘society’ to form its own (animal-like and swarm-like) body. 
In the next two sections, I will explore the ways in which Mandeville’s text was 
received in France, and the ways in which the debates around the relations between 
passionate or reasonable subjects and their social wholes were refracted across the 
Channel. 
 
4. The Reception of Mandeville’s Fable  
Mandeville’s supposedly scandalous presumptions about the nature of humans, 
animals and God prompted outrage not only in Britain, but also in France.76 Scholars 
have given full overviews of both English and French reviews; here, I underline two 
common aspects of most critiques, the first referring to Mandeville’s conception of 
the relationship between man and animal, and the second referring to the question of 
an inborn sense of  morality.77 Critics, mostly members of the traditional elites in the 
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universities and among the clergy, objected to the idea that society was formed not by 
free, rational and virtuous rational souls but by material, passionate bodies.78 They 
argued that Mandeville’s claim that their authority was based on hypocrisy and deceit 
rather than God-given superiority would open the door to atheism and moral and 
political chaos. As William Law (1686-1761), a High-Churchman and former 
Cambridge don who published an extensive refutation of the Fable in 1724 
complained: 
 
For how weak is it to suppose, that the Animal Life should be the Foundation 
of Laws of nature, so as to make it fit for us to act agreeable to its Wants and 
Desires; and that the Rationality of our Beings, which is, in some degree, a 
Likeness to God, should be the Foundations of no Laws of Nature, so as to 
make it fit for us to act suitable to its Perfection and Happiness.79  
 
Law thus complained that Mandeville had made man so similar to animals as to deny 
that men entered society primarily as reasonable beings, rather than in order to satisfy 
their ‘wants and desires’. In this, of course, he was echoing Shaftesbury, whom, as we 
have seen, the satirist had critiqued for having mistakenly conceived of reason as a 
rider controlling his horse.   
In France, too, the brunt of the criticism concerned Mandeville’s conception 
of the relationship between (human) reason and the (beastly) passions, and the way in 
which these entered into the composition of the social whole. Across the Channel some 
of the Fable’s staunchest critics were, predictably, clerics and theologians. A good 
decade before Du Châtelet embarked on her project, French periodicals published 
extensive (and mostly negative) reviews, including excerpts as well as translations of 
British reviews of the Fable.80 French reviewers commented on the scandal the Fable 
had provoked in England and generally agreed on the ‘danger’ that Mandeville’s ideas 
represented for French audiences. As early as 1725, for example, the Bibliothèque 
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angloise published an extensive summary and some translated passages, giving French 
readers access to large portions of the text.81 The first official translation of the Fable 
into French was published in 1740 and was then republished in 1750.82 The text did 
not agree with the French authorities, who, in 1745, placed it on the Index of 
Prohibited Books, had it condemned by the Sorbonne and ritually burned by the public 
hangman.83  
One of the Fable’s earliest reviewers in French summed up the novelty of 
Mandeville’s approach to human morality in the following way: the fabulist’s remarks 
on the connection between bodily sensations and human actions ‘font voir que l’auteur 
a peut-être étudié la Physique plus que la Morale’.84 According to this reviewer, the 
poet denies that humans act out of free will – understood as the capacity to follow or 
reject revealed moral laws – and studies them as one would ‘les animaux les plus 
abjects’. The extracts the reviewer chose to translate were those that showed that for 
the author of the Fable, human sociability was not natural or God-given, but the effect 
of a series of well-channelled physiological impulses uncontrolled by reason, or ‘les 
passions de l’ame independamment de la volonté’. Most of the reviews’ authors 
considered the Fable as an assault on the idea of a universal, God-given, inborn sense 
for moral ‘natural’ conduct that when listened to by enough individuals would 
guarantee social harmony. An image that occurred time and again was the idea, taken 
from Romans 2:15 and from Aquinas, that these universal moral laws were impressed 
onto the human heart as the seat of the soul; Mandeville fails to notice, one reviewer 
complained that: 
 
Les Loix naturelles, qui sont gravées dans nôtre cœur, dépendent si peu de 
nous, que les plus grands scélérats ne peuvent les en effacer entiérement, 
quelques peines qu’ils se donnent pour en venir à bout. Il y a plus, c’est que les 
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ignorans même sont convaincus, sans qu’ils y ayent jamais réfléchi, qu’elles 
sont gravées dans le cœur des autres hommes.85 
 
The author of this Lettre critique sur la Fable des abeilles opposed what they saw as 
Mandeville’s absurd proposition that human societies could prosper without following 
inborn and universally valid moral ‘natural laws’ and accused the Anglo-Dutch poet 
of ignoring human morality in favour of human physicality.86 For this author, the social 
bond is guaranteed through the existence of God-given laws, engraved into the human 
heart from the beginning of time. For Mandeville, of course, the social bond was 
formed on the basis of the universal existence of bodily passions. While Mandeville 
thus considered men in the same way as all living beings – they all tended towards 
self-preservation – his critics assumed the existence of a set of God-given moral laws, 
restricted to ensouled humans, which human individuals could know through reason 
and freely assent to.87  
 
5. Emilie Du Châtelet’s Fable des abeilles 
The first translation of the Fable into French that is still known to us today is the 
unpublished version by Emilie du Châtelet, which she drafted beginning in 1735 and 
probably worked on until about 1738.88 In the following section, I will argue that Du 
Châtelet’s critique of Mandeville is a critique of his view of the passions as much more 
powerful than reason. Feminist scholars have rightly insisted on her role as an active 
member of the Enlightenment Republic of Letters and as translator of Newton’s 
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Principia (1756-1759), rather than just on her romantic relationship with Voltaire.89 
The exact genesis of her interest in and translation of the Fable is unknown, but 
scholars generally surmise that Voltaire brought back the original text from his journey 
to England upon his return in 1728 and presented it to Du Châtelet with the suggestion 
that she might try her hand at translating it. It is equally uncertain how much Voltaire 
was involved in the translation, though we might reasonably assume that the pair 
discussed the Fable as well as Du Châtelet’s progress, considering they were both 
staying at Du Châtelet’s estate in Cirey at the time she began working on it.90 While 
scholars agree that Voltaire benefited from Du Châtelet’s work, most also assume that 
he instigated the project. As the influential Voltaire scholar Ira O. Wade put it in his 
authoritative 1967 edition of some of Du Châtelet’s unpublished papers, ‘The 
importance of her work lies less in its own intrinsic value than in its contribution to 
the formation and evolution of Voltaire’s thought. That he considered her articles 
important may be deduced from the fact that he carried them from Cirey to Paris to 
Berlin, and thence to Geneva and Ferney.’91 This view, however, has recently been 
challenged by feminist scholars, notably by Adrienne Mason.92 Du Châtelet’s 
translation has garnered some scholarly attention, though mainly by critics interested 
in her translation practices and her view of the role of gender in scholarly work, a topic 
she broaches briefly in the preface to the text.93 Marie-Pascale Pieretti argues that 
translation provided an opportunity for women such as Du Châtelet to participate in 
the intellectual debates of their time whilst also not straying too far from gender 
conventions.94 While scholars such as Erica Harth and historians of science such as 
Mary Terrall and Lisa Gardiner have emphasised Du Châtelet’s exclusion from the 
academies on the basis of her sex, and on her ensuing struggle to participate in the 
intellectual activities of her time,95 Judith Zinsser has used her Fable to argue that she 
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was accepted as a philosophe by her contemporaries.96 Voltaire specialists have also 
mined her translation for possible signs of a Mandevillian influence on Voltaire’s 
views of luxury.97 Both strands of enquiry – on Châtelet’s role as a female savant and 
on her and Voltaire’s view on luxury – have yielded important insights.  
Du Châtelet’s oeuvre, however, also provides an example of a French, and 
female, response to the question about the role of individual bodies in the creation of 
harmonious social wholes posed by Mandeville. Though clearly fascinated by 
Mandeville’s daring ideas on the positive role of the passions, her transformations of 
large parts of the Fable speak to her anxieties surrounding their implications. Du 
Châtelet’s interpretation of the Fable needs to be seen in the context of both the 
shifting social debates around the relationship between passions and reason not only 
in human beings in general, but particularly in women. The early eighteenth century, 
as Erica Harth and Jolanta Pekacz have argued, was also a period in which 
opportunities for women to engage in learning were significantly restricted.98 New 
spaces of learned debate such as the Academy were less structured around the 
privileges of rank, though they also excluded women.99 While the mixed-gender salons 
of the early seventeenth century had served as sites of serious intellectual activity, in 
the eighteenth-century, with the growing importance of the exclusively male 
Academies, the salons, in the words Erica Harth, ‘proved a discursive dead end for 
women’.100 Women were also increasingly relegated to directing, rather than 
participating in, salon conversations, the rules of which followed the strict protocols 
of politeness rather than the free pursuit of learning or critical inquiry. Salonnières, 
though highly selective in who they admitted to their gatherings, did not choose their 
members primarily on the basis of social rank. However, both Du Châtelet’s father, 
the Baron de Breteuil, and her husband, descendant of one of Lorraine’s first families, 
were members of the top ranks of France’s high nobility.101 Although Du Châtelet did 
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attend some of the most famous Parisian salons, her attempt to bridge the worlds of 
sociability and of learning brought her the mockery of some salonnières, who 
considered her ‘masculine’ interest in mathematics and physics improper for a woman,  
as well as of academicians offended by her critiques of their work.102 One reason for 
her transformation of the Fable, then, is that she is writing as a noble female savant at 
a time when women were said to be prone to submitting to their passions, which they 
felt more strongly than men and which thus brought them closer to equally passion-
driven animals, and at a time when the social hierarchies of ancient regime France 
were shifting and a scholarly elite was forming alongside the old elites of birth and 
rank.103  
Even though her text remained in manuscript form, her translation was clearly 
important to her, and not only because she continued to work on it for several years. 
First of all, the manuscript circulated among select members of the European 
eighteenth-century intellectual elites. Apart from Voltaire, there are extant letters 
documenting that Du Châtelet showed her work to Francesco Algarotti (1712–
1764),104 author of the widely read Newtonianismo per le dame (1737), and to the 
novelist Françoise de Graffigny, who stayed with the couple at Cirey in 1738 and 
seems to have secretly excerpted sections in order to send them to her friend Devaux.105 
Secondly, Du Châtelet put great care into her translation, as the fact that four versions 
of its preface have survived shows. It was thus clearly not simply an exercise to 
improve her English, as some interpreters have suggested.106 Her translation, or, as 
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Felicia Gottmann notes, ‘transformation rather than translation’,107 constitutes an 
active engagement with Mandeville’s text, which she found congenial enough to 
translate and provocative enough to rewrite. 
The most notable of Du Châtelet’s transformations of the Fable is the fact that 
she chose not to translate the poem itself, instead limiting herself to a selection of 
Mandeville’s notes. In her preface, she claims that this is due to her lack of talent for 
verse translations. Scholars have so far taken this explanation as sufficient, and if the 
Fable is read in isolation it is persuasive. However, if we look at Du Châtelet’s body 
of work, the decision to omit the fable and thus the image of the bee hive emerges as 
consistent with her wider view of the rational human subject not as an animal body, 
but as able to control his or her passions through reason and will. Du Châtelet’s status 
as a woman from the high aristocracy not only influenced her strategies for entering 
into the eighteenth-century scientific discourses; as analysed by Terrall, she attempted 
to set up patronage relations between academicians and herself.108 It also deeply 
affected her view of individual and political bodies, and thus of Mandeville’s Fable.  
Her rendering of the Mandevillian text thus needs to be seen also in the context of 
noble sociability, dominated by ‘polite’ forms of interaction. As historian Jacques 
Revel has argued, following Norbert Elias’ suggestion of a ‘civilising process’, what 
were considered correct manners became increasingly stratified according to social 
status in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.109 In the early eighteenth century, 
codes of manners became so widespread that elites, including members of the high 
nobility such as Du Châtelet, began to distance themselves from the rigid rules of 
‘civility’. Instead, as Revel puts it, they understood truly polite manners to be based 
on the ‘freedom to shape appearances independent of all authority’.110 Du Châtelet’s 
emphasis on finding happiness by using one’s reason to govern one’s personal 
‘passions & goûts’ is thus also an echo of contemporary understandings of noble 
politeness.  
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Not only does the philosophe eliminate Mandeville’s metaphor of the bee 
bodies; throughout the text, she rewrites the English text’s references to the body and 
its passions, emphasising instead the role of reason. In her preface, she explains to her 
readers that Mandeville’s work – and thus her translation – should be read as a work 
of moral philosophy, or, as she puts it, as the product of ‘raisonnement’, not 
‘imagination’. Mandeville, for Du Châtelet, is not a poet nor a satirist, but a ‘manly 
thinker’. Her claim as to her lack of talent for verse translation can also be read in the 
light of her emphasis on reason, for poetry was associated, unlike moral philosophy, 
with the imagination and the passions. Tellingly, in her annotated copy of Antoine 
Houdard de la Motte’s translation of Homer, she condemns the translator for his lack 
of clarity and his ‘passionate need to rhyme’.111 De la Motte was a celebrated member 
of the (exclusively male) Académie Française and an important figure in the Parisian 
cafés, where people could share and debate knowledge regardless of birth and rank.112 
It is thus perhaps not surprising that Du Châtelet agreed with Anne Marie Dacier that 
verse should not be translated and mentioned her as a model in the preface to the 
Fable; author of the translation of the Iliad (1711) to which de La Motte had 
responded, Dacier described her work as a ‘noble’ rather than a ‘servile’ translation.113 
By not translating the poem itself, that is, Du Châtelet presented herself as a rational 
woman who did not, like De la Motte, get carried away by imaginative poetry.114 
Where Mandeville’s poem focused on governing large collectives, or ‘vast numbers 
of [men] with the greater Ease and Security’,115 Du Châtelet insists on the importance 
of individual experience of the passions paired with the capacity for independent 
reasoning in order to govern them. This also explains why it is in the preface to 
Mandeville’s Fable that she makes one of her rare reflections on the role of gender in 
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intellectual work; as Erica Harth puts it, ‘It is perhaps the most extended statement 
that she made on gender.’116 Her association of the (manly) faculty of reason with her 
own intellectual pursuits  and her claim to be unable to produce works requiring too 
much (feminine) imagination is especially ironic in the light of Voltaire’s criticism of 
his lover’s preference for Leibnizian metaphysics over Newtonian physics in the 
preface to the second edition of his Elements of Newtonian Philosophy (1741).117  
Leibinizian thought, he argued, was nothing but ‘imagination adorned with untruths’. 
While previous scholars have argued that this proto-feminist reflection appears in the 
preface to the Fable because of the ‘feminine’ task of translation, we might surmise 
that its appearance here has at least as much to do with the content of the translated 
text. If Mandeville, the doctor-turned-poet, reduces social interactions to effects of 
bodily forces, Du Châtelet as a financially privileged, female intellectual rewrites his 
satire so as to show that the relation between body and mind is not one of cause and 
effect. For Du Châtelet, the body is a vessel for experience, but its laws are not the 
determining factor in moral and social behaviour: 
 
Pourquoy ces creatures dont l’entendement paroit en tout si semblable a celuy 
des hommes, semblent pourtant arrestées par une force invincible en deça de 
la barriere, et qu’on m’en donne la raison, si l’on peut. Je laisse aux naturalistes 
a en chercher une physique, mais iusques a ce qu’ils l’ayent trouvée, les 
femmes seront en route de reclamer contre leur education.118  
 
That Du Châtelet is concerned with severing the connection between animal and 
human selves on the hand and animal bodies on the other is evident in the very first 
sentence of her translation. While Mandeville compares laws to ‘Vital Spirits and Life’ 
and society to ‘the Natural Bodies of Animated Creatures’, his translator reduces the 
latter phrase to ‘Les loix sont a la societé, ce que la vie est au corps humain’. Thus, 
while the original sentence quite emphatically refuses to distinguish humans from 
animals, or indeed from any ‘animated creatures’, the translation unambiguously 
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refers to humans only.119 By ignoring the bee allegory, Du Châtelet thus refocused the 
central problem raised by Mandeville’s Fable. For her, the paradox of the vicious bees 
raised not so much the question of the difference between humans and animals, which, 
as she took for granted, was already sufficiently explained through the human soul. 
Instead, she is much more interested in reinforcing the capacity of reason to govern 
and get pleasure from the passions. Instead of a social order based on the aggregate of 
individual interests, in other words, Du Châtelet emphasises the importance of the will 
of the individual, at least of those privileged enough to have the ability to exercise it. 
Hence, social inferiors could be incapable of recognising their own interest and needed 
strong laws to discipline them; her view of society was strictly hierarchical, with social 
position corresponding also with the ability for self-government: every man or woman 
has ‘a share [of liberté] appropriate to the rank that we hold in nature.’120 This can be 
illustrated with an example of a less noticeable intervention in the Fable of the Bees, 
used by Judith Zinsser to illustrate her preference for ‘straightforward, didactic 
prose’:121 
 
That these two Passions [Pride and Shame], in which the Seeds of most Virtues 
are contained are Realities in our Frame, and not imaginary Qualities, is 
demonstrable from the plain and different Effects, that in spite of our Reason 
are produced in us as soon as we are affected with either.122 
 
This is translated into French as  
 
La honte et l'orgueil, ces deux sources de nos vertus, ne sont point des qualités 
imaginaires, mais des ingredients necessaires a nostre composé. Rien ne le 
prouve mieux que les differents effects quelles produisent en nous malgré nous 
mesmes.123 
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I would like to highlight two changes made by Du Châtelet here. While she does not 
fundamentally alter Mandeville’s claim about the hypocrisy of most virtues, she does 
omit the reference to the passions. Though this might, of course, have been a stylistic 
choice, it is nevertheless interesting to observe that she also translates Mandeville’s 
‘Reason’ as ‘nous mesmes’: whereas the poet-physician’s text implies that reason is 
only one (not particularly powerful) faculty among several, Du Châtelet translates 
‘reason’ to mean ‘ourselves’.  
Her struggle with Mandeville’s presentation of human nature is illustrated by 
her interpretation of the Leibnizian idea of vis viva, the principle that the quantity of 
energy is conserved in movement, and for its perceived indications for human free 
will.124 Though she sided with Leibniz, she was also worried about the implications of 
the principle of the conservation of energy for the freedom of living beings to create a 
force that did not previously exist.125 In a 1738 letter to the mathematician Pierre-Louis 
Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) she wrote: 
  
la seule chose qui m’embarrasse à present, c’est la liberté, car enfin je me crois 
libre et je ne sais si cette quantité de forces toujours la même dans l’univers ne 
détruit point la liberté. Commencer le mouvement, n’est-ce pas produire dans 
la nature une force qui n’existait pas?126 
 
Written roughly at the same time as her Fable des abeilles, the letter expresses both 
her endorsement of the idea that the universe was organised according to immutable 
mechanical laws and her struggle to accept that human subjects were organised on the 
basis of similarly mechanical laws. Unlike Mandeville, according to whose Fable all 
human decisions ultimately reveal themselves to be results of the pursuit of self-
interest, she insists – or wants to insist – that humans have the (rational) liberty from 
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their passions. Like Descartes, then, she insisted that humans were not automata, as 
they possessed a free will to govern over their machine-like bodies.127  
Sometimes, her emphasis on the importance of reason leads to outright 
contradiction between her own and Mandeville’s ideas. Like Mandeville’s Jesuit 
critics, she insists, for example, on universal moral laws given to humans alone. In a 
passage where the English poet explains his idea that all ‘virtues’ are merely the result 
of clever politicians who devised them ‘affin de gouverner la multitude avec plus de 
sureté’, she inserts the following comment:  
 
Mais tous les hommes s’accordent a observer les loix etablies chez eux, et a 
regarder les actions comme bonnes ou mauvaises selon leur relation ou leur 
opposition a ces loix. Il y a une loy universelle pour tous les hommes que Dieu 
a luy mesme gravée dans le cœur. […] et je crois que le sage Lock [sic] a esté 
trop loin, quand apres avoir detruit les idées innées, il a avancé qu’il n’y avoit 
point d’idées de morale universelle.128 
 
In her considerable changes to Mandeville’s text, she subverts his central intuition by 
showing that human subjects can and should continue to take into account the effects 
of their common good, rather than, as Mandeville suggests, relying on ‘skilful 
politicians’ to produce an almost magical order out of aggregate self-interests. Her 
refusal to incorporate the bee analogy into her writing reveals that what she found 
most problematic about a text she nevertheless admired for its insights into human 
social life was also one of its most important contributions: the suggestion that humans 
and their communal bonds were formed on the basis of animalistic passions.   
This becomes markedly clear when we read her translation and commentary 
alongside her most important work on moral philosophy, the Discours sur le bonheur, 
which remained unpublished during her lifetime and was published posthumously in 
1779. Her interest in Mandeville’s positive take on the pursuit of the passions is clearly 
coloured by the norms of absolutist France and of her own aristocratic circles, rather 
than by those of Mandeville’s commercially oriented Britain and the Low Countries. 
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Like Shaftesbury, she has been accused, by contemporaries as well as by modern 
biographers, of being blinded by her status as a privileged, rich noblewoman.129 In her 
Discours sur le bonheur, Du Châtelet elaborates a theory of happiness as the fulfilment 
of one’s ‘passions & goûts’.130 Like Mandeville (and Shaftesbury) before her, Du 
Châtelet agrees that ‘l’amour-propre’ is the driving force for all human actions. While 
Mandeville makes the universal driving force of self-interest the basis of his theory of 
human social life, however, for Du Châtelet it is the individual differences that matter. 
What distinguishes her views from Mandeville’s theory of the pursuit of self-interest 
as the key to both individual and communal happiness is the idea that each individual 
is endowed not only with a unique combination of passions, but also that he or she is 
capable of rationally governing and enjoying them. Thus, for example, while like 
Mandeville she argues that being held in high esteem by others is an integral factor in 
a happy life, she also argues that it is only the esteem of ‘honnêtes gens’ that counts; 
now, to determine who these ‘honnêtes gens’ are, one needs a certain kind of education 
and social standing. Happiness, for Du Châtelet, is thus not attainable by everybody: 
‘Mon but n'est pas d'écrire pour toutes sortes de conditions & pour toutes sortes de 
personnes; tous les états ne sont pas susceptibles de la même espèce de bonheur.’131 
Happiness, then, is not the pursuit of bodily passions and self-interests. Instead, it 
means savouring the pleasures made possible by one’s use of reason:  
 
Quiconque a su si bien économiser son état & les circonstances où la fortune 
l'a placé, qu'il soit parvenu à mettre son esprit & son cœur dans une assiette 
tranquille, qu'il soit susceptible de tous les sentiments, de toutes les sensations 
agréables que cet état peut comporter, est assurément un excellent philosophe, 
& doit bien remercier la nature.132 
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As Catherine Larrère has shown, those French philosophers who were working to 
construct an enlightened moral science were often kindred in spirit to Mandeville.133 
Du Châtelet’s contemporary and fellow anglophile, the abbé de Saint-Pierre, for 
instance, asserted that ‘the mutable minds, opinions, appetites and passions of 
particular men’ were outside the purview of his philosophy. Instead, he proposed a 
government based on the rational calculation of the population’s overall happiness:  
 
Nous savons deja le prix en argent de certains plaisirs journaliers, & de 
l’exemtion de certaines peines, & nous le savons par notre depense journaliere 
& anuelle; or comme nous pouvons comparer plaisir à plaisir, peine à peine, 
depense à depense, nous pouvons par conséquent par cette comparaison 
estimer en revenu anuel la jouissance des nouveaux plaisirs anuels, l’Exemtion 
des nouvelles peines anuelles qu’un bon Reglement nous procurer, car nous 
pouvons facilement avoir des points de comparaison qui soient eux-mèmes 
deja bien calculez par une estimation en revenu anuel en argent.134  
 
Du Châtelet’s highly individualistic pursuit of happiness was, unlike Mandeville’s and 
Saint-Pierre’s, not amenable to calculation on the part of government political 
economists. Unlike Mandeville’s untrammelled pursuit of self-interest, it was also not 
suitable as a means of understanding and governing the masses. It relied, instead, on 
the elitist language of politeness that Mandeville had satirised as the result of pride.  
It is possible that Du Châtelet’s status as an intellectual excluded from the most 
respected circles of learning on the basis of her female body made her more acutely 
aware of some of the consequences of the growing authority of naturalists’ research. 
Her complaint about naturalists’ reduction of immaterial properties such as 
intelligence to observable physical causes also resonates with discussions of the 
animal soul. Academicians were not necessarily from noble backgrounds and 
clamoured for the government to institute salaried posts. As Mary Terrall has noted, 
this professionalisation made it more and more difficult for women philosophers like 
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Du Châtelet to have access to learned circles.135 By insisting on the uniqueness of the 
rationally cultivated mind, Du Châtelet implicitly critiqued the new culture of 
academic expertise from which she as a woman was excluded. As Erica Harth has 
shown, the salon culture and the Cartesian dualist philosophy of the seventeenth 
century afforded a handful of privileged women the opportunity to participate in 
learned discourse. This culture, however, helped bring about the idea of universally 
applicable mechanical laws that should be studied by (male) experts in observation 
and experiment; it thus ended up excluding women like Du Châtelet who insisted on 
the uniqueness of the human soul.136 It is, perhaps, not by accident that her vocabulary 
would be equally suitable for the latter topic: women, like animals, are mere 
‘creatures’ whose apparently intellectual understanding is reduced to physical causes. 
Although in her work on Newton, she demonstrates the mechanical lawfulness of the 
universe, she also clearly distinguished between living creatures and mechanical, 
inanimate bodies; in the letter to Maupertuis, for instance, she wrote:  
 
dieu peut avoir établi des lois de mouvement pour le choc des corps inanimés 
par lesquelles, ils conservent, ou communiquent, ou consomment dans des 
effets, la force qu’on leur imprime, mais cela n’empêche point qu’il ne reside 
dans les êtres animés un pouvoir soit mouvant, qui est un don du créateur 
comme l’intelligence, la vie &cc.137 
 
Just as for Mandeville, then, for Du Châtelet, there was a mysterious and noble force 
acting in humans in addition to the material, physical causes of behaviour. However, 
in order to rise above the physicality of the body, the mind needed certain material 
conditions, such as the time and money to study. Hence her interest in luxury and the 
passions as instruments for the pursuit of a rationally governed noble ‘self’ rather than 
ends in themselves. Where Mandeville showed luxury to be a spur for self-interested 
work, (and the concept of ‘work’ included the labour of the savant and expert),138  for 
Du Châtelet it was a precondition for the cultivation of the mind and thus only 
accessible to those born with enough privilege to enjoy it without physical labour.  
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Both Mandeville and Du Châtelet concurred in their assertion of the 
importance of the body and its pleasures, which was, perhaps, one of the crucial 
motivations for the French philosophe to begin her translation in the first place. For 
both, the human body took precedence over God and Christian teachings when it came 
to explaining and guiding human conduct. However, while the author of the Fable of 
the Bees suggested that humans were fundamentally equal, Du Châtelet insisted  ̶  and 
this is particularly clear in her essay on happiness  ̶  that individuals, though they all 
have bodily desires, differed in their passions as well as in their ability to use their 
reason to govern them. Of course, we can call Mandeville ‘democratic’139 and it is 
obvious how Du Châtelet’s status as rich aristocrat would lead her to conclude that 
people of different stations could not be driven by the same motives. At the same time, 
however, Mandeville’s ‘democratic’ hive does not entail an equal distribution of 
power; the ‘clever politicians’, can after all, exploit the self-interests of their 
subordinates to their own advantage.  
Thus, while most of Mandeville’s early critics in France attacked him for his 
refusal to acknowledge the ‘universal light of reason’, instilled in the human mind by 
God, Du Châtelet agreed with Mandeville on the importance of the body and its 
passions, but instead insisted that it should be treated as a vessel for rational self-
government. Du Châtelet’s oeuvre, then, can be read as a form of resistance to some 
of Mandeville’s ideas about the relationship between the body and the rational 
faculties, and between individual bodies and the social whole. Though in the debate 
on luxury she stood firmly on the side of those who endorsed the benefits brought on 
by the abundance of the ‘superfluous’ (like Voltaire, in his famous poem ‘Le 
Mondain’), her writings show an uneasiness with a social order based on commerce 
and a self-interested, competitive human nature. Striving to reconcile physics and 
metaphysics, her translation of the Fable constitutes an attempt to view human beings 
– or, rather, members of the nobility – as at the same time embodied and as more than 
a composite of bodies driven by the self-interest. Ultimately, of course, her resistance 
would turn out to be futile. Her aristocratic ideal of individual and social happiness 
was, after all, deeply rooted in the feudalistic regime whose fate of which was soon to 
be sealed. Nevertheless, her struggle to reconcile individual happiness, bodily passions 
                                                 
139 Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 113. 
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and moral responsibility is a fascinating contribution to the intellectual landscape of 
Enlightenment France, as well as a reminder of what preceded the spread of free-
market political economies based on the notion of whole populations rather than 
responsible individuals.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, then, we find a conception of the social whole as a 
‘natural body’ with its own law-like regularities that remained irreducible to the sum 
of its passionate, self-interested parts. Rather than governing moral subjects, 
Mandeville’s skilful politicians harnessed their animal passions. Mandeville’s Fable, 
we might say, provides an early example of a vitalistic body politic, understood almost 
like an animal body, forms and holds together. As we will see in chapter three, later 
vitalist authors, particularly after the 1740s, emphasised that bodies held together 
through spontaneous generation and forces such as attraction or sympathy. Others, like 
Mandeville, continued to emphasise importance of management of skilful politicians 
in providing the framework necessary for the harmony of the body politic. These 
authors, despite their differences, however, agreed that the body of the population took 
on a ‘life of its own’: they agreed, that is, that the parts of either animal or political 
bodies, themselves endowed with desire and passions, would interact and form a new 
body greater than sum of its part. Like Mandeville, these writers used insect imagery 
– or observations of living insects – to think through their theories of the social whole; 
as we will see, relations between animal and political bodies continue to echo one 
another throughout the century.  
Du Châtelet’s interpretation, on the other hand, expressed the disagreement of 
a learned noblewoman not so much with the Anglo-Dutch poet’s satire of supposed 
virtues, but with the Mandevillian suggestion that animal passions cannot be governed 
by reason and free will. At a time of intense debate around the nature of human nature 
and its relation to animals, that is, Du Châtelet rejects the suggestion that the human 
‘self’ (‘nousmesmes’) is dominated by the passions. In the next chapter, we shall see 
how these debates around animal passions and human reason played out in relation to 
discussions of insect nature.  
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Du Châtelet, on the contrary, excluded through her gender from those scientific 
institutions which increasingly held the authority to define those natural laws,140 could 
hardly accept a theory of governmentality based on the physicality of the body that 
rendered her moral philosophy of the self-fashioned aristocratic woman impossible. 
Her interpretation of the Fable also reflected her place in the shifting French social 
order, so different from the Dutch and English commercial societies where Mandeville 
was at home, she refuses this conception of the political body, maintaining instead that 
society was organised hierarchically, with free, autonomous, self-fashioning 
individuals standing above the masses. Mandeville’s reviewers, many of whom were 
members of religious orders, had similar, though certainly not identical objections to 
the scandalous English poem. Their world view depended, after all, on the idea that 
humans had been endowed with rational souls, which enabled them to consent to 
God’s eternal moral laws, expressed in the feudal hierarchies of their absolutist 
monarchy. The king’s subjects, that is, were not animal bodies, but human beings 
whose duty was obedience to the laws of the crown and the Church. The subsequent 
chapters turn to the ways in which this new governmentality of population played out 
in and was shaped by natural history of animals. Prior to this analysis, then, the French 
reviews of Mandeville’s Fable, as well as Emilie Du Châtelet’s work, serve, by way 
of contrast, as a reminder of what the new ideas of governance replaced.  
                                                 
140 Terrall, ‘Gendered Spaces, Gendered Audiences’. 
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Chapter Two. Animal Rationality and the Problem of Human Nature   
1. Introduction 
In 1740, the German mathematician Samuel König (1712-1757) caused a stir in the 
French Republic of letters with the publication in the annals of the Académie des 
sciences of a mathematical analysis of the shape of the hive’s cells.141 Having measured 
a sample of beeswax he had received from Réaumur, König could show that bees acted 
as perfect geometers when constructing their homes. Bees had found the solution to a 
problem which mathematicians had struggled to solve for centuries: with a limited 
amount of wax, they succeeded in building the biggest possible cells occupying the 
smallest possible amount of space in the hive and leaving the fewest empty spaces. 
The result was perfectly hexagonal cells arranged in double rows and varying in size 
according to their function. König struggled to provide a mathematical explanation for 
the bees’ complex constructions, but eventually succeeded in calculating (wrongly, as 
it turned out a few years later) the cells’ angles. As this chapter demonstrates, König’s 
concern with providing precise measurements for the geometry of bee architecture, 
though seemingly a mathematical game, played into crucial Enlightenment debates 
about human nature, or more specifically the nature of the rational individual.142 
Geometrical truths, for König and Réaumur, reflected the precise, rational and 
harmonious order of the divinely constructed natural world. The bees’ capacity to 
construct their cells in such a way as to make the most efficient use of their materials 
was seen as an example of the wider rational ordering of the natural world. The 
mindset of the human geometers able to mathematically demonstrate the insects’ 
rationality – the ‘esprit géométrique’ – was, similarly, thought to embody nature’s 
order and thus considered applicable to all areas of investigation.143 Jean le Rond 
d’Alembert (1717-1783), mathematician and editor of the Encyclopédie, described the 
geometrical spirit as ‘l'esprit de méthode & de justesse’; Bernard Bovier Le Fontenelle 
                                                 
141 Samuel König, ‘Solution du problème des cellules hexagones des ruches des abeilles’, Mémoires de 
l’Académie des Sciences de Paris, 1739, 30–35. 
142 Lorraine Daston has discussed how the development of classical probability relied on the idea that 
mathematics should describe the conduct of ‘rational men’ under conditions of uncertainty: Daston, 
Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, ch. two, ‘Expectation and the Reasonable Man,’ pp. 49-
110. 
143 As Isabel Knight describe the spirit of geometry, it was used as ‘a kind of ritual invocation of a 
whole cluster of virtues associated with science of all kinds, including the antimathematical science of 
the empirical tradition.’ Isabel F Knight, The Geometric Spirit: The Abbé de Condillac and the French 
Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 18–19. 
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(1657-1757), the influential member of three of the Parisian Academies, optimistically 
declared that the geometrical spirit, or ‘[l]’ordre, la netteté, la précision, l’exactitude’ 
was spreading in all fields of knowledge.144  
Indeed, the bees’ mathematical skills had a long philosophical history of being 
used as evidence for teleology in nature and for arguments, put forward by Thomas of 
Aquinas and his followers, which understood animal cognition as the result of divine 
purpose.145 The eighteenth-century debate about the bee cell has mostly been read as 
an attack on his theological motivation; as we will see, there was more still at stake.146 
Several of the most prominent French naturalists and philosophers in the period 
between the 1730s and 1760s reignited this age-old debate on the mathematics of the 
bee cell. In the process, they questioned the role of divine order in nature and proposed 
their own models of the mental and physical faculties of living beings (animal or 
human) and their differences from automata.147 Réaumur, who had started his career 
at the Academy of Sciences as élève géomètre, discussed the geometry of the hive’s 
cell at length in his memoir on bees (1740). Réaumur argued that the bees’ geometrical 
skills pointed to the order God had instituted in nature; the bees knew how to construct 
their cells because He had implanted this order in their souls. Discovering God’s order 
was, for Réaumur, the task of both the mathematician and the naturalist. The two 
professions, he argued, shared the same ‘esprit d’observation’, capable of ‘appercevoir 
ce qui a échappé aux autres’.148 Both mathematics and natural history were, for 
Réaumur, concerned with perceiving orderly relations between things. Thirteen years 
later, his fellow academician and rival naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de 
Buffon (1707-1788), launched an attack on Réaumur in his controversial Discours sur 
la nature des animaux (1753). Buffon, though himself a translator of Newtonian 
mathematics and a proponent of probability theory, asserted that mathematicians, as 
                                                 
144 Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Œuvres  de Fontenelle (Paris: Salmon, 1829), p. 54. 
145 Bernd Roling, ‘Die Geometrie der Bienenwabe: Albertus Magnus, Karl von Baer und die Debatte 
über das Vorstellungsvermögen und die Seele der Insekten zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit’, 
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, 80.2 (2013), 363–466. 
146 The classic reference remains Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French 
Thought, ed. by Keith Rodney Benson, trans. by Robert Ellrich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), p. 454. For my take on the question of Providence, I refer the reader to section 4 of the 
Introduction. 
147 On eighteenth-century automata, see Voskuhl; Simon Schaffer, ‘Enlightened Automata’, in The 
Sciences in Enlightened Europe, ed. by William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 126–65. 
148 René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, Mémoire pour servir à l’histoire des insectes: Sur les chenilles 
& sur les papillons (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1734), I, pp. 60–61. 
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they distanced themselves from their sense perceptions through use of abstractions, 
could not grasp the reality of living beings. For Buffon, bees were automata, but 
sensing automata; if they were capable of solving problems for human geometers, they 
did so thanks to their sensitivity to one another’s movements. Buffon was, in turn, 
attacked by the abbé de Condillac (1714-1780), the foremost thinker of sensationalism 
in France, agreed with Buffon on the importance of the senses for rational behaviour, 
but vehemently disagreed with what he thought was a contradiction in Buffon’s 
thought, namely his Cartesianist claim that humans had a rational soul in addition to 
their sensory experiences.149  
The answer to the question of the hive’s perfect geometry thus depended on 
one’s understanding of human rational conduct, and its connection to the mental 
different faculties – reason, the passions, the imagination – in determining the 
behaviour of living beings. The debate on bee cells, in other words, a debate not only 
about God’s role in the government of nature, was also a debate of the 
(self)government of the animal and human body. The question of whether bees where 
rational geometers or sensible automata was not, as this chapter suggests, an abstract 
discussion of animal cognition. The discovery of geometrical skills in animals was 
also an argument for the rationality of humans. Furthermore, the question of whether 
man’s (unquestioned) superiority over animals was grounded in a stronger ‘esprit 
géométrique’ or, on the contrary, in a more acute sensibility, served as the basis for 
theories of how to organise human social life. Condillac, in his writings on 
government, and François Quesnay in his writings on the ‘animal oeconomy’ of the 
body as well as on political economy, thus interrogated the connection between the 
rational order of nature, the rationality of animals or humans, and the most rational 
order for human society.  
The following sections discuss the unfolding of these debates in natural 
historical, philosophical and political economic writings, arguing that discussions of 
rationality, and the ‘esprit géométrique’, served as a bridge that linked natural 
historical ideas of animals, moral philosophies such as Condillac’s, and writings on 
government. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section two gives an overview 
of the debates around the animal soul, which provide the background to the debate on 
                                                 
149 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Traité des animaux: où, après avoir fait des observations critiques sur 
le sentiment de Descartes & sur celui de M. de Buffon, on entreprend d’expliquer leurs principales 
facultés (Amsterdam; Paris: Jombert, 1755); Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self, pp. 114–15. 
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the bee cell, which, in turn, is discussed in detail in section three. The final section 
shows how the same debate on geometry, rationality and sensibility pervaded also 
writings on political economy.  
 
2. The Self and the Question of the Animal Soul  
As we will see in this chapter, discussions about, and observations of, animals 
revolved around the question of what it means to be an individual mind or body, 
whether animal or human. Insects, and social insects in particular, provide a pertinent 
window onto the question of personhood, because they allowed eighteenth-century 
thinkers to observe and debate the role of the individual in large collectives. In 
eighteenth-century France, there was no one term for the self; writers variously 
referred to ‘âme’, ‘personne’, ‘soi’, and ‘moi’, though the latter two continued to be 
used mainly as pronouns.150 Given that each of these terms referred to slightly different 
understandings of personhood, I will try to use the term favoured by each of the writers 
discussed.  
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the question of the emergence of the 
modern view of personhood is, of course, not new. An earlier narrative of the 
emergence of the modern ‘self’, an independent and rational actor who could thus 
enter into exchange with similarly atomistic individuals,151 has been shown, in the 
wake of poststructuralist theory and cultural history, to have been more complex and 
uneven.152 Close to the purpose of this chapter, Jan Goldstein has shown that, 
modernity has produced not only theories of self-possessive individuals (what she 
calls ‘unitary’ or ‘holistic’ selves) but also of individual ‘mental stuff’ as 
                                                 
150 On terminology, see Charly Coleman, The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the 
French Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp. 14–15; Goldstein, The Post-
Revolutionary Self, pp. 115–18. 
151 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989); Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of 
Economic Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Crawford Brough Macpherson, The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). 
152 As Roy Porter puts it, historians have set out to ‘rethink our received grand saga of the self’ Rewriting 
the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present, ed. by Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997), 
p. 8. To this purpose, the contributors to the volume address a wide range of contexts (from medieval 
to postmodern) and issues (such as the importance of theatre or of gendered histories). In a recent 
revision of the French case, Charly Coleman has analysed currents of thought and practice in 
eighteenth-century France that relied on or shaped what he calls a ‘dispossessive self’: Quietists, but 
also thinkers such as Diderot, Rousseau or Robespierre among others, ‘valorised the human person’s 
loss of ownership over itself and external objects.’ Coleman, Virtues of Abandon, p. 4. 
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discontinuous and fragmentary.153 While philosophers such as Taylor argued that there 
was one continuous story of the Western self stretching from Greek antiquity all the 
way to the twentieth century, Goldstein has demonstrated that in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the unitary self was contested by sensationist thinkers such as 
Condillac.154 Condillac, following John Locke’s theory of cognition, argued that all 
knowledge originates in the senses, rather than in innate ideas. As we shall see, this 
raised questions as to the differences between humans and animals, given that the 
latter, just like the former, were evidently capable of sensations. This chapter takes its 
cue from a remark Goldstein makes in her discussion of Condillac. She argues that the 
philosopher was never very interested in the question of how distinct sense 
impressions could form into a coherent, unitary and stable ‘moi’. She thus finds it 
‘comic’ that his only affirmation of such a self would occur in his discussion of 
animals, rather than in his more well-regarded treatises on cognition, and argues that 
even there, Condillac only asserts a unitary self because he considered himself 
‘compelled to rebut’ Buffon’s dualism.155 As this chapter sets out to show, however, 
debates on animal cognition, and its similarity to or difference from human cognition, 
were an important locus for wider debates on what it means to be human, and in 
particular a rational man. This chapter, then, approaches the question of the self from 
a new angle by looking not at those writings singled out by historians as most 
significant in bringing about the shift to the modern self (a lineage of mostly 
philosophical texts), but by approaching the question sideways, so to speak. When 
eighteenth-century naturalists observed insects and other animals, they did so on the 
back of over a century of debates between major thinkers of most European countries 
on the question of whether or not animals possessed a (rational) soul, and, related to 
this idea, whether or not they could be considered anything more than machines. The 
question of the soul was important also because it raised the related issue of rationality: 
if the soul was the source of rational thought and conduct, why did animals exhibit 
seemingly rational behaviour?  
The consensus before the 1750s, as Cohen Rosenfield has shown, was that 
animals had some form of soul capable of feeling and some (inferior) degree of 
                                                 
153 Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self. 
154 For Goldstein’s take on Taylor, see The Post-Revolutionary Self, pp. 16-17. 
155 Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self, pp. 114–15. 
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reason.156 Positions such as those held by Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751) were 
considered a threat to the social order by many of his contemporaries.157 La Mettrie, in 
his L’Homme machine (1748), had reached the conclusion that the human abilities 
Descartes had explained through the rational soul were themselves a consequence of 
the disposition of the material human body; he thus brought to its extreme, 
materialistic conclusion a century of arguments about the animal as machine.158 On the 
contrary, the much more orthodox members of the Academy of Sciences, intent on 
fortifying their authority as savants contributing to the state’s prosperity, strove to put 
God at the centre of the world they observed and explained, and thus used observations 
of animals to prove the existence of a feeling and thinking animal soul.159 Most 
academicians were what Lorraine Daston calls ‘philosophical moderates’. 160  They 
believed, that is, that though absolutely certain knowledge is impossible to obtain, the 
world had been divinely arranged according to a rational order, which careful 
observations and the avoidance of metaphysical speculation on final causes could 
come reasonably close to describing. Academicians’ defence of the existence of the 
animal soul was part of the wider project of describing the natural world as the 
realisation of a divine plan.  
In one of the most famous and extensive research projects on animals 
undertaken by the Academy, for instance, the court anatomist Claude Perrault (1613-
1688) adopted a mechanist view of the body, but also attributed a self-moving soul to 
animals.161 Echoing some of the ideas of one of the earliest opponents of the beast-
machine theory, the physician and founding member of the Academy Marin Cureau 
de la Chambre (1594-1669), Perrault argued in the fourth volume of his Essais de 
Physique (1688) that animals had a soul because they were masters over their own 
bodies: 
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158 See Cohen Rosenfield, Beast-Machine, particularly Part 2, chapter 2. 
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il est vray que si l’on connoissoit un animal comme on connoît une horloge, 
on le connoîtroit parfaitement ; parce que la connoissance de l’un & de l’autre 
ne consiste qu’à sçavoir qu’elles sont leurs manieres d’agir : or comme elles 
semblent fort differentes, une machine agissant necessairement, & toûjours 
suivant un certain ordre qui dépend de ses dispositions, & y ayant apparence 
qu’un animal se sert de ces dispositions de manière qu’il en est le maître ; on 
ne peut pas dire que l’on soit aussi assuré de sçavoir comment les organes d’un 
animal agissent, comme il est certain que l’on connoît comment un contrepoids 
ou un ressort font aller une horloge ; & l’on ne sçait point ce qui est cause 
qu’un chien qui a perdu son maître ne mange point, comme on est assûré que 
ce n’est pas le chagrin qui empêche une horloge d’aller.162 
 
Perrault, also on the basis of his authority as anatomist, subverted the Cartesian 
analogy of the beast with the machine by arguing that animals appeared to exhibit both 
feelings (the dog’s sadness) and will (animals are ‘masters’ of their mechanically 
functioning bodies). Perrault insisted on the existence of an inorganic soul governing 
mechanically functioning human as well as animal bodies. With a sense of 
epistemological modesty later echoed by Réaumur, however, he also affirmed that the 
ultimate causes of living beings could not be known; the task of the anatomist was to 
observe what could be seen and if he did hypothesise about the causes of bodily forms 
and functions, to do so without assuming that humans could ever attain complete 
knowledge. Perrault’s most famous work, an account of the dissected animals of Louis 
XIV’s menagerie titled Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire naturelle des animaux (1676) 
was republished in three volumes in 1733 and 1734, the very year that Réaumur’s own 
memoirs began to appear.163 While there were crucial differences between the works 
of the two academicians – most importantly the shift from exotic, spectacular and 
individualised animals in Perrault to Réaumur’s insects – they agreed on the probable 
existence of the animal soul. Réaumur, careful not to assign causes when these were 
unobservable, refused to decide on what exactly drove insects to behave in certain 
                                                 
162 Claude Perrault, Essais de physique, ou Recueil de plusieurs traités touchant les choses naturelles 
(Paris: Jean Baptiste Coignard, 1688), IV, pp. 21–22. 
163 On the publication history of Perrault’s memoirs, see Anita Guerrini, ‘Perrault, Buffon and the 
Natural History of Animals’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 66.4 (2012), 393–409. She argues 
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ways, let alone on whether they possessed a ‘soul’;164 his Mémoires are thus peppered 
with questions like the following: ‘Mais pouvons-nous nous promettre de découvrir 
les differentes fins que [la nature] s’est proposées dans la construction de chacun de 
ses ouvrages, & dans l’arrangement de chacune de leurs parties.’165 Like Perrault, the 
naturalist thus circumvented the theologically problematic question of the animal soul 
by arguing that the naturalist’s task was to make visible what could be observed rather 
than speculate on immaterial causes.166  
   
3. The Geometry of the Bee Cell: Rationality and the Problem of the Human-
Animal Distinction 
Réaumur’s approach to the question of animal nature and animal rationality is 
exemplified in his discussion of the way in which bees construct their geometrically 
almost perfect cells. Relating the discussion among mathematicians such as König, 
the naturalist admits that in order to understand the bees’ construction, one needs to 
be proficient in the newest geometrical theories: ‘Il faut même être aussi habile en 
géométrie qu’on l’est devenu depuis que les Nouvelles méthodes ont été découvertes 
pour connaître la perfection des regles que les abeilles suivent dans leur travail.’167 
Studying the hive was, for Réaumur, a way of furthering mathematical knowledge, 
given that God had transmitted His knowledge to the bees which in turn could serve 
as models for ‘nos Archimedes modernes’.168 It was, however, not only the bees’ 
perfect geometrical skills that the naturalist was interested in (indeed he referred 
interested readers to König’s memoir for the geometrical demonstration itself). In his 
explanation of the construction of the bee hive in the fifth volume of his insect 
memoirs, Réaumur emphasised that bees, like human geometers, could err when 
constructing their homes and then struggled to correct their mistakes:  
                                                 
164 Abramovici even goes so far as to find materialist tendencies in Réaumur. He argues that Réaumur’s 
insect history was ultimately too close to a ‘rococo’ aesthetic to have any deeper influence on 
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165 Réaumur, Mémoires I, p. 23. 
166 Harold Cook makes a similar argument with regards to Herman Boerhaave’s medical practice; see 
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elles peuvent manquer de donner au premier rhombe la grandeur & les angles 
qui lui conviennent; mais aussi elles sçavent remédier à leurs méprises. Elles 
ajustent alors plus de piéces les unes contre les autres, afin que la pyramide 
prenne une figure qui s’éloigne le moins qu’il est possible de celle qu’elle 
aurait dû avoir.169 
 
Though Réaumur admired the bees’ geometrical perfection, it was the insects’ 
capacity to fail that he was most interested in. In his descriptions of the errors 
committed by bees and of their strategies for remedying them, Réaumur was 
describing not only the hard-working animals of traditional folklore, but also animals 
capable of more than simply executing a mechanical programme. As the active voice 
(‘elles ajustent’) underlines, the naturalist considered that the bees were more than 
mere automata driven by mechanical impulsion. Indeed, in several passages on bees, 
Réaumur explicitly labelled the insects’ principal mode of action ‘intelligence’. The 
insects’ capacity to choose the most suitable pyramidical shape, for Réaumur, proved 
that the choice was based on intelligence, not mechanical necessity or randomness. 
Ultimately, of course, the bees’ individuel intelligence was limited for the naturalist, 
but it pointed to the existence of ‘une intelligence, qui voit l’immensité de tous genres, 
& toutes leurs combinaisons, plus lumineusement & plus distinctement que l’unité ne 
peut être vû par nos Archimédes modernes.’170 Though Réaumur saw the geometry of 
the hive as proof for nature’s divinely planned order, he also complicated the strict 
distinction between human rationality and animal instinctiveness. While he did not 
explicitly argue for the existence of reasoning processes in insects, Réaumur described 
how each individual bee acted in the most rational way possible so as not waste the 
resources of the bee hive as a whole and to contribute to the ‘perfection & oeconomie’ 
of its hive’s architecture.171 
Whether or not Réaumur had read Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, his natural 
historical research seemed to contradict the Fable’s central claim that it was possible 
to contribute to the good of the whole without intending to do so.172 It was not self-
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interest that drove Réaumur’s bees, but the reproduction of their hive; as Réaumur put 
it, ‘l’unique fonction’ of insects was to ‘travailler à la multiplication de leur espece’.173 
Moreover, rather than indulge in luxury, they worked to produce as much as possible 
for their commonwealth (and for their human beekeepers). Written at the height of the 
early-eighteenth-century debates about the moral dangers or advantages of luxury, 
Réaumur’s treatise on bees thus seemed to show that nature’s creatures were made to 
work for the fulfilment of God’s order, not to consume excessively for their own 
benefit. As historians have outlined, the luxury debate revolved around anxieties about 
the usurpation of the traditional signs of the high nobility’s social distinction by the 
nouveaux-riches, whether lowly nobles or rich non-nobles.174 In protest against what 
they considered excessive, members of the high nobility began to champion a return 
to the supposed frugality and simple aesthetic values of the ancients.175 Réaumur’s 
description of the bees as hard-working oeconomists fitted neither the high-aristocrats’ 
rejection of luxury (at least for the lower classes) nor Mandeville’s praise of luxury as 
an engine of civilisation; instead, Réaumur’s insects anticipate the civic-minded 
defence of ‘patriotic’ luxury of the 1760s, endorsed also by the physiocrats. As John 
Shovlin has argued, ‘middling elites’, including provincial nobles and rich, rural non-
noble landowners repackaged certain kinds of luxury as contributions to the common 
good by spurring agricultural production.176 Such a vision also reflects Réaumur’s own 
social situation. His grandfather had been a ‘receveur de douanes’, and thus one of the 
rich seventeenth-century bourgeois who had been able to buy a noble title.177 A life-
long bachelor, Réaumur renounced his responsibilities as noble pater familias in 
favour of his career at the Académie des Sciences.178 As an academician, he considered 
it his task to improve the monarchy’s ‘oeconomy’ and, like his bees, to make each of 
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its parts as efficient as possible.179 In his observations on anchor construction, Réaumur 
argued that the application of geometry would significantly improve the quality and 
quantity of anchors produced. He admitted that geometrical perfection was impossible 
to obtain, though ‘il est toujours avantageux de connaître le but auquel on doit 
tendre.’180 Geometry, and the description of the methods obtained thanks to 
observational and mathematical skills, are thereby considered much more important 
in the construction process than the workers constructing the anchors (they are hardly 
mentioned at all in the memoir).181 The purpose of the project on the arts of which the 
memoir on anchors formed part was thus to obtain descriptions of the most rational 
methods of production possible, so that workers anywhere could carry them out. 
Descriptions of the labour of bees and the labour of human workers in Réaumur’s 
oeuvre thereby echo one another: geometers outline rational instructions, to be 
executed by labourers capable of following rational plans but not of using their 
imagination to deviate from them. In contrast to the unenlightened human labourers 
Réaumur tried to reform followed only a ‘routine aveugle’, Réaumur praised the bees’ 
capacity to adapt their plans to changed circumstances.182 Réaumur’s attribution of a 
soul to bees, then, did not make them less docile creatures; on the contrary, it meant 
that they were capable of amending their errors and thus of labouring more efficiently 
for the improvement of their hive than (human-built) automata could do.  
By contrast, Buffon, Réaumur’s opponent in the Academy, emphasised the 
power of humans to govern themselves and their societies through the wilful creation 
of their own laws and to creatively transform, rather than merely manage, the natural 
world.183 Man, for Buffon, had two ‘natures’, one material – just like all other animals 
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– and one spiritual.184 Both natures had the power to feel sensations and passions, but 
only the latter had the capacity to develop rational thought, memory and, crucially, 
spiritual imagination. Although animals (and man’s animal nature) could recall past 
sensations, only human memory was capable of comparing past, present and possibly 
future sensations. Similarly, Buffon argued that animals and humans shared a 
corporeal imagination, which represented images of objects to the inner sense and 
provoked unreflective, even violent and dangerous reactions.185 This imagination was 
responsible for turning past and present sensations into passions, which were very 
difficult for the rational faculty to control and could even lead to the downfall of 
man;186 in the case of unenlightened workers, for example, their ‘présomption’ and 
‘vanité’ made them blind to the advantages of enlightened methods of production.187 
It was this kind of imagination that, as Goldstein has shown, was considered by 
eighteenth-century philosophers to be the most vulnerable and dangerous of the human 
mental faculties.188 The spiritual imagination, on the other hand, was the faculty that 
gave man the power to compare ideas and images, or, as Buffon put it, ‘de saisir 
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vivement les circonstances et de voir nettement les rapports éloignés des objets que 
nous considérons’.189 The spiritual imagination granted man the liberty to not only 
discover the predetermined rational course of action but also to create ‘des productions 
nouvelles’.190  The spiritual imagination distinguished not only man from animal, but 
also geometers, behaving as if they were automata, from true philosophers.191 Though 
Buffon himself had begun his career as a mathematician, in his work on natural history 
he insisted that the living world could never be understood through the tools of 
mathematics. In his programmatic discourse on method in natural history, Buffon 
argued that mathematical truths were a consequence of arbitrary and abstract 
definitions, and could thus reveal only what mathematicians had themselves 
presupposed: ‘comme les définitions sont les seuls principes sur lesquels tout est 
établi, & qu’elles sont arbitraires & relatives, toutes les conséquences qu’on en peut 
tirer sont également arbitraires & relatives’.192 This was true also for man’s capacity 
for knowledge. Since all knowledge came from the senses, and the senses were 
themselves effects rather than causes, the most man could only ever know were 
‘general effects’ that explained other effects.193 Contrary to what geometers wanted to 
believe, Buffon argued, man could never grasp certainties, only probabilities and 
‘vraisemblances’. Unlike orthodox Christian thinkers such as Réaumur, Buffon did 
not put faith in God’s creative powers to order the world according to a preordained 
plan; while both naturalists thus warned against the attempt to speculate about final 
causes, Buffon went further in asserting that such an order might not exist. Nature’s 
causes were so varied and even disorderly that analogies were the closest man could 
get to physical truths.194 Mathematics was of little use in this enterprise, at least 
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initially, given that it could only account for simple, abstract entities, and not the 
complexities and particularities of living bodies. Buffon was not absolutely opposed 
to mathematics, but he insisted that it only yielded useful truths when combined with 
observation, understood as a product of the imagination: 
 
lorsque vous avez imaginé par la Physique le comment, c’est-à-dire lorsque 
vous avez vû qu’un tel effet pourroit bien dépendre de telle cause, vous 
appliquez ensuite le calcul pour vous assurer du combien de cet effet combiné 
avec sa cause, & si vous trouvez que le résultat s’accorde avec les observations, 
la probabilité que vous avez deviné juste, augmente si fort qu’elle devient une 
certitude.195 
 
While bees, understood as automatic geometers, were capable of constructing abstract 
geometrical shapes, only men, using their spiritual imagination for observing natural 
particulars (note the conflation between ‘imaginer’ and ‘voir’), could be said to reach 
knowledge of living bodies.196 
In the polemical Discours sur la nature des animaux, included in the Histoire’s 
fourth volume, Buffon spent several pages discussing bees in order to refute the model 
of animal behaviour – and, implicitly, of human nature – put forward by Réaumur. He 
used the insects as his main example of an ‘animal en troupe’ to compare and contrast 
with ‘l’homme en société’.197 The example of the bee cell served Buffon as an 
illustration of his claim that animals, even ‘social’ animals, could never teach man 
lessons about what he called ‘l’art de bien gouverner’.198 He thus argued for the 
superiority of human over all other animals, and implicitly accused Réaumur of 
ignoring the difference between humans, masters of their own fate, and mechanical 
                                                 
vrai-semblable, et qui me paroît fondée sur de bonnes analogies ; car je vois que dans la Nature tous les 
êtres organisés qui sont dénués de sens, sont aussi privés du mouvement progressif, et que tous ceux 
qui en sont pourvûs ont tous aussi cette qualité active de mouvoir leurs membres et de changer de lieu. 
Je vois de plus qu’il arrive souvent que cette action des objets sur les sens met à l’instant l’animal en 
mouvement, sans même que la volonté paroisse y avoir part, et qu’il arrive toûjours, lorsque c’est la 
volonté qui détermine le mouvement, qu’elle a été elle-même excitée par la sensation qui résulte de 
l’impression actuelle des objets sur les sens, ou de la réminiscence d’une impression antérieure.’ 
Buffon, ‘Discours sur les animaux’, pp. 17-18. 
195 Buffon, Histoire naturelle vol. 1, p. 58. 
196 Buffon does not deny that mathematics could be fruitfully applied to objsects such as the planetary 
system, which for him more readily lend themselves to abstraction than the bodies studied by natural 
historians; see Buffon, ‘De la manière d’étudier,’ pp. 58-62. 
197 Buffon, Histoire naturelle, vol. IV, p. 90. 
198 Buffon, Histoire naturelle, vol. IV, p. 91. 
 93 
 
animals, devoid even of instincts. Man was part of nature for Buffon, which made it 
possible to include him in a work of natural history. Despite this, however, the 
naturalist insisted throughout the volumes of his masterpiece that humans were 
absolutely different from animals because they possessed a second, spiritual nature in 
addition to their material bodies. In his Discours sur l’homme, the author had given 
two key pieces of evidence for the existence of a soul in man, but not in animals. The 
first, following a long line of Cartesian thinkers, was the lack of language in other 
animals.199 The second and main argument against the animal soul was the fact that 
man had domesticated animals; human superiority was thus grounded in the capacity 
to govern and control other beings:  
 
On conviendra que le plus stupide des hommes suffit pour conduire le plus 
spirituel des animaux, il le commande et le fait servir à ses usages, et c’est 
moins par force et par adresse que par supériorité de nature, et parce qu’il a un 
projet raisonné, un ordre d’actions et une suite de moyens par lesquels il 
contraint l’animal à lui obéir, car nous ne voyons pas que les animaux qui sont 
plus forts et plus adroits, commandent aux autres et les fassent servir à leur 
usage;200 
 
Buffon argued, in other words, that humans were superior to animals because they 
were capable of governing others, not through violence, but through the pursuit of a 
‘projet raisonné’. Where Réaumur had seen insects as evidence for God’s ‘projet 
raisonné’, that is, Buffon considered man’s subjugation of animals as proof of the 
human capacity to realise their own creative projects. Buffon, instead, took the fact 
that bees’ architectural skills could be used to illustrate complex geometrical problems 
pointed as evidence for the insects’ mechanical nature. In this sense, the fact that bees 
succeeded in constructing identical hexagonal cells is easily explained as the 
consequence of the mechanical arrangement of their bodies, indistinguishable from 
one another. Just like Réaumur, he honed in on the possibility, or rather, in his case, 
impossibility, of animals making mistakes. The cells’ perfection, he argued, should 
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not give rise to admiration, since perfection could only serve to prove the mechanical 
nature of the bees’ work. Humans err because they have the privilege of being able to 
use the related and uniquely human faculties of imagination and reason, while soulless 
insects (just like any other animal) have no choice but to follow the invariable path set 
for them by nature and her laws. Buffon’s argument here echoes that of Descartes, 
who similarly denied animals a free will on the basis of the perfection of their 
actions.201 The inability of animals to err was thus fundamental to both thinkers’ 
theories of animal nature; for Cohen Rosenfield, Descartes’ entire thought stemmed 
from his realisation as a young man of ‘the contrast between the perfect regularity of 
animal behaviour and the hesitant uncertainty of human rational conduct’.202 Thus, for 
both Descartes and Buffon, living bodies, whether animal or human, operated 
according to the laws of mechanics, and humans alone could use their reason to will 
some, though not all, of their movements. Bees, according to Buffon, were determined 
by the physical arrangement of their machine-like bodies. Acting as perfect geometers, 
they had not willed any of their actions and their architectural skills were the 
consequence of their physical nature in the same way that, for example, the hexagonal 
scales arranged on a fish’s body or hexagonal salt crystals did not will their form. The 
comparison between living and non-living forms is not a coincidence. The fact that 
bees could build perfectly geometrical cells could quite simply be explained as a 
logical necessity following from their body shape: ‘Il est donc nécessaire aussi, 
puisque le corps des abeilles est cylindrique, que leurs cellules soient hexagones’.203 
Bees’ cells are shaped hexagonally because the mathematical arrangement of their 
body parts gave rise to their mathematically perfect cells.  
Despite Buffon’s polemical insistence on the mechanical nature of the bees’ 
behaviours, however, he also posited a crucial difference between insects and 
insensitive automata: insects could receive and process sense impressions.204 Buffon 
had explained earlier in the Discours sur les animaux how the animal oeconomy of 
the bee bodies worked; the key for understanding the functioning of living bodies, he 
argued, lay in the senses. From his comparisons between living and non-living 
organised beings, Buffon concluded that any movement on the part of the animal must 
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be the consequence of a sense impression, without the need for the animal to will its 
own movements. Once an object had made its impression on the senses of the animal 
(or the human being), this impression awakened a ‘desire’ that would prompt the 
animal to use its body to satisfy it. The same principle applied to needs, which for 
Buffon were simply inner sense impressions felt by the brain.205 The difference 
between the brain and the other organs was that the former possessed greater 
sensibility and was thus able to preserve the impressions (‘ébranlements’) made on it 
for longer than the other sense organs; the brain also transmitted sense impressions to 
the nerves, which then caused the body to move.206 One of the main purposes of 
studying animals thus becomes clear: by comparing actions and behaviours in humans 
that could be caused by the inner sense of the brain and those that could not, the 
observer could learn what was a result of the exclusively human spiritual substance, 
or soul.207 An important part of this spiritual soul for Buffon was the faculty of the 
imagination. Beasts, Buffon argued, only feel as long as their senses are moved 
(‘ébranlés’) by an object; humans, on the other hand, are capable of imagining an 
absent object. Where for Réaumur it was necessary to attribute an independent 
intelligence and the capacity for choice to each insect, Buffon claimed that their 
sensibility to one another was sufficient to explain the complexities of their collective 
work. Echoing the opposition between Réaumur and Buffon, Cartesian critics of 
sensationism argued that scattered sense impressions could not explain the workings 
of the mind, insisting instead on the existence of the soul as an independent 
substance.208 While Buffon seemed to agree with the Cartesian theory of the beast-
machine, he combined it with the sensationist insistence on the communication of 
sense perceptions as the basis for collective existence.209 It was, then, through the 
actions of the senses that bees were capable of building their elaborate hives. As each 
bee sensed the ‘impulsions’ given to her by her fellow bees, the insects’ bodies 
necessarily arranged themselves into constructing their geometrical cells. While the 
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single bees ‘ont moins de génie que le chien, le singe et la pluspart des animaux’,210 
the sensibility of their bodies gave them the appearance of – and similar results to – 
the workings of intelligence.  
Animals act because they sense, but they are incapable of reflecting on and 
comparing their own sensations; the bees feel pleasure or pain, but do not will or think. 
While Buffon argued for the unique capacity of humans to shape their own destiny, in 
other passages it becomes clear that only a small minority of men (rather than women), 
and only in their adulthood, actually use their ‘moral’ side.211 This can be explained 
through his insistence that the relations between sensing bodies, rather than immaterial 
souls, can be enough to explain complex social orders. Detailing the differences 
between the sense of self (what Buffon calls ‘âme’) in men and in animals, the 
naturalist asserts: 
 
d’autres enfin, et c’est la multitude, ont si peu de vie dans l’âme, et une si 
grande indolence à penser, qu’ils ne comparent et ne combinent rien, rien au 
moins du premier coup d’œil ; il leur faut des sensations fortes et répétées mille 
et mille fois, pour que leur âme vienne enfin à en comparer quelqu’une et à 
former une idée : ces hommes sont plus ou moins stupides, et semblent ne 
différer des animaux que par ce petit nombre d’idées que leur âme a tant de 
peine à produire.212  
 
If human superiority is grounded in the capacity to form ideas through comparing the 
past and the present, and if the great majority of men only demonstrate this capacity 
in negligible, short-lived moments, it follows that most of what Buffon has to say on 
human excellence applies to a very small minority only. Human superiority was real 
for Buffon, but he found it not in the individual but in the human collective. Adriana 
Benzaquén, in her analysis of Buffon’s views of childhood, argues that even though 
Buffon thought childhood did not influence the identity of the adult individual, he 
posited that the long period of the child’s dependency on the adult was responsible for 
human sociability and thus the difference of the human species from all other 
                                                 
210 Buffon, ‘Discours sur les animaux’, p. 93. 
211 Londa Schiebinger, ‘Why Mammals Are Called Mammals: Gender Politics in Eighteenth-Century 
Natural History’, The American Historical Review, 98 (1993), 382–411 (pp. 388–89). 
212 Buffon, Histoire naturelle, vol. IV, pp. 52-53. 
 97 
 
animals.213 Man only became truly human once he was in full control of his rational 
and sensible abilities; the period of childhood thus did not count towards Buffon’s 
calculations of the length of life for the human.214 For the spiritual principle to truly 
develop, human children needed to be educated by others: ‘c’est par la communication 
des pensées d’autrui que l’enfant en acquiert et devient lui-même pensant et 
raisonnable, et sans cette communication il ne seroit que stupide ou fantasque, selon 
le degré d’inaction ou d’activité de son sens intérieur matériel.’215 Man alone, that is, 
remained on the level of the animal; it was only through sociability (and education) 
that men and women became truly human.216 Even if, that is, the multitude of men did 
not use their capacity to reason, the rational observer could influence them by 
intervening not on the level of the individual, but by educating the collective.217 All 
the while upholding that all men had a dual nature as moral and as physical beings, 
Buffon thus suggested that for the purpose of governing them, rational observers could 
treat them as mere sensible bodies, just as they did in the government of domestic and 
farm animals. Although Buffon insisted on the nobility and superiority of the human 
mental faculties, his description of the bee swarm also provided an example of a social 
order based purely on sensations. Thus, defending himself against possible accusations 
of having presented a highly reductive view of animals, Buffon insisted that  
 
bien loin de tout ôter aux animaux, je leur accorde tout, à l’exception de la 
pensée et de la réflexion ; ils ont le sentiment, ils l’ont même à un plus haut 
degré que nous ne l’avons, ils ont aussi la conscience de leur existence actuelle, 
mais ils n’ont pas celle de leur existence passée ; ils ont des sensations, mais il 
leur manque la faculté de les comparer, c’est-à-dire, la puissance qui produit 
les idées ; car les idées ne sont que des sensations comparées, ou, pour mieux 
dire, des associations de sensations.218  
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The bees described by the naturalist, then, lacked the reason and spiritual imagination, 
that is the capacity to not only retain and imagine ideas, but also to compare them. 
Even without this faculty, however, they were capable of forming a complex and 
(re)productive society. Just as Buffon had said of man, the single bee – the ‘mouche 
solitaire’ – had very little ‘génie’;219 despite Buffon’s own protestations that bees were 
automata, then, there was, in fact, an important link between bees and men, made 
possible the idea that the insects were sensible automata: both needed the company of 
their fellows to develop their ‘génie’, and both did so by transmitting and receiving 
one another’s sensations.  
A third voice to join the debate on the meaning of the bee cell for an 
understanding of ‘rational’ man was the philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, 
foremost interpreter in France of Locke’s sensationism.220 Condillac radicalised 
Locke’s sensationism by reducing all ideas to the result of sense impressions where 
Locke had argued that ideas stemmed both from the sense and from reflection.221 True 
knowledge was to be reached by a process Condillac called ‘analyse’, by which he 
meant the process of breaking down ideas in order to untangle what is based in sense 
experience from what has been erroneously added by imagination.222 In his Traité des 
animaux (1755), Condillac pointed out the contradictions in Buffon’s assertion that 
animals were mere machines, and thus in his stark distinction between mechanical 
animal actions and human reason. Since Buffon admitted that beasts had sensations 
that gave them pleasure or pain, Condillac denied that they could be reduced to 
automata.223 Unwilling to accept Buffon’s two natures, Condillac, following Locke, 
attributed all actions of living beings to sensations. Réaumur had hinted at the 
possibility that even animals adapt to their changing circumstances, though, of course, 
according to a fixed range of possible behaviours, implanted into their bodies and souls 
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by the Creator. Condillac, by contrast, claimed that animal instincts were nothing but 
the reactions of the sensory apparatus to circumstances experienced so often that the 
reaction had become instinctual (‘l’instinct n’est que [l’]habitude privée de 
réflexion’).224 Just like Buffon, Condillac argued that animals and humans navigated 
their environment through their senses – alerting the individual of beneficial or 
harmful elements in their surroundings through pleasure or pain – in order to fulfil 
their bodies’ needs.225 If men and animals were so visibly different, this could simply 
be explained by the fact that men’s bodies, and, as a consequence, their needs, were 
infinitely more complex: ‘On voit aisément comment, dans la société, la multitude des 
besoins et la différence des conditions donnent à l’homme des passions dont les bêtes 
ne sont pas susceptibles.’226 Since animals had fewer needs than men, they needed to 
reflect less and could rely, for the most part, on instincts they had acquired early in 
their lives.227 
His treatise on animals, Condillac claimed, had been prompted by Buffon’s 
contradictory Discours. Though the abbé agreed with Buffon on the importance of the 
senses, he could not accept the latter’s theory of the ‘homo duplex’. Condillac thus 
took issue with Buffon’s explanation of the bee hive as a product of purely mechanical 
laws. This, he argued, contradicted the naturalist’s own realisation that animals were 
capable of feeling. Using the example of the hive’s hexagonal cells, the abbé accused 
Buffon of the cardinal sin of eighteenth-century natural history, that of creating 
imaginary arguments ‘tout-à-fait contraires aux observations’ (and to Condillac’s own 
system of ‘analyse’): 
 
Je lui accorde que les ouvrages de dix mille automates seront réguliers, comme 
il le suppose, (…) pour-vu que les conditions suivantes soient remplies ; 1.° 
que dans tous les individus, la forme extérieure et intérieure soit exactement la 
même ; 2.° que le mouvement soit égal et conforme ; 3.° qu’ils agissent tous 
les uns contre les autres avec des forces pareilles ; 4.° qu’ils commencent tous 
                                                 
224 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, ‘Dictionnaire des synonymes de la langue française. Tome IV. Ici-
Qui’ <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90583058> [accessed 5 August 2015]. 
225 Condillac, Traité des animaux, pp. 87-92. 
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doivent être bornées à l’instinct.’ Condillac, Traité des animaux, p. 109. 
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à agir au même instant ; 5.° qu’ils continuent toujours d’agir ensemble ; 6°. 
qu’ils soient tous déterminés à ne faire que la même chose, et à ne la faire que 
dans un jeu donné et circonscrit. Mais il est évident que ces conditions ne 
seront pas exactement remplies, si nous substituons dix mille abeilles à ces dix 
mille automates ; et je ne conçois pas comment M. de B. ne s’en est pas aperçu: 
est-il si difficile de découvrir que, la forme extérieure et intérieure ne saurait 
être parfaitement la même dans dix mille abeilles, qu’il ne saurait y avoir dans 
chacune un mouvement égal et conforme, des forces pareilles ; que ne naissant 
pas et ne se métamorphosant pas toutes au même instant, elles n’agissent pas 
toujours toutes ensemble, et qu’enfin, bien loin d’être déterminées à n’agir que 
dans un lieu donné et circonscrit, elles se répandent souvent de côté et 
d’autre?228 
 
What observation reveals, according to Condillac, is, firstly, the fact that the animals 
cannot act like machines given that their bodies – and thus also their sensory faculties 
– differ from one another. Condillac here echoes Réaumur’s erring insects. The bees 
do not begin to act at the same time, nor do they execute the exact movements (points 
4.°  and 5.°); they cannot be automata because they rely on sense impressions, which 
necessarily differ from individual to individual, for determining their course of 
action.229 According to Condillac’s definition of the term ‘instinct’ in his Dictionnaire 
des synonymes, instincts are both the consequence of an animal’s bodily dispositions 
– thus innate and inevitable – and acquired habits which require reflection but only the 
first time an animal (including a human animal) displays a certain behaviour: ‘Ce mot 
comprend toutes les opérations où la réflexion n’a point de part, c’est-à-dire, tout ce 
que les animaux font en conséquence de l’organisation et des habitudes acquises.’230 
Though Condillac uses the word ‘animal’, it is clear from his definition that instincts 
belong to animals as well as humans: both depend on their bodies and both adapt their 
behaviours to their experiences. For both humans and animals, Condillac collapses the 
distinction between intelligence and instinct, or between behaviours determined by 
moral or reasoned deliberation and physical constitution: the two are linked simply by 
                                                 
228 Condillac, Traité des animaux, p. 33. 
229 On this point, see also John O’Neal, ‘La notion d’expérience,’ pp. 157-158. 
230 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, ‘Dictionnaire des synonymes de la langue française. Tome IV. Ici-
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an ‘et’.231 Experiences solidify into instincts, but new or unexpected circumstances 
prove an animal’s ability to deliberate and adapt. A similar process applies to the 
distinction between passions, sensations and desires. Condillac accuses Buffon of 
defining the passions as simply more intense sensations.232 Instead, he insists that they 
are, in fact, desires, that is the feeling occasioned by the gap between a need and the 
object for its fulfilment, made more intense through their persistence over time (in 
other words, through habit). Bees have needs and receive sense impressions; this, for 
Condillac, is enough to prove Buffon’s reduction of the insects to automata wrong. In 
Condillac’s philosophy of behaviour, then, there is no need to argue for human rational 
souls in order to preserve their natural superiority over all other animals. 
The second argument is more properly based on observation (though Condillac 
himself probably never observed bees himself): the insects do not seem to follow 
regular, patterned movements, as machines would. Even an organism as simple as a 
bee, seems to go through a decision-making process based on some kind of 
deliberation. Given that the will, for Condillac, was a direct consequence of a living 
being’s sensations as it transmitted the pleasure and pain promised by an external 
object, there was no reason not to accord it to animals.233 The wonder of the bee hive, 
for Condillac, cannot be understood as that of well-constructed machine; it is, rather, 
the ability of the bees to coordinate their communal lives into a coherent, highly 
productive whole as each bee reacts to the sensations produced in it by its surroundings 
that fascinates the philosopher. Condillac’s basic assumption is grounded in the 
observation that humans and animals share the anatomical faculties for sense 
perceptions (eyes, ears, and so on) and are thus exposed to similar experiences:  
 
D’ailleurs, l’abeille a bien d’autres rapports avec nous que celui de nous fournir 
de la cire et du miel. Elle a un sens intérieur matériel, des sens extérieurs, une 
réminiscence matérielle, des sensations corporelles, du plaisir, de la douleur, 
des besoins, des passions, des sensations combinées, l’expérience du 
sentiment.234 
                                                 
231 Göran Blix, ‘The Zoology of Mind: Instinct and Intelligence in Eighteenth-and Nineteenth-Century 
Natural History’, L’Esprit Créateur, 56.4 (2017), 49–63 (pp. 58–59). 
232 Condillac, Traité des animaux, p. 138. 
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Given that insects have a sensory apparatus similar to that of humans, Condillac 
argues, there is no reason to assume that there is any fundamental difference in the 
way they navigate and experience the world. Buffon would have not disagreed with 
this list of faculties shared by animals as well as humans, though of course he would 
have insisted on man’s second, rational nature. Condillac pointed out that Buffon’s 
own admission of sensory experience in the supposed bee-automata meant that man 
had more in common with the bees than harvesting their produce. While, as we have 
seen, Buffon accorded memory to all animals and made imagination, at least in its 
spiritual form, the noblest of the human faculties, Condillac claimed that animals had 
imagination and, as a consequence, were able also to combine rather than just receive 
perceptions. While Condillac denied any radical difference between man and animal, 
he did agree with Buffon that man’s manifest superiority was grounded in his 
sociability. Because beasts, even those living in close proximity to one another, had 
not developed language, they could not share each other’s experiences and thus 
 
ne font que les progrès que chacune auroit faits séparément. Le commerce 
d’idées, que le langage d’action établit entr’elles, étant très borné, chaque 
individu n’a guères pour s’instruire que sa seule expérience.235  
 
Ultimately, then, Condillac agreed with Buffon that the individual, animal or human, 
was a limited creature; it was only in society, developed thanks to human language, 
that man could become a truly rational, and thus free, being.236 Through the 
accumulation of knowledge, which increased from generation to generation, man 
could even reach knowledge of God.237 
For Catholic, orthodox observers such as Réaumur, the individual soul was 
necessary to explain how persons could act in accordance with God’s greater plan; 
bees, in this scheme, contributed to the greater good of the hive because their souls 
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instructed them to do so.238 Réaumur, though reluctant to discuss explicitly the issue 
of the animal soul, does at times employ the term ‘âme’ to explain the seemingly 
intelligent – which for the naturalist means, above all, the ability to react rationally to 
changing circumstances – actions of insects.239 Naturalists and philosophers, 
particularly from the 1740s onwards, began to posit theories of behaviour that 
deemphasised, or even denied, the role of the soul. Instead, they found that both 
animals and men derived the feelings and passions that prompted them to act from the 
impressions received by their senses. While thinkers as different as Buffon and 
Condillac agreed on this basic premise, they disagreed on its implications. Condillac 
granted a sense of self (what he called a ‘moi’) to even the lowliest creatures. By 
deriving even the mind’s highest faculties from sense impressions rather than innate 
capacities for rational thought, the abbé thus provided a much more thoroughly 
materialistic theory of sensationism than Locke had done.240 Buffon, on the other hand, 
argued that man consisted of two natures, one animal and one spiritual and thus 
exclusively human. While the former functioned on the basis of sense impressions and 
the pleasure and pain derived from them, the latter gave rise to reflection and hence to 
a ‘moi’ (even though animals did have consciousness of their own present 
existence).241 Buffon dismissed animals as automata, mechanically reacting to their 
sensations. Consequently, Condillac accused the naturalist of self-contradiction for his 
claim that knowledge derived from a separate principle all the while attributing 
sensations the power to guide not only animals, but also human children. 
 
4. The Issue of Human Nature in Political Economy 
Before François Quesnay went on to invent the ‘new science’ of ‘économie’, he was 
a student of medicine and physiology. These preoccupations led to the publication of 
the Essai physique de l’oeconomie animale (1736; an expanded edition appeared in 
1747) and of the article ‘Évidence’ published in the Encyclopédie (1756), works in 
which Quesnay reflected on man’s bodily and mental faculties. Historians have 
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debated the influence of these medical texts on Quesnay’s economic works. While 
some flatly deny any influence at all, others see a mainly metaphorical relation.242 
Thus, the circulation of the blood is seen to provide an analogy for the circulation of 
capital.243 Economic historian Philippe Steiner argues that Quesnay’s political 
economy relies on quantification and thus bears little resemblance to his medical work; 
however, as I aim to show here, the connection lies in the ‘esprit géométrique’ that 
pervades both phases of his oeuvre. Like the authors surveyed so far, Quesnay was 
trying to answer the question of what it meant to be human as opposed to animal, and, 
more specifically, what it meant to be a rational living being. If Quesnay’s analyses of 
what we would now class as psychology do not play a big role in the more properly 
‘political economic’ texts, this, I argue, is because in the latter Quesnay is concerned 
with the population as a whole. Individual motivations and experiences thereby matter 
much less than the broad and regular patterns emerging from the study of groups of 
people; these regularities produced by the aggregate of the living then allow the wise, 
enlightened governors to provide the framework in which individual actors are free to 
pursue their rational self-interest.  
Quesnay was a sensationist, that is, he believed that men (as well as animals) 
were born as blank slates that received knowledge through their senses.244 Like 
Condillac, with whom he was personally acquainted,245 he emphasised the 
fundamental importance of the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain in human 
individual and collective life.246 He expounded his views on these in his Essai physique 
sur l’économie animale, where he closely engaged with medical, or what we would 
now call psychological, writings of his time. Although in his Essai physique, Quesnay 
never references the literature on the animal soul, it provides the clear if implicit 
background to his outline of the human faculties.247 In perfectly orthodox manner, 
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 105 
 
Quesnay insisted on the differences between animals and humans as far as their 
decision-making process is concerned. The latter, he claims, possess an immaterial, 
intelligent soul denied to the former. Quesnay thus plants himself firmly on the side 
of those who insisted on an unbridgeable gap between humans and animals. They are 
driven by instinct, which means that they are incapable of forming a conscious plan 
for the future and instead live purely in the (pleasurable) present. At the same time, he 
concedes that both animals and humans possess instincts, defined as dispositions 
towards certain behaviours that precede the experiences gained from the senses and 
that are determined by an animal’s physical make-up.248 Furthermore, all animals – 
and this term could refer to humans too – have the same fundamental interests towards 
which all actions tend: preservation of the species and individual subsistence. Like 
Buffon, Quesnay posited two natures in man, one ‘sensitive & passive’ and one 
‘intellectuelle & active’. Just as for Buffon, it was the latter that elevated humans 
above animals by endowing them with free will. The two men also agreed that most 
humans did not possess, or at least did not exercise, the quality that made them truly 
human. Rather pessimistically (and, of course, elitist), Quesnay emphasised that most 
men were hopelessly dominated by their bodily passions, and thus passive captives to 
immediate bodily sensations.  
Unlike Buffon, however, Quesnay was not interested in emphasising man’s 
creative powers; liberty, for Quesnay, meant the ability to deliberate on the most 
rational course of action. Where Buffon had extolled creativity and man’s ‘productions 
nouvelles’, Quesnay praised the few rational men for regulating their passions; the aim 
of liberty, he explained, was to ‘régler notre conduite’.249 The model for such a rational 
man anticipates the career of the later Quesnay: he is a merchant, deliberating which 
merchandise to purchase:  
 
Un Marchand, par exemple, toujours excité par le desir du gain, veut employer 
une somme d'argent à acheter quelque marchandise ; il s'en présente à lui de 
deux sortes, qui peuvent lui être avantageuses ; mais il y en a une qui, au 
premier aspect, lui paroît plus profitable ; cependant la crainte de se méprendre, 
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5). 
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lui fait examiner le prix de l'achat de chacune de ces marchandises, les frais 
qu'elles exigent, le détriment qu'elles peuvent souffrir, la promptitude du débit, 
le prix qu'il pourra la vendre ; il parvient par des calculs à évaluer toutes ces 
choses ; & après avoir comparé il se détermine pour celle qui lui paroît la plus 
avantageuse : ce Marchand est donc d'abord poussé par le desir du gain à faire 
valoir son argent : il est porté ensuite à délibérer par la crainte de se tromper : 
enfin il est décidé par la marchandise qui lui paroît la plus profitable, & souvent 
cette marchandise n'est pas celle qui lui sembloit d'abord la plus avantageuse. 
L'homme qui se conduit avec raison, n'est donc pas déterminé immédiatement 
comme les bêtes, par l'objet qui le frape & l'affecte le plus.250  
 
The most rational of men, and thus also the most human, is the merchant, able to weigh 
up and calculate the costs and benefits of his business decisions. The merchant has 
dominated his sensations and his passions through the use of his reason, and in 
particular of what for Quesnay is the main instrument of reason, namely attention. For 
Quesnay, as for Condillac, it was the task of the imagination to separate the sensations 
transmitted through the nerves to the brain and then to recombine them into ideas. The 
imagination of irrational men as well as of animals combined only the crude sensations 
received immediately by the brain; rational men, on the other hand, recombined the 
sensations only once they had been separated out, using their faculty of attention to 
focus on distinct sensations and combine them into relevant patterns.251 Applying a 
process similar to Condillac’s process of ‘analyse’, the merchant divides the problem 
at hand into its component parts (price, costs, risks), compares them and then judges 
between them. Rational man, for Quesnay, does not invent; he applies his reason in 
order to discover the ‘rules’ of conduct. Indeed, in Quesnay’s Encylopédie article 
‘Évidence’ (thought by Rousseau to have been authored by Condillac), ‘règle’ is the 
key word. This text echoed many of the same concerns of the 1747 edition of his Essai 
physique, even though its concern was, on the face of it, with metaphysics rather than 
physiology. In the following short passage from the article, the word ‘règle’ and its 
cognate ‘déréglement’ appear eight times: 
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La loi naturelle se présente à tous les hommes, mais ils l'interpretent 
diversement; il leur faut des regles positives & déterminées, pour fixer & 
assûrer leur conduite. Ainsi les hommes sages ont peu à examiner & à délibérer 
sur leurs intérêts dans le détail de leurs actions morales; dévoüés 
habituellement à la regle & à la nécessité de la regle, ils sont immédiatement 
déterminés par la regle même. Mais ceux qui sont portés au déréglement par 
des passions vives & habituelles, sont moins soûmis par eux - mêmes à la regle, 
qu'attentifs à la crainte de l'infamie & des punitions attachées à l'infraction de 
la regle. Dans l'ordre naturel, les intérêts ou les affections se contrarient; on 
hésite, on délibere, on répugne à la regle; on est enfin décidé ou par la passion 
qui domine, ou par la crainte des peines.252  
Where animals and ‘deregulated’ humans are prey to their bodily sensations, rational 
humans can train themselves to recognise rational rules of conduct. As is clear from 
the passages quoted above, man does invent these rules, but discovers them. Rational 
man is a geometer, which is why Mirabeau could later compare his mentor’s political 
economic system to the science of geometry based on mathematical proofs and 
demonstrations.253 The first meaning in eighteenth-century dictionaries given for 
‘règle’ tends to be that of ruler, or ‘instrument de mathématique […] qui sert à tirer 
des lignes droites.’254 Its other meanings, in the sense of ‘Principe, maxime, loi, 
enseignement, & généralement tout ce qui sert à conduire, à diriger l'esprit & le coeur’, 
are, according to eighteenth-century dictionaries, figurative uses of the mathematical 
sense.255 As we saw above, in his description of the geometrical skills of bees, Réaumur 
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had granted them ‘la perfection des regles’; although Quesnay insisted on man’s 
superiority, his rational being thus resembled the naturalist’s insects. This is not a 
coincidence, but rather the result of both men’s belief in a divinely instituted order; 
just as the skills of Réaumur’s bees point to the intelligence that created them, 
Quesnay’s rational rules of conduct are the discovery of nature’s order: 
 
c'est dans toute l'étendue de cet ordre, ou de ce systéme général, qu'il faut en 
chercher la régularité, & non dans la distribution égale ou inégale du droit 
naturel de chaque homme ; c'est aux hommes à se régler sur cet ordre même, 
& non à le méconnoître, ou à chercher inutilement ou injustement à s'en 
affranchir.256 
 
In healthy minds, the process of reaching a decision consisted in the deliberative 
weighing up of different sensations, interests, passions, and of possible punishments 
and rewards, leading to the recognition of the most rational rules. In practice, however, 
even though all humans were endowed with rational souls capable of judging 
according to evident natural ‘règles’, most had strayed too far and for too long from 
intelligent reflection, or had ‘perverted’ bodies making reflection impossible; some 
were even ‘plus stupides, plus féroces, plus insensés que les bêtes’.257 These men and 
women, incapable of recognising their long-term interest, needed the disincentive of 
heavy punishments. The internal system of checks and balances could be blocked by 
internal (a lack of education and practice in using one’s judgement, for example) or 
external circumstances; good government thus depended on ‘hommes sages’, whose 
habit of using their intellect made them more receptive to nature’s rules. The famous 
‘laissez-faire’ doctrine of the physiocrats relied on savants who instituted the 
framework within which citizens could pursue their self-interest:  
 
Le Gouvernment du Prince n’est pas, comme on le croit vulgairement, l’art de 
conduire les hommes ; c’est l’art de pourvoir à leur sûreté & à leur subsistance 
par l’observation de l’ordre naturel des Loix physiques qui constituent le droit 
                                                 
(University of Chicago:  ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey 
and Glenn Roe) <http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu> 
256 Quesnay, Essai Physique, pp. 370-371. On the importance of Providence for Quesnay’s political 
economy, see also Banzhaf, ‘Productive Nature’. 
257 Steiner, La science nouvelle, p. 47 ; p. 57.  
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naturel & l’ordre économique par lesquels l’existences & la subsistance 
doivent être assurées aux Nations & à chaque homme en particulier, cet objet 
rempli, la conduite des hommes est fixée, & chaque homme se conduit lui-
même.258 
 
Governors did not ‘regulate’ the conduct of the individual. Rather, they ensured that 
the constitution of the state was based on natural law in such a way as to force humans 
to make rational, and free, decisions. As is also implied in Quesnay’s paradoxical 
formula of the ‘despotisme légal’, men should be both free (‘chaque homme se conduit 
lui-même’) and forced to be free by the legal despot (‘la conduite des hommes est 
fixée’).259   
As Quesnay moves from animal to human oeconomy, his conception of the 
human decision-making process does not so much change in kind, but certainly in 
emphasis. While in his Essai and in ‘Evidence’ he insists on the possibility of arriving 
at free, rational decisions in line with the rules of nature, in his political economic 
writings the internal decision-making processes mostly disappear from view. As he 
turns from studying the individual to observing and governing the population, humans 
are considered not in terms of their experiences and own internal conflicts between 
passions and interests, but as members of a population-body, naturally striving for 
self-preservation and increased physical comforts (‘aisance’). From the point of view 
of the governor, that is, individuals are important only as member of the population. 
The cognitive processes that do count are those of the savants, responsible for 
instituting and maintaining the framework in which the natural order can unfold. It 
was their task, in Quesnay’s words, to institute a legal framework that corresponded 
to the rule of nature:  
 
Les lois positives sont des règles authentiques, établies par une autorité 
souveraine, pour fixer l’ordre de l’administration du gouvernement, pour 
assurer la défense de la société, pour faire observer régulièrement les lois 
naturelles, pour réformer ou maintenir les coutumes et les usages introduits 
                                                 
258 Victor de Riquetti Mirabeau marquis de and François Quesnay, Philosophie rurale, ou économie 
générale et politique de l’agriculture, 3 vols (Amsterdam: les librairies associés, 1763), I, p. xviii. 
259 As Hirschman puts it, the physiocrats wanted a system in which both the sovereign and the people 
would be ‘impelled, for reasons of self-interest, to promote the general interest.’ Hirschman, Passions 
and Interests, pp. 96-98. 
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dans la nation, pour régler les droits particuliers des sujets relativement è leurs 
différents états, pour déterminer l’ordre positif dans le cas douteux réduits à 
des probabilité d’opinion ou de convenance, pour asseoir les décisions de la 
justice distributive. Mais la première loi positive, la loi fondamentale de toutes 
les autres lois positives, est l’institution de l’instruction publique et privée des 
lois de l’ordre naturel, qui est la règle souveraine de toute législation humaine 
et de toute conduite civile, économique et sociale.260 
 
Just as Buffon, in his similarly elitist view of human beings, had located the superiority 
of the human species in the aggregate rather in the individual, the physiocrats insisted 
on the importance of education, which served to transmit the rational principles, or 
‘règles’, discovered by a handful of rational men. Defined by their capacity for rational 
reflection and attentive observation, it was the task of savants such as the physiocrats 
themselves to recognise the regularities produced by the bodies of the population and 
to fix them into the nation’s legal framework.  
Condillac, though nowadays famous above all for his sensationist theories of 
human (and, to a lesser extent, animal) behaviour, also published a text late in his 
career that he himself classified as ‘science économique’, called Le commerce et le 
gouvernement, considérés relativement l’un à l’autre: Ouvrage élémentaire (1776). 
As historians have outlined, Condillac wrote this work in response to the physiocrats’ 
theories of government, and was eagerly, and very critically, read by the younger 
generation (Quesnay had died two years before its publication).261 In many ways, 
Condillac’s work followed physiocratic principles closely. He agreed with their 
fundamental dictum that the grain trade needed to be free; he thus considered both ‘la 
police sur la circulation intérieure des grains’ and ‘la police sur l’exportation et 
l’importation des grains’ to be ‘attacks’ on commerce.262 At the same time, however, 
he also insisted – and was rebuked for it by the physiocrats Nicolas Baudeau (1730-
1792) and Guillaume François Le Trosne (1728-1780) – that industry and commerce 
                                                 
260 François Quesnay, Œuvres  économiques complètes et autres textes: Textes polémiques, Documents 
associés, ed. by Christine Théré, Loïc Charles, and Jean-Claude Perrot, 2 vols (Paris: INED, 2005), I, 
p. 108. 
261 Arnaud Orain, ‘Condillac face à la physiocratie: terre, valeur et répartition’, Revue économique, 53.5 
(2002), 1075–99; Walter Eltis, ‘L’abbé de Condillac and the physiocrats’, History of Political Economy, 
27.2 (1995), 217–236. 
262 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Le commerce et le gouvernement, considérés relativement l’un à 
l’autre: Ouvrage élémentaire (Amsterdam; Paris: Jombert & Cellot, 1776), ch. 12 and ch. 13. 
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were not sterile but productive in the same sense that agriculture was.263 
The connection between his theories of cognition and his political economical 
text is not made explicit by Condillac himself. The differences between humans and 
animals, however, are crucial to understanding his theory of government. Just as he 
had explained all animal behaviour through the drive to satisfy physical needs, human 
economic activity begins, for Condillac, with the search for means of subsistence. 
Further developing Quesnay’s (and, more distantly, Mandeville’s) ideas on the role of 
the arts, Condillac explained human sophistication ‒ the fact that we are not ‘de vils 
animaux’ ‒ not through inborn ‘qualités morales’, but through the development of 
new, historically created needs based on more basic physical ones. He thus 
distinguished between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ needs: 
 
Les uns sont une suite de notre conformation ; nous sommes conformés pour 
avoir besoin de nourriture, ou pour ne pouvoir pas vivre sans aliments. Les 
autres sont une suite de nos habitudes. Telle chose dont nous pourrions nous 
passer, parce que notre conformation ne nous en fait pas un besoin, nous 
devient nécessaire par l’usage, et quelquefois aussi nécessaire que si nous 
étions conformés pour en avoir besoin. J’appelle naturels les besoins qui sont 
une suite de notre conformation, & factices les besoins que nous devons à 
l’habitude contractée par l’usage des choses.264 
 
According to the abbé, then, all living beings have sensory experiences, and thus the 
capacity to satisfy their needs, though humans had learnt to invent new ones. With this 
interpretative move, Condillac was able to explain not only human superiority as the 
consequence of the human sensory apparatus, but also a social order based on 
production and consumption of superfluous goods. Just as he (and, to some extent, 
Buffon) had done in his work on animals, Condillac explained the complexity of the 
human social order not through rational souls, but through the interaction between 
sensing bodies. In a typical Enlightenment scenario, the abbé began his exposition by 
imagining a primitive people developing from a group of hunter-gatherers into an 
organised society. New needs and the developing organisation of the community 
                                                 
263 Baudeau's and Le Trosne's reaction to Condillac’s text is outlined in Eltis, pp. 225–30. I am following 
Arnaud Orain’s reading of Condillac’s reception; see especially Orain, pp. 1079–80. 
264 Condillac, Commerce et gouvernement, p. 9. 
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thereby conditioned one another. The isolated individual felt only the most basic 
needs, the satisfaction of which was essential for his or her survival; as men organised 
themselves, however, they began to find new means for satisfying their needs. This 
process of gradual development from agriculture to ever more sophisticated methods 
and technologies for need fulfilment also led to the development of ever more 
sophisticated needs. Like Buffon, then, Condillac insisted on the importance of society 
for the formation of human beings that were truly distinct from animals. The small 
agricultural society with which Condillac begins his thought experiment knows only 
the immediate needs dictated by the body. The development of language in turn allows 
for the ‘commerce des idées’ that is the hallmark of civilised societies and which 
‘préside aux sociétés et à ce grand nombre d’habitudes qu’un homme qui vivrait seul 
ne contracterait point. Principe admirable de la communication des idées il fait circuler 
la sève qui donne aux arts et aux sciences la naissance, l’accroissement et les fruits’.265 
Condillac parted company with Quesnay not only, as economic historians have noted, 
on the idea of the sole productivity of agriculture.266 His insistence that other sectors, 
too, could create true riches was founded on his emphasis on the human capacity to 
create new needs and transmit them to others, rather than, as Quesnay had insisted, on 
the application of reason to the discovery of natural laws.  
Some of the physiocrats’ and Condillac’s contemporaries were appalled by the 
alignment they had made between subjects and need-driven animals. None other than 
the abbé de Condillac’s brother, the abbé de Mably, passionately decried physiocracy 
as a crime against morality. Famous in his own right as one of the most ‘revolutionary’ 
thinkers of the Old Regime,267 the abbé de Mably based his rejection of the physiocrats’ 
theories on their attempt to ground human politics in the physical need for subsistence:  
 
N’est-il pas manifestement évident, nous dit-on, qu’il nous est physiquement 
impossible de vivre sans subsistances? D’accord; mais n’est-il pas également 
évident que nous ne pouvons être en société sans qualités sociales? Qui 
pourroit nier, Monsieur, que les qualités morales n’aient beaucoup plus 
                                                 
265 Condillac, Commerce et gouvernement, p. 360. 
266 Eltis, ‘Condillac’; as fellow economic historian Orain argues, Condillac was one of the first thinkers 
to put use-value at the centre of economic theory, which explains the paradoxical relationship with 
physiocratic ideas; see Orain, ‘Condillac’. 
267 Keith Michael Baker, ‘A Script for a French Revolution: The Political Consciousness of the Abbé 
Mably’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 14.3 (1981), 235–63. 
 113 
 
contribué à l’établissement de la Société, que le besoin de subsistances?268  
 
Like the theorists of natural law critical of Mandeville discussed in the previous 
chapter, Mably argued that men were fundamentally different from animals.269 Unlike 
both the natural law theorists and the physiocrats, Mably wrote in order to subvert 
rather than strengthen the absolutist state. Influenced by ancient theorists of 
Republicanism and their seventeenth-century English interpreters, Mably insisted that 
the passions, resulting from feelings of pleasure or pain and shared by humans and 
animals, were essential to making humans act at all.270 Even though a passionless 
human being would simply stand still, governments also needed to encourage their 
citizens to regulate their passions by an appeal to their virtue. He thus recommended 
intervention by the state to prevent poverty, strict regulations of ‘moeurs’ and 
censorship.271 The abbé insisted that human decisions were grounded in men’s double 
nature (physical as well as ‘moral’, that is in possession of a rational soul) and that 
rational, wilful choices could give rise to a new organisation of society. As Keith 
Baker has argued, Mably’s goal was to construe ‘a definition of situation in which 
public order in France was perceived not as the expression of tradition or prescription, 
custom or law, but as the outcome of wilful action.’272 Like the physiocrats, he was 
thus engaged in a redefinition of government that steered away from the central 
importance of the will of the ruler. He agreed with the physiocrats that the aim of 
government should be the happiness of the population. Unlike the physiocrats, 
however, Mably wanted to ground this order in man’s capacity to create, not to 
discover, social laws. Instead of the physiocrats’ insistence on the importance of 
agriculture and hence private property, Mably proposed that man’s capacity for moral 
behaviour explained the institution of the first society:   
 
Notre chasse, devois-je dire, notre pêche, les fruits que nous avons cueillis, tout 
entre nous sera commun. Quand la fortune n’aura pas favorisé mes recherches, 
                                                 
268 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Doutes proposés aux philosophes économistes, sur l’ordre naturel et 
essentiel des sociétés politiques (La Haye; Paris: Nyon et Veuve Durand, 1768), p. 29. 
269 On Mably as a natural rights theorists with regards to the question of property, see Johnson Kent 
Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Thought of Mably 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 96–99. On French Republicanism, see Hammersley, 
English Republican Tradition. 
270 Hammersley, English Republican Tradition, pp. 91-94. 
271 Wright, ‘Classical Republican’, p. 106. 
272 Baker, ‘A Script,’ p. 237. 
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les autres me fourniront ma subsistance; & je les consolerai à mon tour de leurs 
disgraces quand leurs peines seront infructeuses, je partagerai avec les fruits 
que j’aurai ramassés, ou le gibier que j’aurai pris.273 
 
For Mably, as for earlier Republican theorists, government should not encourage the 
pursuit of self-interest. The physiocrats, he claimed, had confused the misguided self-
interests of the property owners, who benefited from a workforce considered only as 
animals in search of subsistence, with the law of nature. As he noted, the physiocrats 
wanted to govern humans as one would govern animals, taking into account only their 
physical and thus neglecting their moral needs. Mably, instead, exhorted his 
contemporaries: ‘Comme de vils animaux, ne nous occupons pas de notre seule 
pâture.’274 Mably insisted on the importance of the legislators to exhort citizens to 
pursue a virtuous life in favour of the common good; virtue, he insisted, was not 
natural, but had to be artfully invented.275 Both the physiocrats and their fierce critic 
were trying to solve the same problem of devising a government in line with human 
‘nature’ rather than with the divinely instituted will of the sovereign. For Mably, 
however, the physiocrats had mistaken the avarice of privileged landowners for human 
nature; not property, and the passion of avarice that it engendered, should be the basis 
of the social order, but virtue wilfully employed to further the common good.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The debates on the animal soul and cognition were conducted with such vigour 
because what was at stake was not just the idea of the animal soul, but a new theory 
of the human subject. Thinking about the mental and physical faculties of animals 
became so interesting to Enlightenment writers because it allowed them to think 
through a new conception of man, according to which, as Albert Hirschman has 
shown, he (or she) was no longer the simple product of a God-given soul, but a body 
whose sensations and passions formed the subject through their constant interplay and 
conflict.276 As we will see in subsequent chapters, it is only on the back of this new 
                                                 
273 Mably, Doutes, p. 39. 
274 Mably, Doutes, p. 34. 
275 On this point, see also Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the 
Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 
197–99. 
276 Hirschman; see also: Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, pp. 38–44. 
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conception of man that collectives become thinkable as a ‘population’, or, in other 
words as a whole with predictable laws, but made up of unpredictable parts. 
In the next chapter, we will see in more detail how exactly eighteenth-century 
writers thought that these crucial relations between living, sensing bodies could come 
about. Once more, it was an insect that provided a particularly powerful forum for 
debates about the relation between human and animal nature, and parts and wholes. 
Signalling and reinforcing the shift from a collective of souls to a dynamic whole 
composed of sensible bodies, the next chapter will focus on an extraordinary ‘insect’: 
the animal that eighteenth-century naturalists baptised hydra or freshwater polyp. 
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Chapter Three. Parts and Wholes in Nature and Society: Polyps and Swarms 
1. Introduction 
In the summer of 1740, the Genevan naturalist Abraham Trembley (1710-1784) made 
a discovery that would send shockwaves through the eighteenth-century Republic of 
Letters. As he observed a tiny creature that seemed to be a plant as much as an animal, 
Trembley noticed that the seemingly unremarkable animal that would later be known 
as the freshwater polyp, or hydra, has a remarkable property: when Trembley cut off 
its limbs, the polyp did not die; instead, it ‘grew’ new individuals from the severed 
body parts.1 As Trembley himself acknowledged in the preface to the treatise he would 
eventually publish on the topic, the Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de 
polypes d’eau douce (1744), he was not, in fact, the first naturalist to have observed 
the creature, though most of his predecessors had dismissed it as a plant and none had 
noticed its strange ability to reproduce from cuttings.2  
Nevertheless, the extent to which the discovery of the polyp aroused the 
curiosity  ̶  and sometimes anxieties   ̶ of contemporary savants is difficult to overstate.3 
The polyp’s strange qualities troubled a range of eighteenth-century assumptions 
about the nature of animal and plant life, and the more daring writers in France did not 
hesitate to draw out the implications of the polyp for understandings of human life.4 
The polyp’s capacities to regenerate from wounds observers had expected to be fatal, 
to divide itself into new individuals, as well as the possibility of formerly distinct 
polyps merging into one animal, posed troubling questions as to the boundaries, and 
hierarchies, between both the parts of the animal body and between the particular body 
and the collective.5 No matter their doctrinal allegiance, naturalists and writers 
                                                 
1 Though Trembley had communicated his discovery to naturalists across Europe, including Réaumur 
who presented it to the Académie in Paris in 1741, he published them only in 1744; see Abraham 
Trembley, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polypes d’eau douce, à bras en forme de 
cornes (Leiden: Jean & Herman Verbeek, 1744). 
2 Antoni van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) and an anonymous Englishman had published an article in the 
Philosophical Transactions of 1702, discussing the animal’s strange properties, in particular its asexual 
reproduction. See Trembley, Mémoires, p. 6. In France, Bernard de Jussieu had ordered drawings to be 
done for inclusion in Reaumur’s Mémoires, though Jussieu had assumed that the organism was a plant. 
See Dawson, Nature’s Enigma: The Problem of the Polyp in the Letters of Bonnet, Trembley and 
Réaumur, pp. 110–11.  
3 As Dawson puts it, ‘Trembley’s polyp made the decade of the 1740s one of crisis.’ Dawson, 
Trembley’s Polyp, p. 185. For Janelle Schwartz, the polyp provoked a ‘paradigm shift’ in eighteenth-
century theories of classification and of ‘vitality’ more generally; see Janelle A. Schwartz, Worm Work: 
Recasting Romanticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), pp. 72–74. 
4 In particular, the polyp was used to bolster materialist, even atheist, theories of life; the most important 
treatment of the materialist polyp remains Aram Vartanian, ‘Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and 
Eighteenth-Century French Materialism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 11.3 (1950), pp. 259–86. 
5 As I will discuss below, Charles Bonnet even used the term ‘moi’ to refer to the polyp. 
 117 
 
concerned with the implications of the polyp for wider conceptions of ‘nature’ 
considered the tiny animal to provide a crucial piece to the puzzle of how order could 
arise from apparent chaos.6 The spontaneity of the polyp’s reproduction thus seemed 
to favour materialist or vitalist theories of life over providentialist explanations 
according to which God had preordained the order of the living.7  
In this sense, the polyp was closely connected to a second entomological image 
(and object of study) frequently used by eighteenth-century thinkers of very different 
stripes: the bee swarm. By the mid-century, the swarm had become one of the most 
widely used images among vitalist medical writers to figure interaction between the 
different parts of the animal oeconomy of the human body.8 While naturalists such as 
Réaumur or the writers of beekeeping manuals we will encounter in chapter five 
defined the swarm as the temporary and highly unstable formation of a collective of 
bees as they searched for a new home, these medical writers were fascinated by the 
way in which the swarm seemed to form a new bodily unity irreducible to the insects 
that formed it. The swarm-body, they argued, mirrored the oeconomy of the human 
body, similarly composed of seemingly independent parts that became one with the 
body as a whole. Vitalist writers used the swarm not only to figure, but also to explore 
and speculate about the relationship between bodily parts and wholes. If each of the 
swarm’s parts was an independent whole in itself (the single bee), how did these parts 
come to form the swarm? How could the human observer continue to distinguish 
between the animal’s whole and its parts?  
The use of the images of the polyp and of the swarm have been discussed by 
scholars, particularly in their function as metaphors for the materialist ideas of the 
period.9 Thus, in a pioneering article, Aram Vartanian argued that the polyp, especially 
through the work of Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751), represented a watershed 
                                                 
6 This question, as Jonathan Sheehan and Drohr Wahrman have recently shown, had become 
particularly urgent in the second third of the eighteenth century, and occupied intellectuals of all stripes. 
One answer, the idea of spontaneously emerging orders, or what they term ‘the language of self-
organisation’, provided a shared vocabulary and conceptual toolbox for naturalists and social theorists 
alike: Sheehan and Wahrman. 
7 For an overview of theories of generation and the polyp’s challenge to preformationism, see Shirley 
A. Roe, ‘The Life Sciences’, in The Cambridge History of Science. Volume 4:  Eighteenth-Century 
Science, ed. by Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 397–416 (pp. 408–11). 
8 Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology, pp. 71–73; Charles T. Wolfe and Motoichi Terada, ‘The Animal 
Economy as Object and Program in Montpellier Vitalism’, Science in Context; Cambridge, 21.4 (2008), 
537–79 (pp. 550–54). 
9 Vartanian,‘Polyp’; Annie Ibrahim, ‘Maupertuis dans Le Rêve de D’Alembert : l’essaim d’abeilles et 
le polype’, Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie, 2011; Tunstall. 
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moment for materialist theories that strove to explain the living without recourse to 
the divine.10 Virginia Dawson, by contrast, has emphasised the Calvinist context of 
Trembley’s Geneva, which she described as more liberal and conducive to the 
experimental study of nature than Catholic France.11 Similarly focusing on the 
Genevan context and on experimental practice, Marc Ratcliff has considered  the polyp 
as enabling the development of microscopy, as naturalist shared observations and 
specimens across European boundaries, all the while leaving metaphysical 
speculations to the philosophers.12 Conversely, historians of vitalist medicine have 
highlighted the popularity of the image of the bee swarm in descriptions of the human 
organism.13 Diderot’s use of the image, in particular, has attracted the attention of 
literary scholars: Kate Tunstall has thus recently analysed the philosophe’s use of the 
image of the swarm for speculating about human beings without an immaterial soul, 
but also as an image of the collective nature of truth.14 
In this chapter, I shall present these familiar images as they were used as 
vehicles for contrasting speculations about both natural and social wholes, and about 
the different dynamics that various Enlightenment thinkers considered to enable 
previously independent parts to come together and form such wholes.15 While the 
polyp might seem to represent nothing more than a curious aberration from nature’s 
usual patterns, the issues it raised played into contemporary political economic 
discussions on the relationship between individuals and aggregates. Both polyps and 
swarms raised a fundamental problem for Enlightenment thinkers: how does a 
multitude of seemingly distinct parts become a harmonious whole? This also raised 
the related question of how exactly natural and social wholes were held together. As 
we will see, the selection of thinkers studied in this chapter gave slightly different 
                                                 
10 Vartanian, ‘Trembley’s Polyp’. See also Dawson, Nature’ Enigma, pp. 155-156; Jacques Roger, Les 
sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIIIe siècle: la génération des animaux de Descartes à 
l’Encyclopédie (Paris: Colin, 1963), p. 749. 
11 Dawson, Nature’s Enigma.  
12 Marc J. Ratcliff, pp. 103–24; Marc J. Ratcliff, ‘Abraham Trembley’s Strategy of Generosity and the 
Scope of Celebrity in the Mid‐Eighteenth Century’, Isis, 95.4 (2004), 555–75 
<https://doi.org/10.1086/430649>. 
13 Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology, pp. 71-73; Wolfe and Terada, ‘Animal Economy’, pp. 537-79. 
14 Tunstall, ‘Embodied Mind’; another literary analysis is Colas Duflo, ‘Diderot and Ménuret de 
Chambaud’, Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie, No 34.1, 25–44. 
15 Rudy Le Menthéour has analysed both the image of the hive and of the polyp in view of the kinds of 
‘communities’ they are used to imagine. While this chapter is thus close to Le Menthéour’s article, I 
also show that both images could be used to illustrate and think through contrasting theories of social 
organisation, rather than, as Le Menthéour contends, polyps serving only to illustrate a ‘communauté 
organique’ and bees a ‘société structurée’.  
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answers, but these two questions, raised via discussions of bee swarms and polyps, 
hovered over all writings discussed here.  
The link between the natural and social worlds was provided by the notion of 
the ‘oeconomy’. At its most fundamental level, the term ‘oeconomy’ described the 
relation between parts and wholes, and as such could refer to human and animal bodies 
(the ‘animal oeconomy’) as much as to households (the domestic oeconomy) or the 
organisation of social bodies (‘political oeconomy’).16 As the polyp pushed thinkers to 
clarify and, in some cases, revise their notion of the animal oeconomy, understood as 
the interaction between body parts that gave life to the whole, they were thus 
simultaneously reflecting on the interaction in nature between wholes and parts more 
generally. The problem raised by these ‘insects’ (for polyps were classified as such 
once it was clear that they were, indeed, animals) touched on contentious questions 
about the interaction between soul (or mind) and body, the nature of the ‘oeconomy’ 
of the living body and  ̶  by implicit or explicit analogy  ̶  the ‘oeconomy’ of human 
individual and collective bodies. The following sections will focus on the notion of 
the (animal) oeconomy in order to explore how reflections on the insect body 
interacted with, provided images for or shaped reflections on both animal and human 
bodies as they came to form new collectives irreducible to the particular parts 
composing them. The concept of the animal oeconomy, broadly defined as the 
ensemble of anatomical structures, organs and fluids necessary for the upkeep of the 
living body, spanned all living beings from insect to man and made the study of one 
kind of body relevant to that of another. Definitions of the animal oeconomy, in other 
words of bodily ‘life’, in turn affected understandings of social life.17 One name 
sometimes given to the force that ‘glued’ parts together into wholes was sensibility, 
                                                 
16 See the definitions provided in Académie française, ‘Oeconomie’, Dictionnaire de l’Académie 
Française (Paris: Vve J. B. Coignard et J. B. Coignard, 1694), 140; Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud, 
‘OEconomie Animale, (Médec.)’, Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers, ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, (University of Chicago:  ARTFL 
Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe) 
<http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu>; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Economie Ou Oeconomie’, 
Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. by Denis Diderot and 
Jean le Rond d’Alembert, (University of Chicago:  ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2016 Edition), 
ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe) <http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu>  
. See also definitions by Lissa Roberts, ‘Practicing Oeconomy during the Second Half of the Long 
Eighteenth Century: An Introduction’, History and Technology, 30.3 (2014), 133–48; De Marchi and 
Schabas; Emma Spary, ‘Political, Natural and Bodily Economies’, pp. 178–79. 
17 Harro Maas analyses the thought of Thomas Reid to show how his understanding of physiology 
affects his political economic thought; Maas ‘Mechanism’. 
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and its close relative sympathy.18 In social as much as in physiological bodies, 
sympathy was a natural force connecting living and sensitive parts through sensation. 
It thus did not require a conscious mind or will to operate but instead caused 
immediate, unwilled bodily reactions (such as, in humans, blushing). Sympathy was 
thought to connect individual bodies into social wholes, but on a smaller scale it also 
circulated through living bodies ensuring the communication between body parts. 
In this chapter, we shall be moving between two broad kinds of answers to the 
question of the generation and function of organic and social wholes: answers that had 
recourse to the notion of a providential order, and answers that, instead, theorised the 
existence of a force (or forces) that, distinguishing the living from the non-living, 
enabled previously independent parts to form new, self-sustaining wholes. These 
theories of the bodily wholes will be analysed, first with regards to the polyp and 
second in writings on the bee swarm, in order to tease out how images of insect bodies 
were used to think through the ways in which seemingly disparate parts could come 
to act as one functioning animal or political economy. 
 
2. Trembley’s Polyp  
As Trembley describes in the account of his discovery and the ensuing experiments 
(published in 1744), the first problem posed by the polyp’s strange qualities was to 
determine whether the being he had observed was, indeed, an animal.19 While the 
hydra’s capacity to generate from budding and its unequal number of arms (or, 
Trembley thought at first, roots) seemed to place it in the category of plants, its ability 
to move suggested that it was an animal. Though some naturalists speculated that the 
hydra might provide the ‘missing link’ between the animal and vegetable kingdoms, 
using the tiny organism to support the theory of a ‘chain of being’ according to which 
all of creation, from mineral to human, was linked through almost imperceptible 
gradations, both Réaumur and Trembley rejected the idea of the polyp as an 
                                                 
18 For good definitions of this ambiguous concept, see Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, pp. 83-96; Evelyn 
L. Forget, ‘Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and 
Physiology’, History of Political Economy, 35 Suppl 1 (2004), 282–308; Anne C. Vila, ‘Beyond 
Sympathy: Vapors, Melancholia, and the Pathologies of Sensibility in Tissot and Rousseau’, Yale 
French Studies, 1997, 88–101; James Rodgers, ‘Sensibility, Sympathy, Benevolence: Physiology and 
Moral Philosophy in Tristram Shandy’, in Languages of Nature: Critical Essays on Science and 
Literature, ed. by Ludmilla Jordanova (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986), pp. 117–58. 
19 Trembley’s experiments are described in Dawson, Nature’s Enigma. 
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intermediate being and classified the animal as an insect.20 The second problem posed 
by the polyp was its extraordinary capacity to survive not only all sorts of mutilations 
to which naturalists and curiosi subjected them, but to generate new specimens from 
the severed parts.21 This discovery was extraordinary; while naturalists knew of 
animals able to regrow severed body parts (Réaumur had shown, for example, that 
crayfish can grow back mutilated legs), an animal able to produce complete 
individuals from its own bodily matter, without needing a ‘head’, had hitherto been 
unimaginable.22 The discovery of the polyp also raised the spectre of spontaneous or 
equivocal generation, the Aristotelain  idea that animals could generate spontaneously 
from putrefied matter without requiring a sexual act.23 Réaumur had entered into a 
debate on the matter with the Jesuit authors of the Journal de Trévoux, who to his 
dismay continued to defend the theory:  
 
j’ai mis même au nombre des obstacles qui avoient le plus arrêté le progrès de 
nos connoissances sur les insectes, l’opinion des anciens qui faisoit sortir de la 
pourriture de différens corps; car dès qu’on croyoit qu’ils venoient de 
corruption, la partie la plus curieuse de leur historie, tout ce qui a rapport à la 
manière dont ils se perpétuent, ne sembloit pas demander à être étudiée.24  
 
The error of the Jesuits, Réaumur argued, was to believe that randomness, rather than a 
host of regular and thus calculable and observable ‘circonstances’ governed animal 
(re)production, an idea that contradicted his notion of a natural order governed by regular 
                                                 
20 Réaumur, as we have seen, included any animal that did not fit the categories of quadruped, bird or 
fish as an insect; see Réaumur, Mémoires VOL 1, pp. 57–58. Trembley’s cousin Charles Bonnet did not 
hesitate to consider the polyp ‘an intermediate being’, publishing, against Réaumur’s advice, an 
illustration of the ‘scale of beings in his 1745 Traité d’Insectologie; see Dawson, Nature’s Enigma, pp. 
167-176. The classic study of the chain of being is Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A 
Study of the History of an Idea (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). 
21 Today, the hydra is studied above all as a potentially immortal organism; see Melinda Cooper, 
‘Rediscovering the Immortal Hydra : Stem Cells and the Question of Epigenesis’, Configurations, 11.1 
(2004), 1–26. 
22 Réaumur discusses the polyp soul’s location, presuming that souls should be located in the head ; see 
Réaumur, Mémoires 6, p. lxvii. On the crayfish experiments, see Catherine Abou-Nemeh, ‘Réaumur’s 
Crayfish Experiments in Hartsoeker’s Système Regeneration and the Limits of Mechanism’, in The Life 
Sciences in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. by Ohad Nachtomy and Justin E. H. Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), pp. 157–80. 
23 For a comprehensive analysis, see Peter McLaughlin, ‘Spontaneous versus Equivocal Generation in 
Early Modern Science’, Annals of the History of Philosophy and Biology, 10 (2005), 79–88. 
24 Réaumur, Mémoires vol 2, p. xvi. 
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laws instituted by divine Providence.25 Discussions about the nature of polyps, that is,  
stoked disagreements not only between Catholics and potential unbelievers, but also 
between adherents of different strands of Catholicism. Unsurprisingly, then, Trembley’s 
discovery of the freshwater hydra only a few years later threatened to destabilise this idea 
of providential creation. In the introduction to his memoir on the polyp, Trembley 
reflected on the consequences of his discovery for ideas about the order of animal life, 
which he subsumed under the notion of the animal oeconomy: 
 
Je ne regardai cependant le mouvement de ces deux moitiés du même Polype, 
que comme des signes d’un foible reste de vie. C’est ce que je pensois surtout 
par rapport à la derniére partie: car pour l'autre, j'étois porté à croire, en 
supposant le Polype un Animal, que sa tête & une partie du corps pût encore 
vivre. Je pensai que l'opération que j'avois faite, n'étoit à son égard qu'une 
mutilation, qui n'avoit pas dérangé essentiellement en elle l'oeconomie 
animale.26 
 
As the Genevan naturalist describes, he had assumed that an animal requires a head – 
the seat of the faculties of will and consciousness directing the movements of the body 
– in order to survive. The functioning of the animal oeconomy depended on a constant 
circulation of ‘forces’ between the head and other organs. Hence, Trembley expected 
to see the headless part of the polyp die.27 To the naturalist's surprise, however, the 
second part not only continued to live by itself, but to generate a new head and 'arms'. 
With the discovery that both halves of the polyp continued to live despite his 
mutilations, Trembley was challenging the mechanist notion of the animal oeconomy: 
even though he had removed some of the fundamental ‘springs’ of the polyp body, the 
‘little machine’ continued to function.28 At the time of Trembley’s discovery, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the theory of the animal soul had become generally 
accepted.29 The polyp, however, challenged this orthodoxy. If the polyp had a soul, 
where was it located? What happened to the soul when offspring ‘grew’ from the 
                                                 
25 Mary Terrall, Catching Nature in the Act: Réaumur and the Practice of Natural History in the 
Eighteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), pp. 98–101. 
26 Trembley, Mémoires, p. 14. 
27 Ménuret, “Oeconomie Animale”, pp. 365-6. 
28 Dawson, Nature’s Enigma, pp. 112-118. 
29 See also Dawson, ‘The Problem of Soul in the “Little Machines” of Reaumur and Charles Bonnet’. 
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orginal polyp? Were there, as Réaumur speculated, ‘ames sécables’?30 Even when 
leaving aside the idea of an immortal animal soul, the polyp’s divisibility troubled the 
hierarchy between the head as the seat of the central, directive faculty and the rest of 
the body. While the iatromechanist theory of the body had suggested that each organ 
or body part served a distinct function, the polyp’s parts seemed able to spontaneously 
change their function without requiring a central directive faculty. In the absolutist 
culture of eighteenth-century France, this idea seemed to undermine the established 
order. In the widespread metaphors equating the human body with the body politic, 
after all, the head usually served to represent the king, and any suggestion that a living 
body, be it merely that of a polyp, could survive without the direction of a head thus 
evoked the threat of political subversion.31 
The wider reading public first learnt of Trembley's discovery through its 
publication in the 1741 issue of the Histoire de l'Académie des Sciences. As the 
hyperbolic language of the article makes clear, the polyp's strange capacities pushed 
thinkers, from the moment of its first discovery, to question the presumed order of 
organised beings preordained by a providential God:  
 
Les idées chimeriques de la Palingénésie ou régénération des Plantes & des 
Animaux, que quelques Alchymistes ont cru possible par l'assemblage & la 
réunion de leurs parties essentielles, ne tendoient qu'à rétablir une Plante ou un 
Animal après sa destruction; le Serpent coupé en deux, & qu'on a dit se 
rejoindre, ne donnoit qu'un seul & même serpent; mais voici la Nature qui va 
plus loin que nos chimères. De chaque morceau d'un même animal coupé en 
2, 3, 4, 10, 20, 30, 40 parties, &, pour ainsi dire, haché, il renait autant 
d'animaux complets & semblables au premier.32  
 
The challenge that the polyp presented to theories of the singular living being that 
considered it a preordained whole is particularly apparent in Trembley’s experiments 
on the animal’s digestive functions. The question of nourishment and digestion was a 
                                                 
30 René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire des insectes (Paris: de 
l’Imprimerie Royale, 1742), VI, p. lxvii. 
31 Arnold D. Harvey, Body Politic: Political Metaphor and Political Violence (Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2007). 
32 Histoire de l’Académie des Sciences, année 1741 (Amsterdam: Pierre Mortier, 1747) 1: 46. Quoted 
in Dawson, 7. For the argument that the polyp was associated with wonder, see Schwartz,  Wormwork, 
pp. 80-98. 
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crucial one for Trembley, as these processes were considered key to understanding 
how the different body parts came together to provide the whole with nutrients. The 
nutritive faculty of the living being was considered fundamental by both 
iatromechanists and vitalists alike to the functional unity of the animal, given that 
during the digestive processes, the individual parts of the body had to interact to 
nourish the whole. Boerhaave, whom Trembley had studied, had even based the 
distinction between animal and plant on the criterion of digestion, arguing that animals 
digested their food through internal and plants through external ‘roots’.33 Even after 
Réaumur had confidently pronounced the polyp to be an animal rather than a plant, 
using its capacity to move as the central criterion, Trembley, influenced by Boerhaave, 
continued to withhold his judgment until he had managed to observe the little animal’s 
nutritional strategy.34 As Dawson’s analysis of Trembley’s correspondence reveals, 
the Genevan naturalist took great care in studying the polyp’s digestion, even delaying 
the publication of his memoirs so that he could confirm his observations. It took 
Trembley almost a year before he could watch the animal catch its prey with its 
tentacles and swallow it and then to observe the food enter the cavity that he could 
only then confirm to be the stomach.35 Given the importance of digestion for the 
functional unity of the animal body, Trembley was interested in understanding polyp 
digestion not only so as to classify the being as either plant or animal but also, once 
he had settled that question, for understanding the ‘oeconomy’ at work in the polyp’s 
body. In so doing, Trembley’s research resonated with heated debates about animal 
and human vital functions  ̶  of which digestion proved one of the most contentious  ̶  
and whether or not mechanist explanations could sufficiently account for them.29  
Trembley assumed that the polyp’s structure, rather than its vital forces, could 
explain digestion. While the polyp had no visible vessels, as required by Boerhaave’s 
model of the body, Trembley could uphold the Boerhaavian model by arguing that the 
entire body of the polyp was one long vessel.36 In order to prove this, Trembley 
                                                 
33 On this point, see Dawson, Nature’s Enigma, pp. 118-131. 
34 Dawson, Nature’s Engima, p. 120. 
35 John R. Baker, Abraham Trembley of Geneva: Scientist and Philosopher (1710-1784) (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1952), pp. 60–61. 
29 The debates surrounding digestion as they related to issues of diet and consumption are outlined in 
Spary E. C. Spary, Eating the Enlightenment, ch. 1; Elizabeth A. Williams, ‘Food and Feeling: 
“Digestive Force” and the Nature of Morbidity in Vitalist Medicine’, in Vital Matters: Eighteenth-
Century Views of Conception, Life, and Death, ed. by Helen Deutsch and Mary Terrall (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012), pp. 203–21.  
36 Trembley, Mémoires, p. 52. Dawson, Nature’s Enigma, p. 126. 
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undertook one of his most famous experiment, turning a polyp inside out ‘like a 
glove’.37 He thus fed the animal a worm so as to dilate its mouth and stomach and then 
pierced the polyp with a pig or boar bristle to prevent it from turning back into its 
original form: ‘de faire en sorte que la superficie intérieure de sa peau devienne donc 
la superficie extérieure, & que l’extérieure devienne l’intérieure.’38 The chiasmus of 
this sentence underlines the marvellous nature of an animal body turned inside out, 
highlighting the way in which the hydra seemed to defy notions of inside and outside, 
and of a fixed order of organisation for the animal body. In the case of the polyp, it 
seemed, body parts could be remodelled to serve new functions, all the while 
maintaining the animal oeconomy. As Trembley notes in the conclusion to his unusual 
experiment, his new creations were capable of reproduction and could thus be 
considered functional animals.39 
In another experiment on digestion, this time aimed at understanding the 
interaction between seemingly distinct polyp bodies, Trembley inserted one polyp 
individual into another’s stomach. After his observations of the nourishment of polyp 
bodies, he had decided to study the way in which the two polyps that he had merged 
together might be able to consume and digest food. Although he attempted to 
distinguish between what he termed the ‘polype intérieur’ (the insertee) and the 
‘polype extérieur’ (the inserted polyp), he noticed not only that the polype extérieur 
did not ‘digest’ the polype intérieur, but also that the inner polyp digested the worms 
the naturalist had fed it in a way that allowed the outer polyp, the mouth of which was 
stuffed by the second animal, to benefit from the nutrients:  
 
Il a avalé, & après qu[e le ver] a été digéré, le suc nourricier s’est répandu 
sensiblement dans toutes les parties des deux polypes. […] Il me seroit 
impossible de dire dans quel état étoit la portion du Polype intérieur cachée 
dans le Polype extérieur, peu après qu’elle s’est ouverte: mais, je puis assurer, 
qu’elle s’est ensuite confondue avec la portion a i du Polype extérieur, sans 
ôser, cependant, dire comment cela s’est fait.40 
 
                                                 
37 The image is Trembley’s; Mémoires, p. 253. 
38 Trembley, Mémoires, p. 253. 
39 ‘Ils ont mangé, crû, & multiplié.’ Trembley, Mémoires, p. 161. 
40 Trembley, Mémoires, pp. 286-287. The letters a I refer to the book’s accompanying illustrations. 
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Despite its otherwise rapacious character, as Trembley had described in the second 
part of the Mémoires, the polyp refused to consume its own kind even at the risk of 
starvation. Over the course of the three months that Trembley observed the merged 
polyps, they continued to share their food, gradually growing into one another and 
even producing offspring.41 Trembley’s experiments on joining two previously 
separate polyps was one way of asking the question of how, and when, parts became 
new bodily wholes. For Trembley’s polyp, the answer was not to be found in 
speculations about the animal soul; rather, he showed that the two polyps became one 
through the sharing of nutritive matter. 
As this short overview of Trembley’s experiments has shown, the polyp 
seemed to challenge notions of the singular animal body as an entity easily 
distinguishable from other bodies of its kind. The polyp’s body subverted the 
conventional notions of visible and porous surface (the skin and hidden inside (organs, 
fluids). The experiment on the digestive processes of two merged polyps, on the other 
hand, seemed to indicate that the polyps’ animal oeconomies could interact with each 
other spontaneously and collaboratively, thus forming a new bodily oeconomy in 
which nutrients could circulate between body parts formerly belonging to two 
different wholes. Although the naturalist himself refused to speculate openly about the 
metaphysical implications of his discovery, as we shall see in the next section, other 
eighteenth-century writers eagerly took on the challenge posed by Trembley’s 
experiments. 
 
3. Gilles-Auguste Bazin’s Abrégé de l’Histoire des Insectes: the Polyp and its 
Moral Lessons 
The discovery of the polyp, occurring as it did at a time when authors had begun to 
capitalise on (and thus reinforce) the wider reading public’s curiosity about the insect 
world, was soon incorporated into entertaining and educational natural history texts.42 
Virginia Dawson has discussed in detail the angle taken by Réaumur on the polyp 
                                                 
41 Trembley, Mémoires, p. 387. 
42 On scientific texts for ‘polite audiences’, see Aileen Fyfe, ‘Reading Children’s Books in Late 
Eighteenth-Century Dissenting Families’, The Historical Journal, 43.02 (2000), 453–473; Mary 
Terrall, ‘Fashionable Readers of Natural Philosophy’, in Books and the Sciences in History, ed. by 
Marina Frasca-Spada and Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 239–
54; On Bazin, see Emma Spary, ‘Political, Natural and Bodily Economies’,‘Economies’; Marc Olivier, 
‘Gilles Auguste Bazin’s “True Novel” of Natural History’, Eighteenth Century Fiction, 18.2 (2005), 
187–202. 
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debate; here, I will focus on the writings of his correspondent Gilles-Auguste Bazin 
(1681-1754), comparing his description of the polyp with that of contemporaneous 
writings. The aim of this section is to outline different ways in which the polyp was 
used to model the way in which parts are bound into communities. A close collaborator 
of Réaumur and himself an avid observer of insects, Bazin summarised the 
academician’s findings to make them palatable and pleasing to a more general, and in 
particular to a female, readership.43 While his texts closely follow those of Réaumur 
and, in the case of the polyp, of Trembley, their rendering in a literary format allows 
Bazin to spell out the implications of the polyp for his reading public, avid for natural 
historical knowledge that would serve them in the management of their daily lives. 
Bazin uses the bodily oeconomy of the polyp to emphasise the ‘naturalness’ of the 
household oeconomy he describes in his dialogue: hierarchical, composed of virtuous 
members and managed by women who are conscious of their duties as managers and 
mothers and seek to fulfil their role as best they can.   
Following his Abrégé de l’Histoire des abeilles (1744), which was almost 
immediately translated into English, Bazin published the four-volume sequel Abrégé 
de l’Histoire des Insectes (1747).44 It thus seems that Bazin was successful in reaching 
a wider audience and convincing his readers of the usefulness of the knowledge 
contained in his texts.45 The Abrégé’s five volumes are constructed as a dialogue 
between the enlightened naturalist Eugène, explicitly said to be the voice of the author, 
and two female friends, called Clarice and Hortense.46 As we learn in the first volume, 
Clarice is a ‘mère de famille, à la tête d’un ménage de campagne’ whose friend  Eugène 
(their exact relation is never specified), visits her at her countryside home.47 In this 
pastoral setting, Clarice declares that Réaumur’s work on bees, recommended to her 
by Eugène, is written in too ‘geometric’ a style to suit her needs as a busy mother and 
                                                 
43 On Bazin as a collaborator of Réaumur, see Terrall, Catching Nature in the Act: Réaumur and the 
Practice of Natural History in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 29–38. 
44 Gilles Augustin Bazin, Abrégé de l’histoire des insectes, pour servir de suite à l’histoire naturelle 
des abeilles, 3 vols (Paris: les Frères Guerin, 1747); Gilles-Augustin Bazin, Histoire Naturelle Des 
Abeilles, 2 vols (Paris: Guerin, 1744), I; Gilles Augustin Bazin, The Natural History of Bees. Containing 
An Account of Their Production, Their Oeconomy, the Manner of Their Making Wax and Honey, and 
the Best Methods for the Improvement and Preservation of Them. Illustrated With Twelve Copper 
Plates. Translated from the French. (London: J. and P. Knapton, 1744). 
45 What Emma Spary calls the ‘beau monde’ of eighteenth-century France. Spary, ‘Economies’. 
46 On Bazin’s use of the form of the pedagogical dialogue, see Nathalie Vuillemin, ‘Le dialogue aux 
prises avec la science des lumières : Gilles-Augustin Bazin et les langues du savoir’, Comètes, Revue 
des littératures d’Ancien Régime, 1 (2004), unpaginated. 
47 Bazin, Abrégé des abeilles I, p. 2. 
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manager of her household. Eugène/Bazin reassures her that bees are not only capable 
geometers and contributors to the ‘improvement’ of her household by providing honey 
and wax, but might also serve as a source of knowledge about her own domestic 
‘oeconomy’. Like herself, the bees are members of ‘un peuple industrieux, laborieux, 
infatigable, rigide observateur de ses loix, plein de prévoyance, & d’oeconomie, dont 
la passion dominante est la prospérité et le bien de la famille; d'un peuple, en un mot, 
qui semble avoir pris modèle sur vous.’48 As Eugène’s introduction to the world of the 
bees makes clear, the insects in his text will be used to transmit a view of nature, and 
by implication, a view of society, based on the familial oeconomy as well as on hard 
work and the ‘oeconomic’ management of one’s resources and on women’s 
willingness to take up their role as managers of the domestic oeconomy.49  
The dialogue form thereby not only makes Réaumur’s natural histories more 
palatable to women like Clarice. As Eugène takes it upon himself to explain the 
memoir on bees in the format of the conversation, he also directs the characters’ and 
readers’ interpretation of the insect world more closely than the genre of the academic 
treatise would allow. Eugène thus frequently links the natural history of insects to the 
lives of his interlocutors, and hence to those readers who might identify with them. By 
presenting the queen bee as the manager of a large household, for instance, Eugène 
can use the insects to model Clarice into the ideal female ‘agricultural improver’, who 
even promises to disseminate the new beekeeping techniques her tutor had shown her 
among the peasants working her land. The natural history of insects, as Emma Spary 
has shown, here serves the purpose of improving the mind of the female observer, who 
acquires a new sense of civic-mindedness from the industrious creatures she 
observes.50 The younger, still unmarried Hortense, on the other hand, is taught to prefer 
the regulated, ‘oeconomic’ lives of the insects she observes with her friends to her old 
life as Parisian socialite. Before she leaves Clarice’s estate, she thus declares herself 
‘converted’ to the more austere lifestyle that the rural nobility was then beginning to 
promote for itself:  
 
Ces gens tout occupés de jeux, de fêtes, de spectacles, de festins, d’intrigues 
ambitieuses, de visites, de courses, auront assurément peine à comprendre 
                                                 
48 Bazin, Abrégé des abeilles I, p. 4. 
49 Spary, ‘Economies’. 
50 Spary, ‘Economies’, pp. 285-287. 
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comment des plaisirs aussi tranquilles & aussi innocens que ceux que l’on m’a 
procuré ici, auront été capables d’attacher une personne de mon âge, 
accoutumée au tumulte & aux bruyans éclats de la ville. Je pensois comme eux 
en arrivant, & je m’en retournerai pensant comme vous.51  
 
The polyp appears relatively late in the series, at the end of the second volume of the 
Abrégé de l’histoire des insectes. After Eugène and Clarice conclude their 
conversation by expressing their gratitude for the King who guaranteed the 
peacefulness of the idyllic lands (Alsace) in which they have observed their insects, 
Eugène sends his female friend, who is said to be occupied with a court trial, an urgent 
letter. Eugène’s summary of the natural history of the polyp at the end of the second 
volume thus inaugurates the series’ switch from the dialogue form to the letter form, 
subsequently maintained over the remaining volumes.52 Because, in contrast to the 
dialogue, we never get to read Clarice’s thoughts on the matter, the potential for what 
Nathalie Vuillemin sees as the dialogue’s capacity to ‘déjoue[r] les stratégies d’un 
savoir monologique – et masculin’ is removed.53 As we move from bees to the polyp, 
the significance of which was contested by writers with very different theories of 
‘nature’, and also through the change in form, Bazin’s text works to constrain even 
further the little room there is to question his interpretation of the insect world.  
Eugène’s letter begins by explaining the reception of the polyp by the learned, 
as well as its consequences for contemporary understandings of nature. With the help 
of a series of hyperboles, he tells Clarice:  
 
Je n’eus pas plutôt appris cette nouvelle dont je veux vous faire part, que je 
renonçai sur le champ à ma léthargie. Depuis ce tems j’observe jour & nuit, & 
je vois des prodiges. Je vous conseille, Clarice, de laisser là vos soins 
domestiques, de perdre votre procès, de vous plonger dans vos viviers, de 
                                                 
51 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, pp. 176-177. On the eighteenth-century ‘middling’ nobility developing 
a new, more austere morality, see Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue. 
52 On the importance of the dialogue for Enlightenment thinking, see Penny Brown, ‘“Girls Aloud”; 
Dialogue as a Pedagogical Tool in Eighteenth-Century French Children’s Literature’, The Lion and the 
Unicorn, 33.2 (2009), 202–18; Claire Cazanave, Le dialogue à l’âge classique: étude de la littérature 
dialogique en France au XVIIe siècle, Lumière classique, 71 (Paris: Champion, 2007); Kevin Lee Cope, 
Compendious Conversations: The Method of Dialogue in the Early Enlightenment (Bern: Peter Lang, 
1992); Daniel Brewer, ‘The Philosophical Dialogue and the Forcing of Truth’, MLN, 98.5 (1983), 1234–
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53 Vuillemin, ‘Le dialogue’, p. 12. 
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pêcher des Polypes, & de voir le plus étonnant spectacle qui se soit jamais 
présenté à l’oeil humain; une découverte en un mot qui déconcerte toute la 
nation des raisonneurs.54 
 
Writers like Diderot (as we will see in more detail below) would later speculate about, 
and figure, a godless universe populated by human polyps as soulless, sexless beings 
without a fixed species identity.55 Bazin’s civilising mission leads him to give a very 
different spin to the story of the polyp. The strangeness of the newly discovered animal 
is thus presented as another example of the wonders found in the insect world, even if 
a particularly striking one. In the first volume of the Abrégé, the author had promised 
his readers that they would find marvels even in the world of the common bee: ‘Mon 
but n’est autre que que de présenter aux yeux du Lecteur les merveilles que la Nature 
a opérées dans les Insectes.’56 Bazin’s phrase ‘spectacle étonnant’ also recalls the abbé 
Pluche’s Spectacle de la nature, a multi-volume bestseller that used the dialogue form 
to teach its readers about the animal, plant and human worlds.57 As the title indicates, 
Pluche’s Spectacle used natural phenomena  ̶  with insects representing almost two 
thirds of the animals discussed  ̶  to demonstrate to readers that nature’s variety and 
orderliness (though inscrutable) spoke of God’s role as supreme artisan of nature. Just 
like his source and correspondent Réaumur, Bazin thus believed in the orderliness of 
the universe and in God’s construction of elaborate mechanisms for particular insect 
bodies and structures, without, however, completely subscribing to the Cartesian 
assumption of a universe governed by universal mechanical laws.58 Even a creature 
like the polyp, which Diderot would fashion into an example of monstrosity, was thus 
made readable as proof of God’s creative powers;59 the variety of insect forms and 
                                                 
54 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, pp. 185-186. 
55 On Diderot’s fluid view of categories of species, see Curran. 
56 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. xi. 
57 On Pluche, see Ann Blair, ‘Noël-Antoine Pluche as a Jansenist Natural Theologian’, Intellectual 
History Review, 26.1 (2016), 91–99; Cynthia Koepp, ‘Curiosity, Science, and Experiential Learning in 
the Abbé Pluche’s, Spectacle de La Nature’, in Childhood and Children’s Books in Early Modern 
Europe, 1550-1800, ed. by Andrea Immel and Michael Whitmore (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 153–
80; Andreas Gipper, ‘Vulgarisation scientifique et physico-théologie en France : le spectacle de la 
nature de l’abbé Pluche’, in Le partage des savoirs : XVIIIe – XIXe siècles, ed. by Lise Andries (Lyon: 
Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2003), pp. 21–34; Benoît De Baere, Trois introductions à l’abbé 
Pluche : sa vie, son monde, ses livres (Genève: Droz, 2001); Dennis Trinkle, ‘Noël-Antoine Pluche’s 
Le Spectacle de La Nature: An Encyclopaedic Best Seller’, in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth 
Century, ed. by Anthony Strugnell (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1998), CCCLVIII, 93–134. 
58 Roger, Les sciences de la vie, p. 224. 
59 Curran, ‘Monsters’. 
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behaviours might be evidence that no general, overarching laws of nature existed, but 
they were, nevertheless, said to be examples of the wonders created by a providential 
God.60 
Despite Eugène’s dramatic introduction to the wonders of the polyp, the bulk 
of his letter focuses on the animal’s morphology as well as on the behaviours it shares 
with more well-known animals, such as food procurement or digestion. While he 
admits that the hydra’s capacity to regenerate from budding challenges the 
explanations of the ‘nation des raisonneurs’, Eugène insists that form and function are 
as linked in the polyp as in any other of God’s creatures. Eugène’s explanation of the 
polyp’s perceptual abilities, for instance, is typical of descriptions of insects based on 
the providentialist idea that God had perfectly matched each creature’s structures to 
the purpose they served, even if this purpose was not always accessible to the human 
observer.61 The polyp, though it has no visible eyes, for example, is nevertheless 
sensitive to light, because it feeds on insects that are drawn to light: ‘Il étoit donc d’une 
utilité indispensable aux Polypes d’avoir un sentiment qui les conduisît vers la 
lumiere, pour y trouver leur vie.’62 While the polyp might destroy some prior 
assumptions about the general laws of nature, then, Eugène can nevertheless use the 
insect to inspire confidence about God’s creative powers when it comes to the order 
of animal bodies.  
Bazin’s tendency to explain the polyp’s strange qualities through the 
providentialist framework of orderliness and purpose emerges also in his discussions 
of those deemed the most noteworthy and potentially troubling by his 
contemporaries.63 Eugène describes Trembley’s experiments on merging polyps, for 
example, not in the context of the naturalist’s ‘operations’ aimed at testing the animal’s 
capacity to multiply through cuttings, as was the case in the Genevan’s Mémoires. 
Instead, Trembley’s experiment on polyps that digest as one animal when inserted into 
                                                 
60 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. xiii. 
61 On providentialist readings of insects, see Roger, Sciences de la vie, pp. 224-241; Eric Jorink, 
‘Between Emblematics And The “Argument From Design”: The Representation Of Insects In The 
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62 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. 209. 
63 For uses of the polyp to challenge nineteenth-century possessive individualism, see Danielle Coriale, 
‘When Zoophytes Speak: Polyps and Naturalist Fantasy in the Age of Liberalism’, Nineteenth-Century 
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one another is framed as an experiment not on the boundaries of the singular animal 
body but as a test of whether or not the polyp could be turned into a cannibal.64 Rather 
than describing Trembley’s successful merging of two polyps into one  (with the help 
of a boar bristle) that lived as such for several months, Eugène thus chooses to describe 
a similar attempt by Trembley, the result of which lasted only a couple of days: ‘il a 
trouvé le secret de faire entrer un petit Polype dans le ventre d’un plus gros, qu’il avoit 
eu soin de tenir affamé. Le petit est quelquefois resté quatre ou cinq jours dans ce 
ventre, & en est toujours sorti plein de vie, de santé, & tel qu’il étoit entré.’65 Though 
further on in the letter Eugène does hint at the experiment that led to the two polyps 
merging into one another, he quickly glosses over it, neglecting to mention that they 
share their resources, and instead refers the reader to Trembley’s memoirs for the 
description of ‘beaucoup d’autres expériences que je passe sous silence’.66 Ignoring 
the more striking result of another iteration of the experiment, Eugène thus simply 
concludes that rather than eat its own kind, a polyp will fast for as long several months 
at a time: ‘Tout est compassé dans la nature avec une providence admirable.’67 
Nature’s oeconomies, in other words, hold together because their order has been 
planned by Providence. 
Eugène describes the polyp body not only as proof of Nature’s orderly 
oeconomy, but also as an example of an insect family. In his descriptions, the 
distribution of resources depends not on the impossibility of distinguishing between 
individuals, but on the wise, hierarchical distribution of the polyp ‘mother’, again, 
perhaps, gesturing to his female readership and confirming the importance of their 
own duties as household managers. Though the narrator acknowledges the polyp’s 
hermaphroditism, he begins his description of polyp reproduction by declaring that he 
has chosen to use the term ‘mère’ for the reproducing insect, simply because ‘il faut 
s’en tenir à quelque terme’.68 Calling the unsexed polyp ‘mother’ allows Eugène to 
refashion the multiplicity of polyps seemingly contained within an individual as a 
family. Polyps that digest together, for example, can thus be described as a family of 
mother and sons: ‘nourrissez le fils seul, il transmettra sa digestion à sa mere, & si 
                                                 
64 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, pp. 220-221. 
65 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. 221. 
66 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, pp. 259-260. 
67 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, pp. 221. 
68 Bazin Abrégé des insectes II, p. 231. Réaumur, too, refers to the polyp as ‘mother’ in his memoir ; 
see Réaumur, VI, p. lxxvi. 
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dans ce tems-là il a des petits freres, c’est-à-dire, d’autres Polypes qui soient nés à peu 
près en même tems que lui, & qui tiennent pareillement au corps de la mere commune, 
il nourrira toute la famille.’69 Without attaching too much meaning to Bazin’s use of 
pronouns in his descriptions of newly birthed polyps, it does seem significant that 
while the generating polyp is called ‘mother’, the young polyp that in Trembley’s 
experiment manages to feed all polyps growing out of her is described as a male son 
feeding the entire ‘family’. The troubling multiplicity of individual bodies is 
reimagined as a family, and the hermaphroditic polyp as a fertile mother capable of 
giving birth to as many as 18 ‘children’.70 Linguistically, then, at least in the 
description of the generative process, the hydra has been subsumed within the 
conventional distinctions between sexed individuals. Even more importantly, the 
threat of a spontaneously organising and multiplying community of polyps, composed 
of infinitely divisible and malleable bodies, has been dispelled through its reduction 
to a family.  
It is not until the end of his letter that the pious Eugène addresses the 
contentious question of the polyp soul, deemed by Réaumur too metaphysical to lie 
within the purview of the naturalist.71 Eugène addresses the question by reporting to 
Clarice an open-ended dialogue between himself, an averred sceptic on the matter, and 
an anonymous 'hermetic’ philosopher and supporter of the hypothesis of the animal 
soul.72 The philosopher argues that the apparently rational behaviours of insects, such 
as their capacity to adapt their actions so as to increase the likelihood of catching their 
prey, points to the existence of a soul, or at least what he calls ‘une substance pensante, 
& par conséquent spirituelle; car la matiere est incapable de raisonner’.73 Eugène 
agrees with him that there can be no such thing as thinking matter, but the philosopher 
goes further. Nature, he argues, is imbued with a general ‘esprit’ ‘sans cesse agissant, 
animal & vivifiant’ that comes to inhabit and gives life to the bodies of plants, animals 
and men.74 This life force is contained in the multitude of tiny ‘germes’ that make up 
living bodies, which, as in the case of polyps, can be divided whilst at the same time 
                                                 
69 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, pp. 235-236. 
70 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. 238. 
71 Dawson, ‘The Problem of Soul in the “Little Machines” of Reaumur and Charles Bonnet’. 
72 The philosopher’s argument here is similar to that advanced by Neoplatonist thinkers such as the 
microscopist Nicolas Hartsoeker, whose theories – influenced by G. E. Stahl - on animal nature attracted 
much scholarly attention; see Cohen Rosenfield, Beast-Machine, pp. 97-101. 
73 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. 263. 
74 Bazin, Abrégé des insectes II, p. 266. 
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preserving,  in each of the severed parts, the vital force that gives rise to the 
development of new life.75 The philosopher’s theory maintains the dualism of matter 
and soul that Eugène/Bazin had upheld throughout the volumes; matter could give rise 
to life only if it had been imbued with the vital ‘esprit’, particular bodies according to 
‘les matrices dans lesquelles [cet esprit] opère.’76 
The philosopher’s theory of the life spirit echoes the theory of generation that 
Trembley’s cousin Charles Bonnet elaborated on the basis of polyp observations. One 
of Réaumur’s most famous correspondents, the devout Protestant Bonnet struggled to 
reconcile the divisibility of the polyp body with both his religion and his belief in the 
animal soul. In his metaphysical works, published mainly in the 1760s, Bonnet made 
sense of his observations of the polyp, as well as of other divisible animals (published 
in1745 in his Traité d’insectologie), by adopting the theory of pre-existing souls.77 
According to this theory, all living and thus ensouled beings spring from miniscule 
‘germes’ already contained in the first individuals of each of the fixed species; at each 
act of creation, whether through sexual reproduction or through budding, one of the 
previously inactive, solid ‘germes’ develops into a fully-fledged individual as nutritive 
fluids begin to circulate in it.78 Bonnet could thus save the notion of the individual 
soul, as well as of the independent individual tout court, by positing that all souls had 
been created at the beginning of time, but required specific circumstances (such as 
being cut in the case of the polyp) to develop. Instead of spontaneously forming wholes 
composed of equally spontaneously created individuals, that is, Bonnet posits a 
preconceived plan according to which clearly demarcated individuals (‘Personnes’) 
develop. As Bonnet writes elsewhere, these individuals can live together out of mutual 
interest and are held together by their sentiments, in ‘une sorte de communauté de 
sentimens et de besoins’, all the while remaining independent selves:79  
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Une Mère Polype, chargée de sa nombreuse Postérité, compose bien avec elle 
un seul Tout physique, mais non une seule Personne. Chaque Rejetton a son 
Moi, puisqu’il a son Cerveau propre, & l’on observe qu’il pourvoit par lui-
même à sa subsistance, en saissiant de petites proyes, & en les avalant, comme 
le feroit tout autre Polype. L’Union étroite de la Mère & de ses Petits & des 
Petits entr’eux, établit dans ce Tout singulier, une sorte de communauté de 
sentimens & de besoins.80  
 
For Bonnet, the polyps preserve their independent ‘mois’, even procuring their own 
subsistence, since they each have their own sensations. While they might form a 
(possibly temporary) ‘Tout physique’, that is, they never cease to possess their own 
‘moi’, or ‘brain’. While Eugène had thus emphasised that the polyps were bound 
together by maternal and filial responsibility, Bonnet describes a polyp community of 
atomistic but equal ‘mois’ united by their common interests.81  
For both Bazin and Bonnet, then, the polyp community represents a family in 
which each body retains its independence all the while communicating, through 
sentiments (at least for Bonnet) to the maintenance of the whole. The polyp as family, 
however, not the only metaphor available for making sense of the strange creatures. 
By way of contrast, we might mention another description of the polyp aimed, like 
Bazin’s dialogue, at a general audience of polite readers. Jacques Christophe Valmont 
de Bomare (1731-1807) discussed the polyp in two entries of his bestselling 
Dictionnaire de l’histoire naturelle (the first edition of which appeared in five volumes 
in 1764 followed by an edition of six volumes in 1767-68, nine volumes in 1775 and 
fifteen in 1791).82 Bomare’s dictionary was a compilation of the most important 
sources on natural history, though he was also an observer in his own right, and had 
given a popular lecture series on natural history in his cabinet in Paris. His article 
‘Polype’ echoed the writings of Trembley, Bazin and Bonnet and described the polyp 
community as a family. In the entry ‘coralline’, however, Bomare described the polyp 
                                                 
80 Bonnet, Considérations, p. xxxi. 
81 Menthéour,’Ruche’, p. 215. 
82 On Bomare, see Robbins, pp. 166–69. The Dictionnaire was the third most held natural history book 
in private libraries after Pluche’s Spectacle and Buffon’s Histoire naturelle according to Daniel Mornet, 
‘Les enseignements des Bibliothèques privées (1750-1780)’, Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, 
17.3 (1910), 449–96. 
 136 
 
community as a ‘republic’.83 Explaining how polyps that had been generated from one 
another live together, Bomare writes:  
 
toutes les nouvelles générations de polypes construisent à côté & au dessus les 
unes des autres; obligées de tendre ailleurs leurs filets, elles forment à leur tour 
& en tout tems de nouvelles colonies, & celles-ci d’autres avec une fécondité 
prodigieuse. Comme tous les fourreaux se communiquent les uns aux autres, 
leurs habitans ne forment alors qu’une seule & même société, où ils se font 
réciproquement part de leurs butins. 
 
Similarly to the two polyps merged together by Trembley, Bomare’s polyp ‘republic’ 
share their resources, circulating food among the entire ‘social’ body. Instead of 
representing the polyps as a family household, de Bomare describes a dynamic, rapidly 
growing ‘society’ of polyps that share their resources even as they branch off into 
separate ‘colonies’. Polyps, Bomare went on to explain, exude a ‘matière gélatineuse’ 
that binds them to one another and allows them to share resources. In Bomare’s polyp 
republic, there are no familial hierarchies, and members are not bound together by 
‘besoins’; they are, instead, physically connected and need to act in concert if they are 
to survive at all. While Bonnet’s polyps remain independent ‘mois’, for Bomare they 
not only connect to each other by sentiment, but have become a unity that feels and 
moves as one.  
 
 
 
4. Insects and Materialist Theories of Active Matter  
While the writers we have discussed so far used the language of human communities 
to understand the polyp, thereby naturalising their own vision of human communal 
living, others went further, making the polyp the basis of radical new theories of living 
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nature composed not of preordained orderly wholes, but of living particles that 
organised more or less spontaneously into complex bodies. These writers saw bodies 
functioning as a unity not because they fitted God’s providential plan, but because 
matter itself was endowed with forces such as desire or sympathy.  
Réaumur’s greatest rival in the realm of eighteenth-century natural history, the 
comte de Buffon, did not attempt to make the polyp fit into an idea of a divinely 
ordained natural system. In the second chapter of the second volume of his Histoire 
naturelle, Buffon set out to explain his ambitious, daring theory of animal generation, 
and through it his theory of (living) nature more generally, making the polyp’s strange 
regenerative capacity the basis of his entire theory of living nature.84 While we know 
that Buffon had been thinking about animal generation at least since 1733, it was with 
Trembley’s discovery of the polyp that his ideas began to assemble into what became 
one of the most controversial theories of the period (and beyond).85 Buffon essentially 
rejected the idea of divine order in nature, arguing that nature consisted of disorder as 
much as of order. As he put it rather poetically in his introductory Premier Discours: 
 
Le nombre des productions de la Nature, quoique prodigieux, ne fait alors que 
la plus petite partie de notre étonnement; sa méchanique, son art, ses 
ressources, ses désordres même, emportent toute notre admiration; trop petit 
pour cette immensité, accablé par le nombre des merveilles, l’esprit humain 
succombe: il semble que tout ce qui peut être, est ; la main du Créateur ne 
paroît pas s’être ouverte pour donner l’être à un certain nombre déterminé 
d’espèces ; mais il semble qu’elle ait jetté tout-à-la fois un monde d’êtres 
relatifs & non relatifs, une infinité de combinaisons harmoniques & contraires, 
& une perpétuité de destructions & de renouvellemens.86 
 
Buffon thus agreed with Réaumur that the human mind was incapable of grasping final 
causes. The two rivals disagreed, however, on why exactly this should be the case. 
While Réaumur’s descriptions of the minute structures of insects hint at his faith in an 
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orderly world where form matched function, even if the match was not always obvious 
to the observer, Buffon questioned the very idea of underlying order among living 
beings, arguing instead the only order man could discover was the order that his own 
senses constructed for him.  
The radical character of this perspective is particularly striking in Buffon’s 
theory of reproduction. Unlike most naturalists and philosophers in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, Buffon rejected the preformationist hypothesis, according to 
which God had created all beings that would ever exist at the beginning of time in the 
form of tiny germs encased (‘emboîtés’) in one another. Preformationists such as 
Bonnet argued over how exactly new living beings were generated from these germs, 
with some claiming that the germ was contained in the mother’s egg (the ovist camp) 
and others asserting that it was the father’s sperm that contained the germ (the 
animalculists).87 Buffon, on the other hand, outright rejected theories of generation 
arguing for the preexistence of germs that merely waited to develop. He replaced them 
with his own theory of ‘reproduction’, with the polyp providing its prime example. 
The polyp’s capacity to regenerate from limbs cut off at random raised the question 
(as expressed in Réaumur’s ‘ames sécables’) of where exactly the germs supposedly 
necessary for the development of a new being were located. The fact that the polyp 
could produce offspring from its own parts, Buffon asserted, pointed to the existence 
of what he termed ‘organic molecules’. In the wake of the discovery of the polyp, 
Buffon and his friend the English naturalist John Turberville Needham (1713-1781) 
observed seminal fluid under the microscope, concluding that the moving particles 
they saw were proof that all animate beings were composed of the same organic 
molecules, which radically distinguished them from inorganic matter.88 Organic 
molecules did not contain tiny but complete animals; they were the fundamental 
building blocks for all living beings, rather than just the being preformed in a ‘germ’. 
Through the processes of nutrition, digestion and decomposition they circulated 
through nature, organising into living beings with help of what Buffon termed 
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‘penetrating forces’ and ‘interior moulds’.89 The ‘interior mould’ of each organ, as the 
naturalist explained in his Discours sur les animaux, attracted organic molecules with 
the help of the ‘penetrating forces’ and formed them according to its shape.  Organic 
molecules thus made Buffon’s view of nature a dynamic one, where forces and living 
matter could organise, decompose and organise again; as he put it in the preface to the 
twelfth volume: ‘la Nature est elle-même un ouvrage perpétuellement vivant, un 
ouvrier sans cesse actif, qui sait tout employer, qui travaillant d’après soi-même, 
toujours sur le même fonds, bien loin de l’épuiser le rend inépuisable.’90 While only 
God Himself could create or eliminate organic molecules, Buffon attributed Nature 
the power to constantly change: she could ‘altérer, changer, détruire; développer, 
renouveler, produire’.91 Given this dynamism, Buffon had much less trouble 
explaining the polyp than Réaumur or Bonnet: the severed limbs of the polyps were, 
after all, composed of the same living molecules as the mother-polyp. For Buffon, 
each of the ‘germs’ contained by the polyp could act as the ‘interior mould’ of its 
offspring; once the ‘penetrating forces’ had assembled enough organic molecules for 
all the necessary organs, the remaining molecules could form new germs and thus 
reproduce the polyp through budding. The new polyp, in other words, was simply the 
reassembly of living molecules into a new body. Buffon’s model echoes, on the level 
of the individual body, Bomare’s image of the republican polyp society, where all 
elements are connected by a ‘gluey’ fluid. In his critique of mechanist accounts of 
physiology, Buffon argued that bodily oeconomies were tied together by a force he 
calls ‘sympathy’: ‘Qu’avec les Anciens on appelle sympathie cette correspondance 
singulière des différentes parties du corps, ou qu’avec les Modernes on la considère 
comme un rapport inconnu dans l’action des nerfs, cette sympathie ou ce rapport existe 
dans toute l’économie animale.92 Buffon’s polyp body, similarly, was composed of 
particles of an equal nature (‘des parties constituantes semblables’) that come together 
not because of ‘besoins’ but because of the ultimately undefinable attractive forces of 
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sympathy.93 As the naturalist explained in the seventh volume of his Histoire naturelle 
(1758), the polyp’s divisibility was possible because the attractive forces holding its 
molecules together were not as strong as in higher animals: 
 
Pour que le sentiment soit au plus haut degré dans un corps animé, il faut que 
ce corps fasse un tout, lequel soit non seulement sensible dans toutes ses 
parties, mais encore composé de manière que toutes ces parties sensibles aient 
entre elles une correspondance intime, en sorte que l’une ne puisse être 
ébranlée sans communiquer une partie de cet ébranlement à chacune des 
autres. […] Ainsi l’homme et les animaux qui par leur organisation 
ressemblent le plus à l’homme, seront les êtres les plus sensibles ; ceux au 
contraire qui ne font pas un tout aussi complet, ceux dont les parties ont une 
correspondance moins intime, ceux qui ont plusieurs centres de sentiment, et 
qui, sous une même enveloppe, semblent moins renfermer un tout unique, un 
animal parfait, que contenir plusieurs centres d’existence séparés ou différens 
les uns des autres, seront des êtres beaucoup moins sensibles. Un polype que 
l’on coupe, et dont les parties divisées vivent séparément ; […] enfin tous les 
animaux dont l’organisation s’éloigne de la nôtre, ont peu de sentiment, et 
d’autant moins qu’elle en diffère plus.94 
 
The polyp was divisible, in other words, because it had a low degree of sensibility; the 
more particles could feel one another, the better they would hold together. Sensibility, 
for Buffon, was what glued disparate parts into harmonious wholes, and polyp bodies 
were a convenient, though less impressive example of how sensibility worked. 
Buffon was not the only eighteenth-century naturalist to posit that living and 
non-living beings were composed of different kinds of matter. Pierre Luis Moreau de 
Maupertuis (1698-1759), in his anonymously published La Vénus physique (1745), 
had already speculated that organised beings were composed of particles endowed 
with varying degrees of ‘activeness’, and had apparently had several discussions with 
                                                 
93 Buffon argues that we can never understand these forces ‘parce que leur action se faisant sur 
l’intérieur des corps, et nos sens ne pouvant nous représenter que ce qui se fait à l’extérieur, elles ne 
sont pas du genre des choses que nous puissions apercevoir.’ Buffon, II, p. 45. 
94 Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon, Histoire naturelle générale et particulière : avec la description du 
cabinet du Roy, 15 vols (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1758), VII, pp. 9–10. 
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Buffon on the nature of matter.95 Thus, for Maupertuis, minerals were formed of the 
least active matter, while animals and humans consisted of the most active particles. 
Maupertuis claimed that active molecules, ‘endowed’ with properties such as desire 
and aversion, organised through the power of attractive forces.96 Unlike Buffon, he did 
not have the concept of an ‘interior mould’, but instead argued that the molecules had 
‘memory’ of their position in their previous organised forms; he could thus posit that 
species had formed by accident. In order to illustrate the idea that matter could 
organise and reorganise dynamically and randomly, among other things in order to 
form the human body, Maupertuis used the image of the bee swarm:  ‘c'est ainsi qu’un 
essaim d’abeilles, lorsqu’elles se sont assemblées & unies autour de la branche de 
quelqu’arbre, n’offre plus à nos yeux qu’un corps qui n’a aucune ressemblance avec 
les individus qui l’ont formé.’97 The bee swarm, for Maupertuis, illustrated that the 
whole was not only more than its parts, but also constituted a new body fundamentally 
different from the previously separate bodies that had formed it. Once the bees had 
left their hive and gathered together as a swarm, or once the human parts had been 
assembled, it would be wrong to think of them as a collection of individual bodies. 
Instead, the bees in the swarm as well as the organs of human body had gained new 
properties that the individual parts could not have; they had irretrievably lost and 
forgotten their ‘sentiment particulier du soi’ but acquired ‘une perception unique, 
beaucoup plus forte, beaucoup plus parfaite’.98 Thus, instead of God’s preordained 
plan, Maupertuis posited that it was possible for completely new wholes to emerge. 
Similar to Buffon’s argument that men become truly human only in and through 
society, for the controversial philosopher collectives, be they of bees or of bodily 
organs, fundamentally transformed the properties of their parts. Maupertuis’ image of 
the bee swarm would, as we will see in the following section, be echoed by vitalist 
                                                 
95 Charles T. Wolfe, ‘Endowed Molecules and Emergent Organization: The Maupertuis-Diderot 
Debate’, Early Science & Medicine, 15.1/2 (2010), 38–65; Shirley A. Roe, ‘Radical Nature in the 
Encyclopédie’, in Science, History and Social Activism: A Tribute to Everett Mendelsohn, ed. by 
Garland E. Allen and Roy M. MacLeod (Dordrecht: Springer, 2001), pp. 37–59; Terrall, ‘Salon, 
Academy, and Boudoir: Generation and Desire in Maupertuis’s Science of Life’. 
96 In his ‘Système de la nature’, Maupertuis expanded his earlier position, arguing that a uniform force 
of attraction could not account for the diversity of living beings and that molecules thus had to have 
desire, aversion, memory; see ‘Système de la nature,’ in Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Œuvres  
de Maupertuis (Lyon: Jean-Marie Bruyset, 1768), II, pp. 146–47. 
97 Maupertuis, ‘Système de la nature,’ pp. 170. 
98 Maupertuis, ‘Système de la nature,’ pp. 171-172. Italics in the original.  
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physicians and writers inspired by vitalist medicine, taking on, we might say, a life of 
its own. 
 
5. From Polyps to Bee Swarms 
One of the most radical, and arguably the most famous, uses of the polyp to think 
through the relation between natural and social parts and wholes occurred long after 
the moment of ‘crisis’ in the 1740s: in Diderot’s dialogue Le Rêve de d’Alembert 
(1769), interlocutors speculate about a world composed solely of matter, where active 
and sensitive molecules come together to form anything from stones and polyps to 
human beings.99 
The Rêve is written as the conversation between the co-editor of the 
Encyclopédie and mathematician, d’Alembert, his friend Mademoiselle de 
L’Espinasse, and the Montpellier vitalist Théophile Bordeu. The text is divided into 
three distinct parts, each of which is given a different set-up: the first, titled ‘La Suite 
d’un entretien entre M. D’Alembert et M. Diderot’ follows the model of the 
philosophical dialogue; in the second and most daring part of the text, ‘Le Rêve de 
d’Alembert’, Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse reads out her transcript of d’Alembert’s 
dream, which he had himself spoken out aloud earlier, to the doctor Bordeu; in the 
final part, ‘Suite de l’Entretien’, de L’Espinasse and Bordeu continue their 
conversation after d’Alembert leaves.100 
Famously, the Rêve uses three entomological images to unsettle the sense of a 
coherent, unified and singular human self, all of which appear in the dialogue’s middle 
part: the bee swarm, the spider and the polyp.101 As the images of the polyp and the 
bee swarm play complementary roles in Diderot’s texts, they need to be read alongside 
one another; the polyp can thus serve to introduce the set of debates centred around 
the bee swarm, debates that are related to but not congruent with the issues raised by 
the discovery of the polyp. 
With the polyp, Diderot develops Buffon’s idea of the organic molecules and 
playfully applies it to speculate about human life: if the same living molecules provide 
the building blocks for all parts of the body, it follows that no part can single-handedly 
                                                 
99 The edition used is Diderot, XVII, pp. 89–207. 
100 For the implications of this structure for the possibility of a single, unified self, and in particular of 
the authorial self, see Tunstall, ‘Embodied Mind’. 
101 On the image of the spider, see Jacot Grapa, ‘Le Moi-Araignée du “Rêve de d’Alembert” de Diderot’. 
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control the whole.102 If all living beings are merely different aggregate forms of the 
same matter then it becomes possible to think of human selves as ‘human polyps’, 
formed out of the matter of other humans just as the body adult insect is formed out of 
its chrysalis. The polyp’s ability to divide itself into new individuals from its own 
matter is thereby used to figure the idea that all life is but a recomposition of matter 
into different forms. As d’Alembert puts it in his dream: ‘vivant, j’agis et je réagis en 
masse … mort, j’agis et je réagis en molécules … Je ne meurs donc point? Non, sans 
doute, je ne meurs point en ce sens, ni moi, ni quoi que ce soit. Naître, vivre et passer, 
c’est changer de formes… Et qu’importe une forme ou une autre?’103 The image of the 
polyp that can spawn new individuals from its severed parts, then, serves as an 
example of, as well as a metaphor for, the idea of particles of matter dynamically 
organising and reorganising itself into new physical (or social) wholes. The building 
blocks of matter thereby do not change, but the forms they take do so in seemingly 
unpredictable ways.104 Thus, with Diderot’s polyps as illustrations of the dynamic 
relationship between parts and (bodily as well as social) wholes, we have come a long 
way from providentialist theories of life positing that the reproduction of individuals 
unfolded according to God’s preordained plan.105 
The image of the bee swarm follows on from the idea of human polyps and is 
introduced by de l’Espinasse; in the dialogue’s typical merging of voices, the dreamer 
addresses de l’Espinasse directly, who in turn reports the conversation between herself 
and d’Alembert to the doctor: 
 
Avez-vous quelquefois vu un essaim d’abeilles s’échapper de leur 
ruche?… Le monde ou la masse générale de la matière est la grande 
ruche… Les avez-vous vues s’en aller former à l’extrémité de la 
branche d’un arbre, une longue grappe de petits animaux ailés, tous 
accrochés les uns aux autres par les pattes?… Cette grappe est un être, 
un individu, un animal quelconque… Mais ces grappes devraient se 
ressembler toutes… Oui, s’il n’admettait qu’une seule matière 
                                                 
102 On Buffon, bees and the organic molecule theory, see chapter 2. 
103 Diderot, ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’, p. 139. 
104 See also Wahrman and Sheehan, Invisible Hands, pp. 173-174. 
105 On how microscopy, particularly of insects, was used to undergird the argument from design, see 
Catherine Wilson, The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope, 
Studies in Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), pp. 176–214. 
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homogène… […] Si l’une de ces abeilles s’avise de pincer d’une façon 
quelconque, l’abeille à laquelle elle s’est accrochée, que croyez-vous 
qu’il en arrive? Dites donc? — Je n’en sais rien. — Dites toujours… 
Vous l’ignorez donc; mais le Philosophe ne l’ignore pas, lui. […] il 
vous dira que celle-ci pincera la suivante; qu’il s’excitera dans toute la 
grappe autant de sensations qu’il y a de petits animaux; que le tout 
s’agitera, se remuera, changera de situation et de forme; qu’il s’élèvera 
du bruit, de petits cris; et que celui qui n’aurait jamais vu une pareille 
grappe s’arranger, serait tenté de la prendre pour un animal à cinq ou 
six cents têtes et à mille ou douze cents ailes…106 
 
The swarm here serves as a means for Diderot to play with notions of the singular 
‘moi’, problematising, as with the image of the human polyp, the idea of a unified self, 
demarcated from both the outside world and other ‘mois’. The use of personal and 
impersonal pronouns in the passages dissolves any simple separation of individual and 
outside world. D’Alembert moves from using the active (’celle-ci pincera’) to the 
passive voice (’il s’excitera’), thus enacting, through language, the merging of the 
individual bee with the ‘tout’ of the swarm. The movement of Diderot’s swarm (not 
dissimilar to Mandeville’s) cannot be explained through the intentions of any of its 
parts, and neither can the swarm be said to be the simple sum of the bees that compose 
it. The individual bee might decide (‘s’avise de’) to pinch its neighbour, but she cannot 
know that her action will result in the agitation of the entire swarm. Similarly, the 
observer would be hard-pressed to determine the origin of the swarm’s movements: 
as each bee senses her neighbour’s movements and thus communicates them to the 
next insect, the swarm really does seem to act as a whole. None of the individual bees 
is any sense ‘aware’ of the consequences of her actions, nor is she contributing to the 
fulfilment of a preordained plan; the bees act, instead, out of what Anne Vila has 
termed the ‘contagious effect’ of sensibility, as they transmit (their seemingly random) 
sensations from individual to individual.107 Unlike Bonnet’s separate polyp ‘selves’ 
with separate sensations and interests, Diderot’s bees really do become a ‘tout’, where 
one bee’s sensations become those of the whole. Just as importantly, Diderot’s swarm 
                                                 
106 Diderot, ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’, p. 120. 
107 Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology, p. 160. 
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is a community without a leader, where agency is distributed among equal, 
indistinguishable parts rather than located with a queen that can easily be singled out 
by the observer. Not only is the bee metaphor a less explicit critique of absolutist 
politics; even more importantly, perhaps, the implicit comparison between animal and 
human communities also roots ideas about the latter in ‘nature’, thus making feudalist 
hierarchies appear less, and communities of equals more, ‘natural’.  
The image of the swarm had connotations linking not only to animal and 
human communities, but also to the human and animal body. Diderot based his image 
of the swarm on a passage from the medical treatises by the real-life Bordeu, who had 
used the swarm as an analogy for the harmony between the separate organs forming 
the whole of the human body.108 According to Bordeu, the swarm illustrates that each 
of the body’s organs had the theoretical capacity to act independently, but that doing 
so would disrupt the bodily oeconomy, causing illness and ultimately death. Diderot’s 
fictionalised Bordeu, is able to guess, much to de L’Espinasse’s astonishment, the 
continuation of d’Alembert’s dream (as if they were part of a single ‘hive mind’), and 
uses the bees to argue that they act as ‘des animaux distincts que la loi de continuité 
tient dans une sympathie, une unité, une identité générale.’109 ‘Sympathy’ is a key word 
of this passage; closely tied to the vitalist view of the human body, it was used in the 
eighteenth century to connote both the physical and the moral means for parts to 
communicate with the whole.110 Ménuret de Chambaud’s use of the term in his article 
“Observation” is instructive in this regard, and not only because he uses two different 
animal swarms to illustrate the functioning of sympathy in as well as between bodies; 
refuting mechanist physiologist who study each of body part as separate building 
blocks of the bodily ‘machine’, Ménuret writes: 
 
Il semble dans leurs écrits qu'il y ait dans l'homme autant d'animaux différens 
qu'il y a de parties & de fonctions différentes; ils sont censés vivre séparément, 
& n'avoir ensemble aucune communication. […] On pourroit, suivant l'idée de 
ces auteurs, comparer l'homme à une troupe de grues qui volent ensemble dans 
                                                 
108 Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology, pp. 70-71. 
109 Diderot, ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’, pp. 121-22. As Tunstall writes, Diderot’s mind ‘is not only 
embodied, [but] also extended’ and all characters participate in it; Tunstall, ‘Embodied Mind,’ p. 216. 
110 As Vila states, analysing Jaucourt’s article “Sympathie” in the Encyclopédie: ‘Jaucourt's 
descriptive language not only makes moral sympathy analogous to organic sympathy, but actually 
suggests that the former is little more than a higher-level expression of the primordial mechanism by 
which all vital entities communicate.’ Vila, ‘Vapors,’ p. 89. 
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un certain ordre, sans s'entr'aider réciproquement & sans dépendre les unes des 
autres. Les Medecins ou Philosophes qui ont étudié l'homme & qui ont bien 
observé par eux mêmes, ont vû cette sympathie dans tous les mouvemens 
animaux, cet accord si constant & si nécessaire dans le jeu des différentes 
parties les plus éloignées & les plus disparates; ils ont vû aussi le dérangement 
qui résultoit dans le tout du désaccord sensible d'une seule partie. Un médecin 
celebre (M. de Bordeu) & un illustre physicien (M. de Maupertuis) se sont 
accordés à comparer l'homme envisagé sous ce point de vûe lumineux & 
philosophique à un grouppe d'abeilles qui font leurs efforts pour s'attacher à 
une branche d'arbre, on les voit se presser, se soutenir mutuellement, & former 
une espece de tout, dans lequel chaque partie vivante à sa maniere, contribue 
par la correspondance & la direction de ses mouvemens à entretenir cette 
espece de vie de tout le corps, si l'on peut appeller ainsi une simple liaison 
d'actions.111 
 
The human body, Ménuret claims, is more like a bee than a bird swarm.112 Each organ 
can only be understood in relation to other parts; rather than governed by a central 
controlling instance, the bees, just as the organs in their bodies, are tied to each other 
by their sensitivity to one another. Even disparate body parts, Ménuret explains, 
‘communicate’ with and depend on one another via the transmission of sensations 
from one part to the next.  
Where Aristotle had classed ‘man, bees, wasps, ants, cranes’ as ‘social 
animals’, defined as ‘gregarious animals’ ‘which have some one common activity’, 
vitalist writers like Ménurest insisted on a distinction between flocks and swarms.113 
Rewriting the political image of the animal society into a physiological analogy, he is 
rejecting here not only Aristotle’s monarchical bee hive and its long reception history 
                                                 
111 Ménuret de Chambaud, J.-J. (1765). Observation(Gram. Physiq. Méd.). In D. Diderot & J. le Rond 
D’Alembert (Eds.), Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire des arts et des métiers (Vol. XI, pp. 313–321). 
Paris: Briasson. On Maupertuis as a source for Diderot’s swarm and polyp images, see Ibrahim, 
‘Maupertuis dans Le Rêve de D’Alembert’,‘Maupertuis dans le Rêve’. 
112 He is echoing here the image used by Mandeville to describe civilised ‘society’: for Mandeville, the 
‘body politic’ should be described as a bee swarm rather than ‘a herd of cows or a flock of sheep’. See 
chapter one for discussion of this image. 
113 Aristotle, History of Animals, trans. by A.L. Peck (London; Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1965) vol. I, 1, 488a33 ff. 
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in favour of the swarm;114 cranes, too, had a long history of being used to illustrate 
monarchical (from Aristotle onwards) but also republican (in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Italy) governments.115 In the French context, the influential 
theorist of sovereignty Jean Bodin (1529/30–1596), had followed Aristotle in equating 
bees and cranes as monarchical animals; arguing that monarchy is the most natural 
form of government, he writes: ‘If we should inspect nature more closely, we should 
gaze upon monarchy everywhere. To make a beginning from small things, we see the 
king among the bees, the leader in the herd, the buck among the flocks or the 
bellwether (as among the cranes themselves the many follow one).’116 Bodin’s 
monarchical hive and flock cranes are, of course, the exact opposite of Ménuret’s 
swarm. Rather than a body guided by its head, the swarm is composed of equal and 
interacting parts. In addition to describing life as the result of constantly 
communicating and interacting parts, the metaphor of the bee swarm as unified body 
implies that this process extends from the oeconomy of individual animal bodies to 
the oeconomy of their societies. Terms such as ‘s’entraider’, ‘font leurs efforts’, 
‘désaccord’ and, of course, ‘sympathie’ could thus easily be applied not only to the 
harmony of the healthy body, but also to the oeconomy of the body politic. Where 
Aristotle and Bodin had figured bees and cranes as members of societies led by an 
extraordinary individual, Ménuret used the image of the swarm to represent a physical 
body as dynamic entity composed of equal parts. Like Diderot’s swarm community, 
Ménuret’s image of the body thus runs counter to absolutist theories of the body 
politic.  
The Montpellier vitalists themselves were intent on avoiding political and 
religious controversy, and thus did not reconvert the swarm from a physiological into 
a political image.117 Diderot, as we saw above, had fewer qualms, at least in his 
                                                 
114 For an overview, see Eva Johach, ‘Der Bienenstaat: Geschichte Eines Politisch-Moralischen 
Exempels’, in Politische Zoologie, ed. by Anne Von der Heiden and Joseph Vogl (Zürich: Diaphanes, 
2007), pp. 219–33. 
115 Sabine Kalff, ‘Are Cranes Republicans? A Short Chapter in Political Ornithology’, in Zoology in 
Early Modern Culture: Intersections of Science, Theology, Philology, and Political and Religious 
Education, ed. by K. A. E. Enenkel, P. J. Smith, and Tamás Demete (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2014), 
pp. 437–59. 
116 The original appeared in Latin as Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem in 1566; see Jean 
Bodin, Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, trans. by Beatrice Reynolds (New York: 
Norton, 1969), p. 271. 
117 As Williams notes, ‘Although Montpellier writings on the vital principle were decidedly secular in 
tone, never resorting to divine action or intervention to explain the workings of nature or the body, they 
were also determinedly respectful of orthodoxy, religious feeling, and the church.’ Williams, The 
Physical and the Moral, p. 63. 
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unpublished Rêve. The implications of the oeconomy of the swarm-body for social 
organisation are rendered most explicit in one of Diderot’s Observations sur le Nakaz 
(written sometime between 1777 and 1780). Diderot wrote the Observations on the 
way back from his extended stay in St. Petersburg in the winter of 1773-1774, 
responding to Catherine II’s proposal for a reform of the Russian code of law (nakaz 
means ‘instructions’).118 Diderot’s Observations advocated the abolition of Russian 
‘despotism’ through a reform of the political system and particularly the institution of 
a permanent national assembly, and was written as a dialogue not only with Catherine 
the Great, but also with physiocratic ideas.119 As he moves from considering the 
composition of the body to the government of the Russian social body, thus returning 
to the traditional metaphorical implications of the bee society, Diderot uses not the 
image of the swarm, but of the productive hive (possibly echoing Mandeville as much 
as his own swarm): 
 
Lever tous les embarrass de la circulation intérieure et des échanges au-dehors. 
Protéger le commerce, le favoriser sans s’en mêler ; jamais un souverain 
n’entendra aussi bien les intérêts du commerce que les commerçant. Le prix 
des denrées s’établit de lui-même. L’agriculture, la population et le commerce 
se tiennent indivisiblement ; leur décadence et leur prospérité sont les suites 
d’une seule et même cause. Ne point donner de coups de pied dans la ruche, 
laisser travailler les abeilles en repos.120 
 
Like the swarm of the Rêve, the order and well-being of Diderot’s political ‘hive’ 
depends on the constant communication between its members. Interference on the part 
of the sovereign in the form of regulations that favour one aspect of the country’s 
oeconomy over another is thus considered to ‘block’ the interbodily communication 
required for the prosperity of the whole.121 Echoing Buffon’s ideas on the sensitivity 
                                                 
118 Denis Diderot, ‘Observations Sur Le Nakaz’, in Diderot: Political Writings, ed. by Hayden Mason 
and Robert Wokler, (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 77–164. 
119 Franco Venturi, ‘La vieillesse de Diderot’, trans. by Patricia Coppola and Sylviane Coppola, 
Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie, 13.1 (1992), 9–30 (pp. 11–15). Catherine refused to read 
Diderot’s text until after his death, when she ordered it to be burnt. 
120 Denis Diderot, ‘Observations sur le Nakaz’, in Œuvres : Tome III, Politique, ed. by Laurent Versini 
(Paris: Laffont, 1995), pp. 507–78 (p. 573). 
121 As a consequence of this stance, Diderot also proposes, for example, that Catherine move the capital 
to a more central region: ‘quelle que soit leur etendue [des empires], le centre est donc le vrai lieu de 
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of bodies and body parts, Diderot imagines the political community as an 
interconnected whole where no part can be moved without affecting the harmony of 
the whole. Just as the bees in their swarm transmit sensations to one another and by 
doing so move as a whole, the oeconomy of a country consists in an interrelated system 
in which food prices, population numbers and the exchange of goods all depend on 
one another ‘indivisibly’; if their system of communication (what in natural bodies 
allows sensations to travel) is interrupted, it can no longer function.  
Diderot, and his medical sources, then, used the bee swarm as a tool for 
imagining life as a quality that spontaneously emerges from the constant interplay of 
different, sensitive parts. Many of the leading naturalists of insects, however, 
described the bee collective in very different terms, emphasising instead the role of 
the queen as the ‘head’ of the bee community. As Buffon’s erstwhile collaborator 
Louis-Jean-Marie Daubenton (1716-1800) points out in his article ‘Essaim’, for 
example, it is the queen that decides when it is time to swarm and that guarantees the 
unity of the swarm: 
 
l'essaim ne subsisteroit pas s'il ne s'y trouvoit une reine, c'est-à-dire une abeille 
femelle. Dès qu'elle quitte la ruche, elle est suivie d'un grand nombre d'abeilles 
ouvrieres, & en moins d'une minute toutes celles qui doivent composer l'essaim 
s'élevent en l'air avec la reine, elles voltigent, & quelques-unes se posent sur 
une branche d'arbre pour l'ordinaire, d'autres s'y rassemblent; la reine se tient 
à quelque distance de ce grouppe, & s'y joint lorsqu'il a grossi à un certain 
point. Alors toutes les abeilles s'y réunissent bientôt; & quoiqu'elles soient à 
découvert, elles y restent en se tenant cramponnées les unes aux autres par les 
jambes: on ne voit voltiger autour du grouppe, qu'autant de mouches qu'il s'en 
trouve autour d'une ruche dans un tems chaud: mais lorsqu'il n'y a point 
d'abeille femelle dans un essaim, il revient bien-tôt à l'ancienne ruche.122 
 
                                                 
communication. La lisière est le vrai lieu de la défense et des échanges ; plus un empire est étendu, plus 
la circulation intérieure doit être facilitée ; plus il faut y multiplier les villes ; plus il doit y avoir de 
grandes villes. Ce sont les grandes villes qui créent les bourgs ; ce sont les bourgs qui créent les 
villages ; ce sont les villages qui créent les hameaux. C’est cette distribution qui forme et concentre un 
empire.’ Diderot, ‘Observations sur le Nakaz’, pp. 561-562. 
122 Daubenton, ‘Essaim’, Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, (University of Chicago:  ARTFL Encyclopédie 
Project (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe) 
<http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu> 
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The very moment in the natural history of the bees that writers like Diderot, Bordeu 
and Maupertuis thus used as an image of the continuity of the body of the group in 
which individual identity is dissolved is here shown to depend on the behaviours of 
the queen. As the repetition of the terms ‘reine’ and ‘abeille femelle’ in virtually every 
sentence of the paragraph underlines, she is the governing principle of the swarm body. 
Daubenton’s description, in other words, presents the hive as a body dependent on the 
queen as its auhtoritative head, echoing an image of the relationship between monarch 
and people used by Louis XIV himself.123 Although Daubenton switches from the 
plural ‘elles’ to the singular ‘il’ (for both ‘grouppe’ and ‘essaim) to indicate that the 
swarm has indeed become a unified whole, he also singles out the ‘abeille femelle’ as 
a singular body. Although the bees are linked to each other in a way that echoes the 
continuity of Diderot’s swarm (‘cramponnées’ this continuity is only temporary. 
Without the queen’s presence, as Daubenton’s description suggests, the swarm can 
only ever be a coherent whole for a limited period, before the bees seek shelter in their 
old, monarchical hive again. Bazin, using characteristically anthropomorphic 
language in his dialogue between Eugène and Clarice, compares the process of 
swarming to a human people setting out to colonise a new territory, even liking the 
bees to Colombus’ expedition.124 Like Daubenton, he insists that it is only the presence 
of a queen that will determine a group of bees to the risky decision of leaving their old 
home: ‘C’est un parti pourtant qu’elles ne prendroient jamais, si elles n’y étoient 
déterminées par un Chef, & si elles n’avoient parmi elles une Reine propre à perpétuer 
l’Empire qu’elles vont fonder.’125 Without the queen at their head, the bees would 
rather perish in their overcrowded hive than found a new settlement.126 In Daubenton’s 
descriptions, the moment of swarming is not an image of a natural community, but a 
short-lived, and dangerous, period of transition in the life of the hive. Much of the 
article is thus taken up by strategies for beekeepers to ensure that the bee community 
does not disintegrate during its unproductive transitional phase; for Daubenton, the 
bees only live in a stable ‘society’ whilst they are firmly tied to the hierarchical, 
productive hive reigned over by the queen. 
                                                 
123 Louis XIV, Mémoires, suivis de Manière de montrer les jardins de Versailles, ed. Joël Cornette 
(Paris: Tallandier, 2007). 
124 Bazin, Abrégé des abeilles II, p. 211. 
125 Bazin, Abrégé des abeilles II, p. 184. 
126 Bazin Abrégé des abeilles II, p. 185. 
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Making a similar point, Réaumur claimed in his Mémoire on bees that it was 
not only common knowledge that a bee community would eventually leave its hive to 
swarm in order to find a new home, but also that ‘cet essaim est conduit par un chef, 
par un Roi qui doit être une Reine, ou plus simplement une mère Abeille.’127 The term 
‘chef’ is worth dwelling on here, for it points to the way in which the natural history 
of swarm was linked to wider ideas about animal, as well as political, oeconomy. 
‘Chef’ was thus commonly used in poetic descriptions of the relationship between 
mind and body. According to the definition of the Dictionnaire de l'Académie 
française of 1762, the term ‘chef’ refers primarily to the human head, and is only used 
figuratively in the modern sense of ‘celui qui est à la tête d' un Corps, d' une 
Assemblée, qui y a le premier rang & la principale autorité’.128 Where the vitalists had 
used the bee swarm to illustrate their vision of the human body as a composite of 
equally important and harmoniously interacting parts, Réaumur made clear that the 
swarm body was guided by the queen bee, just as Cartesian theorists of the mind-body 
relationship insisted that the human mind guided the body. 
While we cannot know for sure whether speculative writers such as Maupertuis 
and Diderot were responding directly not only to vitalist imagery but also to the 
description of the swarm put forward by Réaumur and other naturalists, it is 
nevertheless interesting to note that Réaumur himself uses the analogy of the ‘grappes 
d’abeilles’ to describe a group of bees attached to one another by their legs. However, 
it does not appear in his description of the ‘essaim’ preparing to find a new home. 
Réaumur’s ‘grappe’, instead, appears in his observations on the interior life of the hive, 
when the insects are safely attached to the home assigned to them by their beekeeper.129 
The following passage on the bees’ sleeping habits is thus couched between a 
description of the ‘spectacle’ of their work and of the description of the different hives 
built different types of bees: 
 
On considére même avec plaisir, des masses ou des grouppes de ces mêmes 
abeilles, qui, en prenant le repos qui leur est devenu nécessaire, se mettent en 
état de recommencer leurs travaux. Les arrangements des abeilles tranquilles 
                                                 
127 Réaumur, Mémoires vol. 5, p. 297. 
128 ‘Chef’, Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (Paris: Vve. B. Brunet, 1762), p. 291. Dictionnaire 4e 
édition, t.1. 
129 Réaumur, Mémoires V, p. 308 
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qui forment ces grouppes, forment de chaînes dont toutes les chaînons sont 
animés. Souvent ces espéces de chaînes sont disposées en maniére de 
guirlande. Chaque abeille est accrochée par ses deux jambes antérieures, ou 
seulement par une, à une des jambes, ou aux deux jambes postérieures de celles 
qui la précéde. Ainsi la premiére est chargée du poids de toutes celles qui se 
trouvent jusqu’à l’endroit le plus bas de la guirlande. Les grouppes ne sont, 
pour ainsi dire, qu’un assemblage de chaînes mises les unes auprès des autres; 
je veux dire que les mouches qui forment les plus gros massifs, les plus grosses 
grapes, sont accrochées les unes aux autres par les jambes, qui donnent des 
prises plus commodes que le corps, & que les autres parties.130 
 
Réaumur’s use of the image of the bees as a ‘grappe’ differs from that of Diderot’s 
and his sources not only in that the bees attached to one another are not a swarm but a 
temporary cluster of bees resting in preparation for more hard work contributing to the 
hive’s oeconomy.  
In Diderot’s description of the swarm, its formation means that the bees transmit 
their sensations to one another so as to become one living, moving and, most 
importantly, feeling body: ‘il s’excitera dans toute la grappe autant de sensations qu’il 
y a de petits animaux; [que] le tout s’agitera, se remuera, changera de situation et de 
forme’. Réaumur’s bees, on the other hand, are ‘tranquilles’; as the second, inorganic 
image of the ‘chaînes’ emphasises, their formation is orderly and stable rather than 
excitable. Réaumur’s description of the ‘grappe d’abeilles’ leads to his description of 
the structure of the hive via a reflection on the wonders of the bee ‘society’. The 
naturalist thus asks how the physical arrangement of the bee body  ̶  the bee’s ‘animal 
oeconomy’  ̶  enables the bees in the hive to not only form chains, but to organise the 
‘oeconomy’ of their household: how do the multitude of bees coordinate their bodies 
so as to produce honey and wax?131 In reply to his own question, Réaumur suggests 
that the bees organise themselves, or, rather, seem to organise themselves, through the 
rule of law: ‘Dans tant de mouches réunies, & qui travaillent pour une même fin, on 
croit voir en petit ce que la raison a fait de plus grand & de plus utile pour nous; une 
société, qui, comme celle de nos républiques ou de nos monarchies, est gouvernées 
                                                 
130 Réaumur, Mémoires V, p. 217. 
131 Réaumur, Mémoires V, p. 218. 
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par des loix.’132 Réaumur’s bees are thus driven by a common goal imprinted into their 
very being, rather than moved by the sense impressions transmitted from bee to bee. 
The ‘laws’ of their community have been conceived (assumedly by the Creator 
himself) to achieve the preconceived goal, namely the production of honey and wax 
as necessary steps for the reproduction of the insects. The ‘grappe’ as described by 
Bordeu, Maupertuis, Diderot and Ménuret, on the other hand, serves no purpose; in 
fact, the description of the swarm, without any reference to the hive and its 
(re)productive oeconomy, means that there can also be no reference to the ‘oeconomy’ 
of the hive. Réaumur’s bees leave the hive because they have become too numerous 
in order for the balance between population numbers and the amount of resources the 
insects can produce and store in their home. The terms he uses to describe the 
swarming of the bees reflect the importance of the hive and its productive oeconomy 
to the bees as described by Réaumur: ‘une grande partie des mouches prend l’essor 
pour aller chercher ailleurs une nouvelle habitation’; ‘cette espéce de colonie quitte le 
lieu de sa naissance’.133 The bees in these descriptions are in a phase of transition 
between hives, and they leave their former home in search for one that enables greater 
productivity. In Diderot’s dialogue, on the other hand, d’Alembert asks de l’Espinasse 
whether she has observed ‘un essaim d’abeilles s’échapper de leur ruche’, as if the 
hive were a prison from which the insects could free themselves. For Réaumur, what 
ties the (monarchical) bees to one another is the presence of the queen; this happens 
not through the transmission of sensations, but rather because of an inborn sense of 
devotion the perpetuation of their hive. The swarm, that is, was used to conceptualise 
bodily and political wholes in different, and in some cases contrasting, ways. For all 
thinkers discussed here, however, images of insect bodies provided a key for 
understanding the organisation of the natural oeconomy as a whole as well as, by 
implication, the most ‘natural’ ordering of human society. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a variety of ways in which eighteenth-century thinkers 
conceived of the connection between organic as well as social parts and wholes, using 
images of insect bodies to think through the ways in which seemingly disparate could 
                                                 
132 Réaumur, Mémoires V, 235. 
133 Réaumur, Mémoires V, 235. 
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come to act as one functioning animal or political economy. While for the more 
religious thinkers discussed in this chapter such as Réaumur, Bazin or the Protestant 
Bonnet, bodily or domestic oeconomies functioned on the basis of a preformed order; 
other writers critical of mechanical theories of bodily wholes theorised, via the images 
of the swarm and the polyp, ways in which formerly distinct parts could spontaneously 
form new wholes which could not be reduced to the simple sum of their parts. As we 
have seen, different thinkers had different solutions for the problem of the unity of 
wholes, explaining through forces as sensibility, its cognate sympathy or even 
‘penetrating’ or ‘attractive’ forces. For both groups, however, polyps and swarms 
provided models for theories of the organisation of physiological and political wholes. 
In the next chapter, we shall move to the perspective of those whose task it was to 
manage such wholes. 
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Chapter Four. Managing Insect Pests and Governing Human Political Economy: 
The Notion of the Population in Enlightenment France 
1. Introduction 
 
Les insectes causent des ravages étonnans : ces animaux cherchent dans la 
parenchime des feuilles, la substance de l’écorce & du fruit des plantes, leur 
asyle & leur nourriture. L’on a vu des armées de sauterelles, moissonner des 
prairies entieres, des légions de chenilles, de limaçons & de hannetons, ronger 
tout dans une province, &c.[…] Les moucherons s’attachent à l’écorce des 
plantes & à leurs feuilles, y déposent des millions d’œufs, l’irritation qu’ils y 
causent fait soulever l’écorce & rouler la feuille, qui se dépouillant de sa propre 
substance pour nourrir ces insectes, périt d’épuisement, & sa perte entraîne la 
ruine partielle, souvent totale des plantes, même des arbres.134 
 
As the military language of the above quoted passage underlines, insects were 
considered in the eighteenth century as a threat because they appeared in large 
numbers (‘des milliers d’oeufs’), and because their appearance in swarms, or as 
‘armies’ and ‘legions’, enabled them to profoundly transform or even destroy the 
territory on which they appeared. The extract is taken from a 1766 article in the 
Journal oeconomique, with which the anonymous author intended to describe the 
advantage of what he calls ‘science économique’ for controlling harmful insects and 
thus improving agricultural yields. After his dramatic description of the potential 
damage done by insects, he continues, in typical Enlightenment manner, to explain 
how natural historical observations and new agricultural techniques could help his 
readers avoid such biblical scenes of destruction. He acknowledged that the risk of 
outbreaks of insect infestations was impossible to eliminate completely, but provided 
his readership with means for controlling the extent of the risk developed through the 
observation of insect bodies, both of individuals and groups. Instead of passively 
accepting insect plagues as divine punishment for sin or recommending small-scale 
methods aimed at killing individual specimens, that is, he proposed systematic 
                                                 
134 Anonymous, Journal oeconomique, ou mémoires, notes et avis sur l’agriculture, les arts, le 
commerce, & tout ce qui peut avoir rapport à la santé, ainsi qu’à la conservation & à l’augmentation 
des biens des familles, & c (Paris: Antoine Boudet, 1766), 78.  
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techniques for controlling and managing insect ‘populations’. Natural historical 
knowledge of food sources, birth rates and illnesses of various kinds of insects, the 
author (like other eighteenth-century writers interested in pest control) claimed, would 
reduce the damage to crops to a minimum and thus prevent the decline of the human 
population depending on them for their subsistence.   
In the mid-1750s, writers of political economic texts began to describe groups 
of people as a population, with regular birth rates, patterns of health and illness and of 
subsistence needs. This chapter shows that writers concerned with the understanding 
individual and collective behaviour of insects also conceived of their subjects in these 
terms. It argues that eighteenth-century investigations of insects – whether for the 
purposes of natural history or for its concrete application in pest management – 
provided one of the sites for the construction of the concept of ‘population’. It reads 
writings on pest control alongside political economic treatises as well as medical 
literature on the management of epidemics and epizootics to show that thinkers in all 
of these fields were concerned with one of the most fundamental discussions emerging 
in the late seventeenth century and intensifying during the eighteenth century: the 
question of how to govern the population, on which the strength and prosperity of the 
kingdom was thought to depend.135 As scholars such as Joseph Vogl and Stuart Elden 
have recently argued (following Foucault’s theory of biopolitics), population was 
thereby not understood as a collection of individuals, but increasingly considered a 
‘natural body’ governed by its own laws, which guided the interaction of the individual 
bodies composing it and with the territory on which the population lived.136   
They have shown that eighteenth-century government, that is, took as its object 
not merely the control of the territory, but also the health and well-being of the 
population that occupied this territory.137 The concern with the health and prosperity 
of the population provided new areas for the state to intervene in; new methods were 
                                                 
135 In what is generally considered one of the first works of European political economy, for example, 
Antoine de Montchrétien writes: ‘Mais de ces grandes richesses la plus grande, c’est l’inepuisable 
abondance de ses [du Roi] hommes, qui les sçauroit manger : car ce sont gentils esprits, actifs et plains 
d’intelligence, de qualité de feu, composés par une ingenieuse artifcielle nature, capables d’inventer et 
de faire.’ Antoine de Montchrestien, Traicté de l’oeconomie politique : dédié en 1615 au Roy et à la 
Reyne mère du Roy, ed. by Théophile Funck-Brentano (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit, 1889), p. 24. 
136 On this understanding of population, see Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, pp. 77–82. For a 
consideration of the construction of the concept of the territory in France, see Jacques Revel, 
‘Knowledge of the Territory’, Science in Context, 4.1 (1991), 133–61. For a braoder consideration, see 
Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013). Foucault, p. 
342. 
137 On the notion of territory, see Elden, Territory; Revel, ‘Territory’. 
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thus invented to regulate both individuals and their passions (such as the policing of 
family relations) and the population as a whole (such as the rise of statistical 
methods).138 As medical historians have shown, one important area where this concern 
with the population was developed were the measures used to deal with epidemics, 
that is with illnesses affecting whole populations such as plague and smallpox. As 
Colin Jones has demonstrated, for example, physicians and state bureaucrats in the 
eighteenth century no longer saw plagues as either divine punishment or as a disease 
that could be eradicated by treating every single patient.139 As Daston and Park outline 
in their account of the Enlightenment’s campaign against the marvellous, ‘the new 
sensibility’ and ‘the new metaphysics’ of the eighteenth century pushed natural 
philosophers to abandon their search for supernatural or theological causes of unusual 
phenomena such as insect plagues, instead viewing them as connected to and 
explained by stable natural laws.140 Modifying the seventeenth-century conception of 
natural laws so that these were not only immutable, but also gave rise to ‘regular and 
uniform’ natural phenomena, eighteenth-century natural philosophers effectively 
dispensed with the idea of the miraculous.141 Events such as plague or insect 
epidemics, previously considered divine punishment for human sins, were thus 
naturalised. As Colin Jones notes in his analysis of plague tracts, writers in the early 
modern period progressively reduced God’s role in the causality of epidemics.142 By 
the eighteenth century, Jones argues, all writers agreed that the disease had to be 
explained ‘in terms of material, secondary causality’ rather than as a consequence of 
‘first causes’, or direct divine intervention.143 During the very period in which strict 
                                                 
138 On new quantitative technologies for managing populations see Andrea Alice Rusnock, Vital 
Accounts: Quantifying Health and Population in Eighteenth-Century England and France, Cambridge 
Studies in the History of Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); William Clark, 
‘On the Table Manners of Academic Examination’, in Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis: 1750-1900, 
ed. by Hans Erich Bödeker, Peter Hanns Reill, and Jürgen Schlumbohm (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1999), pp. 33–67; Poovey, ch. 2, pp. 29–91. 
139 Colin Jones, ‘Plague and Its Metaphors in Early Modern France’, Representations, 53 (1996), 97–
127. 
140 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York : 
Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books, 1998), pp. 329–31. 
141 Daston and Park, Wonders, pp. 350-352; Daston and Park also describe this shift as one from 
‘regularity of causes to regularity of effects’ (p. 352). On the earlier conception of miracles, see Simon 
Schaffer, ‘Comets and Idols: Newton’s Cosmology and Political Theology’, in Action and Reaction: 
Proceedings of a Symposium to Commemorate the Tercentenary of Newton’s Principia, ed. by Paul 
Theerman and Adele Seef (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), pp. 206–31; Peter Harrison, 
‘Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56.4 (1995), 
531–553. 
142 Jones, ‘Plague and Its Metaphors’. 
143 Jones, ‘Plague and Its Metaphors,’ pp. 113-114. 
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disciplinary measures such as the cordons sanitaires (implemented from the mid-
seventeenth-century onwards) began to show their effectiveness, medical writers 
argued that it was precisely the divisions among the social body effected by the 
cordons, and the concomitant interruptions in regular exchange of people and goods 
that caused the afflicted to die.144 Historians have also discussed how eighteenth-
century savants developed new techniques for managing animal epidemics affecting 
cattle or horses. Dorothee Brantz, for instance, argues that state-funded physicians in 
France and Germany shifted their approach from ‘ad-hoc measures’ combating 
outbreaks as they happened to ‘anticipatory measures’.145 This, we might reformulate, 
meant that savants treated the animals as populations; given that they were a crucial 
resource for increasing the state’s (agricultural) wealth, managing their health was an 
essential task for governors. Building on insights from medical history as well as from 
the history of political economy, this chapter looks at methods for pest control as a 
hitherto overlooked area in which the concept of ‘population’ was developed. Insects 
could do great damage to an agricultural nation such as France, and knowledge of their 
bodies was thus also ‘useful knowledge’ that could be deployed in the service of 
agriculture. Both for the control of insect and of human populations, writers elaborated 
techniques for conceiving of natural bodies in relation to the material elements of the 
territory, including the trees, plants and crops ravaged by insects. Insect pests had to 
be managed because they blocked the production of goods of a territory. At the same 
time, they began to be conceived of in terms of ‘populations’ which could not directly 
be controlled but managed only by taking into account their natural laws. Insects, in 
short, were considered in terms that echoed those used in medical and political 
economic texts; these animals, which appeared in the aggregate, provided an example 
of a ‘natural’ body to be observed and managed. 
To highlight the ways in which political, economic and medical writings 
echoed those on insect pests, I first outline the changing understanding of the concept 
of the ‘population’ in treatises of political economy. This is followed by an overview 
of the use of the notion of ‘population’ in writings by physicians concerned with the 
management of epidemics and epizootics. This then allows me to draw out the strong 
                                                 
144 Jones, ‘Plague and its Metaphors,’ pp. 116-117. 
145 Dorothee Brantz, ‘“Risky Business”: Disease, Disaster and the Unintended Consequences of 
Epizootics in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France and Germany’, Environment and History, 
17.1 (2011), 35–51. 
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parallels between discussion of government of humans and the increasingly rational 
methods for pest control. Discussing a period when political economists such as 
François Quesnay were trained physicians, and when naturalists were concerned with 
the political economic task of increasing the wealth of the kingdom, this chapter 
suggests that just as political economist texts theorised government on the basis of a 
conception of the human as, fundamentally, a need-driven animal, writings on animals 
described them also in political economic terms.146  
 
2. The Naturalness of the ‘Population’: Reproduction and Subsistence in 
Physiocracy 
Before moving on to the ways in which physicians and naturalists conceived of the 
bodies they observed, I shall briefly remind the reader of the conceptualisation of the 
collective as a population in the writings on political economy of mid-eighteenth-
century, when the concept of the population is usually thought to have emerged. 
Before this period, ‘the population question’, though vigorously debated, had referred 
above all to the issue of France’s supposed depopulation. The idea that more men 
meant more labouring hands and thus more wealth and prosperity for the crown was 
rarely, if ever, questioned.147 The reasons for decreasing numbers were sought above 
all in the moral, and much less in the material realm. On the contrary, in the middle 
decades of the century, writers such as, most famously, the physiocrats, argued that 
men, like all other animals, were fundamentally driven by their sensations and their 
needs, most crucially their need for subsistence. Even religious freedom became a 
material issue, as it increased men’s ability to work for their subsistence 
unencumbered by fear of prosecution. They also severed the assumed link between 
high population numbers and good government, insisting instead that the ‘natural’ and 
thus right number of subjects depended on the territory and the subsistence it offered. 
The earliest political economic texts of the late seventeenth century and early 
eighteenth century, such as Nicolas De LaMare’s influential Traité de la police (1705-
1738), insisted on the importance of the population, though by this they invariably 
                                                 
146 On the changing conception of needs, see Simmons, Vital Minimum; E. C. Spary, Feeding France: 
New Sciences of Food, 1760–1815, Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories, no. 21 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 270–77; E. C. Spary, Eating the Enlightenment, pp. 234–38. 
147 Carol Blum analyses depopulation discourses in her Strength in Numbers: Population, 
Reproduction, and Power in Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
UP, 2012). 
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meant a large population.148 Political economists around the middle of the eighteenth 
century, on the other hand, complicated the association between prosperity and high 
population, increasingly insisting that rather than focusing on increasing the mere 
quantity of the population, governments should ensure also people’s ‘happiness’. This 
was to be ensured by public administration, or ‘police’, concerned not only with the 
containment of crime or disorder, but with fostering the material and spiritual welfare 
not just of the individual but of the population. As the Encyclopédie article on police 
explains, using the Greeks as an ideal model for eighteenth-century France : ‘Chez les 
Grecs, la police avoit pour objet la conservation, la bonté, & les agrémens de la vie. 
Ils entendirent par la conservation de la vie ce qui concerne la naissance, la santé & 
les vivres. Ils travailloient à augmenter le nombre des citoyens, à les avoir sains, un 
air salubre, des eaux pures, de bons alimens, des remedes bien conditionnés, & des 
médecins habiles & honnêtes gens.’149 The tasks of the police were therefore thought 
to concern all areas connected to the ‘public good’. New technologies such as the 
medical police or statistics would account for and ensure the health and happiness of 
the population. Rather than ‘simply’ a matter of encouraging population growth, 
government was conceived of as embracing almost all areas of life: the fertility of 
individuals, their family relations, their health and happiness all became concerns, as 
well as tools, for governors. Population growth depended, political economic treatises 
argued, on a large number of factors, chief among which was the relation between 
means of subsistence and population numbers. In one of many similar works published 
in the middle decades of the century, for instance, Joachim Faiguet de Villeneuve 
(1703-1781) exhorted his fellow citizens 
 
remontons a la source des vrais biens, des biens fisiques et réels; et cherchons, 
avant tout, le secret de les multiplier a proportion de nos besoins. [...] bientôt 
                                                 
148 Nicolas de La Mare, Traité de la police, où l’on trouvera l’histoire de son etablissement, les fonctions 
et les prerogatives de ses magistrats; toutes les loix et tous les reglemens qui la concernent, 4 vols 
(Paris: J. et P. Cot, 1705). 
149 Anon., ‘Police’, Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. 
by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, (University of Chicago:  ARTFL Encyclopédie 
Project (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe) 
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On police, see also Marc Raeff, ‘The Well-Ordained Police State and the Development of Modernity 
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Historical Review, 80.5 (1975), 1221–43; Matthew Ramsey, ‘Public Health in France’, in The History 
of Public Health and the Modern State, ed. by Dorothy Porter (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), pp. 45–118. 
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la population s’augmentera parmi nous: mais, après tout, visons encore plus au 
perfectionnement de l’espece humaine, qu’a l’augmentation numérique des 
individus.150 
 
Even though de Villeneuve maintained the association between a healthy body politic 
and a large population, he also shifted the focus from the latter to the former. 
Population numbers, he argued, would ‘naturally’ correspond to the available 
resources.151 The task of government was to provide resources for the satisfaction of 
the physical needs of the population.  
The conception of collectives in terms of a population (no longer conceived as 
just the number of people in a territory) but as a natural entity – moving, growing, 
declining – with its own natural laws was present in writings on animals too. Among 
the comprehensive reforms proposed by De Villeneuve, quoted above, he 
recommended that political economists model their ideas on the practices of animal 
and plant breeders. He thus suggested that Church and State encourage marriage 
among the strongest, most productive members of the population, rather than condemn 
them to infertility through celibacy laws or poverty: ‘Dans toutes les espéces 
d’animaux que les hommes ont domestiqués, on choisit, pour la propagation, les 
individus les plus beaux et les plus parfaits ; qui le croirait, c’est le contraire dans 
l’espéce humaine ?’152 De Villeneuve, rather troublingly, suggests that in order to 
improve the ‘body’ of the population, governors should adopt an approach well known 
to animal breeders. While this was a rather unusual proposal, De Villeneuve agreed 
with other writers that there was a connection between animal and human populations 
and species. The first eighteenth-century definition of ‘population’, Étienne-Noël 
Damilaville’s Encyclopédie article ‘Population’ argued that the term applied to all 
‘species’:  
 
                                                 
150 Joachim Faiguet de Villeneuve, L’économe politique: projet pour enrichir et pour perfectioner 
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ce mot est abstrait, pris dans l'acception la plus étendue, il exprime le produit 
de tous les êtres multipliés par la génération; car la terre est peuplée non - 
seulement d'hommes, mais aussi des animaux de toutes especes qui l'habitent 
avec eux. […] Mais cette expression s'applique plus particulierement à l'espece 
humaine; & dans ce sens particulier, elle désigne le rapport des hommes au 
terrein qu'ils occupent, en raison directe de leur nombre & inverse de 
l'espace.153 
‘Population’ thus referred to a group of individuals as members of a ‘natural’ (animal 
or human) ‘species’ in relation to a given territory.  
Damilaville’s use of the term ‘species’, in turn, echoes the definitions given by 
naturalists; though the most famous natural historians of the Enlightenment, the 
Swedish Carl Linnaeus and the French Buffon disagreed on such fundamental issues 
as the purpose of classification in natural history, they agreed (at least Buffon did so 
in his early writings) on the basic definition of species, a term that eighteenth-century 
naturalists, unlike their predecessors, applied to animals, plants and humans.154 The 
naturalists argued that despite the astonishing variety of individuals, there existed 
fixed species boundaries which could be empirically tested: if two animals could breed 
together, they belonged to the same species.155 A ‘species’ was thus made up of ‘a 
succession of individuals’ that could reproduce together.156 The term ‘population’ and 
‘species’ were frequently used together, indicating the importance of the population’s 
productive, and reproductive bodies as the object of government. What matters most 
for my purposes is that despite the individual differences in conceptions of ‘species’, 
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authors agreed that man should be classed as part of the animal kingdom. As Nicholas 
Hudson has shown, authors before the seventeenth century distinguished humans not 
according to their skin colour or other bodily characteristics, but according to the 
government under which they lived.157 As historians have argued, in the eighteenth 
century, the redefinition of human differences as based on their bodies in a sense 
reversed this logic; government was now thought to have to take into account the 
characteristics of the bodies making up the population.158 
As historians remind us, the main innovation of the physiocrats was to make 
population dependent on the available means of subsistence – and thus on variables 
such as the fertility of the soil, the kinds of products one could grow or the climate – 
rather than vice-versa.159 If governmental policies ensured a blockage-free framework, 
the number of citizens would ‘naturally’ increase (this is the doctrine associated with 
the famous phrase ‘laissez-faire, laissez-passer’, though it was, in fact, Quesnay’s 
contemporary Vincent Gournay, and not the physiocrats who coined it).160 As for de 
Villeneuve, agricultural growth preceded population growth. This view of the 
anteriority of wealth to population growth differed from the ideas of most of 
Quesnay’s and Mirabeau’s predecessors, who argued that population growth would 
lead to increased wealth.161 Even Mirabeau, before his ‘conversion’, had sometimes 
asserted that the wealth of a nation lay in the number of its citizens.162 For Quesnay 
and the later physiocrats, however, such measures could not be effective, no more than 
trying to force bees or silkworms to multiply without increasing their food supply. As 
Mirabeau, the more ‘literary’ writer in the collaborative pair he formed with 
Quesnay,163 put it somewhat crudely with the help of an animal analogy: ‘Les hommes 
se multiplient comme des Souris dans une grange, s’ils ont le moïen de subsister sans 
limitation.’164 The sovereign’s (or his political economic advisors’) task, in other 
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words, was not to formulate a plan for increasing the population and then inducing his 
citizens to follow it, whether by force or by appeals to their self-interest.165 Instead, 
the sovereign, guided by the enlightened économiste, had to work on the natural 
elements provided by the territory in order to ensure that nothing stood in the way of 
increases in the productivity (though not necessarily the numbers) of the population. 
Famous for his flowery language, Mirabeau frequently employed metaphors from the 
animal realm; in one famous passage of his immensely successful bestseller L’ami des 
homme, for example, he writes:  
Si la multiplication d’une espéce dépendoit de sa fécondité, certainement il y 
auroit dans le monde cent fois plus de loups que de moutons. Les portées des 
louves sont très-nombreuses, & aussi fréquentes que celles des brebis qui n’en 
portent qu’un. L’homme condamne au célibat des armées de moutons; & je 
n’ai pas ouï dire qu’il fît aux loups cette espéce d’injustice. Il tue beaucoup 
plus de moutons que de loups; & cependant la terre est couverte de la race des 
premiers, tandis que celle des autres est très-rare. Pourquoi cela? C’est que 
l’herbe est fort courte pour les loups, & très-étendue pour les moutons.166 
These animal metaphors, if we take them seriously, highlight the physiocrats’ 
understanding of the human population as a natural entity. Even though economic 
actors seem to act rationally, the physiocratic observer is interested not in inner 
motivations, but in broad patterns visible only at the level of the group. In the 
eighteenth century, naturalists and agronomists insisted on the interconnectedness of 
all aspects of nature’s oeconomy; tackling an insect plague, for instance, required 
knowledge not only of the reproductive mechanism of the species in question but also 
of the external factors that influenced the number of individuals. The same principles 
hold true for the physiocratic theory of population.167 As Mirabeau and Quesnay put 
it in their collectively written primer on physiocracy, the Philosophie rurale (1763):  
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Comme tout est astreint aux besoins de la subsistance commune, l’étendue 
d’une espece est une invasion sur le territoire prétendu par une autre espece. 
Delà vient que tout s’entredévore ici-bas. Il résulte de cette loi inviolable de la 
nature, que le principe de la propagation est sans bornes, & que celui de sa 
réalité est astreint aux bornes de la subsistance.168 
 
Bodies pertaining to a ‘species’, whether animal or human, are infinitely fertile in 
principle, but limited in reality by the available means for subsistence. Just as the 
number of crop-devouring caterpillars, for instance, depends on the number of its 
enemies and on available food sources, human populations depend on the amount of 
territory and the food they can find and grow within it. 
At a time when new theories of government increasingly relied on a conception 
of the human body as defined and driven by animal needs which had been fixed by 
natural laws and regularities, naturalists’ methods and findings on animal bodies and 
their needs contributed to thinking through the question of how to observe and control 
all living bodies. Insects were particularly prone to be considered in this light because 
they could only be understood – just like the Crown’s human subjects – as they 
appeared on a specific territory and, crucially, in the aggregate. This distinguished 
them from, for example, the exotic, ‘noble’ beasts favoured by the court’s anatomists 
in the seventeenth century, at the height of the Sun King’s reign.169 I am not arguing 
that the physiocrats and other political economists concerned with population later in 
the century had necessarily read naturalists’ texts on insect pests. Instead, what I am 
proposing is that natural historical, agronomic, medical and political economic texts 
share common and often overlapping ideas on how to conceive of human, and animal, 
individuals and collectives.170 Rational methods for dealing with insect pests were 
published by members of the Académie des sciences who also wrote treatises on 
forestry or civil engineering (such as Duhamel Du Monceau) or investigated how to 
improve techniques used by artisans (such as Réaumur), as well as by landowners who 
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published observations on how to improve agriculture or how to deal with harmful 
insects, but also devised ambitious plans to regenerate France as a whole. The same 
people, that is, could pursue different areas of knowledge which, they thought, would 
contribute to improving the wealth and prosperity of the kingdom. Part of this wider 
project of improvement was to ensure the health of both humans and animals, not only 
individually but also in the collective. 
 
3. Physicians Managing the Population: Human and Animal Epidemics  
As historians of medicine have shown, writings on epidemics from the mid-century 
onwards were particularly prone to considering the Crown’s subjects as a population. 
Andrea Rusnock, in particular, has analysed how medical writers became interested in 
the health not only of indiviudals but also of the population, and developed new 
numerical methods for accounting for the links between disease, deaths and population 
numbers.171 Partly, she argues, physicians’ interest in the aggregate rather than the 
individual can be explained by the resurgence in the eighteenth century of Hippocratic 
medicine, and its concern environmental factors such as airs and waters, occasioned 
by the increasing awareness of the differences in health practices in distant colonial 
spaces.172 Hippocratic physicians emphasised the importance of climate for health and 
disease, thus forcing the practitioner to take into account not only the individual 
patient, but also the space he or she inhabits. Though the basis for these ideas were, of 
course, ancient medical writings, Enlightenment physicians put them on new empirical 
grounds.173 Thus, efforts were made to record and correlate meteorological data, 
topographical information and disease.174 All across Europe, it thus became 
fashionable for savants to keep so-called weather journals, in which they recorded 
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factors such as temperature, climate and diseases.175 In France, the establishment of 
the Royal Society of Medicine enabled Parisian savants to collect standardised data 
from provincial observers, whom they provided with instructions for both record-
keeping and the instruments to be used.176 One of the main tasks of the newly 
established Société would be to collect information on ‘physical situation, weather, 
common diseases, food, and mode of living of the inhabitants and sanitary 
conditions.’177 This search for disease patterns contrasted with the older methods for 
dealing with epizootic (or epidemic) outbreaks, where officials had sought advice from 
the medical community only in emergency and as needed.178 This new interest in 
factors affecting not only individuals but entire populations, as several scholars have 
shown, was especially apparent in the heated debates over smallpox inoculation. 
Defenders and opponents weighed up the benefits and risks of inoculation for either 
the individual (who might die as a result) or for the ‘population’ as a whole (on the 
level of the population, it was hoped, smallpox would one day be eradicated).179 As 
Rusnock has shown, the practice had become increasingly popular among French 
aristocrats, even though its effectiveness, and the relative harmlessness of smallpox 
caused by inoculation, could not be explained by contemporary medical theories.180 
Unlike in England, where physicians embraced mathematical methods, in France it 
was often mathematicians, and not physicians, who advocated for the practice.181 In 
the process, Rusnock has shown, they developed sophisticated mathematical and 
probabilistic methods for representing populations numerically. 
The conceptualisation of the patient-body as part of a population whole is 
exemplified by the catchy aphorism coined by the mathematician Charles Marie La 
Condamine (1701-1744): ‘La petite vérole nous décime, l’inoculation nous 
millésime’. La Condamine here implied that the death of some individual bodies 
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would be offset by the benefits for the social body.182 His Swiss colleague Daniel 
Bernoulli (1700-1782) used pioneering methods in the mathematics of probability, 
based on a series of simplifications such as the idea that one’s risk of contracting the 
disease remained constant throughout one’s lifespan, in order to determine the benefits 
of inoculation.183 He too admitted that individuals might suffer from the practice, but 
insisted that the concern should be with the population as a whole: ‘L’humanité veut 
qu’on assure et qu’on conserve la vie à chaque particulier, soit jeune, soit vieux: 
l’intérêt de l’État demande la population du Royaume.’184 Critics of inoculation, on 
the other hand, attacked precisely the idea that the two levels – of particular bodies 
and of the population body – were comparable. D’Alembert, though a defender of the 
practice, attacked Bernoulli for applying mathematics to calculate the value of a life; 
no one could blame a father, he argued, for refusing to expose his child to a potentially 
lethal practice, even if it benefitted the state. In addition to mathematical calculation, 
d’Alembert stated, one had to take into account moral considerations: the decision 
whether or not to inoculate one’s child would thus depend ‘non-seulement du degré 
auquel [le père] aime son fils, mais de la manière dont il l’aime, si c’est, par exemple, 
comme son fils, ou comme son héritier; si c’est par tendresse, ou seulement par devoir; 
si c’est comme son bien, ou comme le bien de l’État’.185 For d’Alembert, that is, the 
interest of the individual citizen was not automatically identical to the interest of the 
state, which was by necessity concerned with the social rather than the particular body.  
Although many physicians, especially from the conservative Paris Faculty of 
Medicine, were sceptical, smallpox inoculation gradually became accepted medical 
practice.186 Arguments focusing on the social rather than on the particular body 
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became increasingly convincing to eighteenth-century readers. Thus, as Anne Eriksen 
has shown, while before the 1760s, arguments in favour of smallpox inoculation 
foregrounded the interest of the individual, in the later period the focus was on the 
more abstract notions of society or population.187 Initially, the new methods of 
probabilistic calculations were not used to determine the benefits for the population at 
large, but rather to calculate the potential positive effects on the individual. Medical 
writers argued that inoculation would save individual lives, not necessarily that it 
would contribute to the prevention of new outbreaks of the epidemic.188 Given that 
external causes were considered less important than the constitution of the patient him- 
or herself, physicians were not yet concerned with the immunity of the population. 
Gradually, however, they began to think of smallpox as an independent object to be 
fought, rather than as inextricably linked with the individual’s constitution. The efforts 
on the part of civic-minded to control the prevention and containment of epidemics, 
but also of epidemics among animals, which threatened agricultural revenue, 
culminated in the establishment of the Royal Society of Medicine in 1778, which 
worked to replace the locally operating medical police, faculties and guilds with a 
centralised bureaucratic system.189 As enlightened reformers became increasingly 
concerned with the welfare of all of the Crown’s subjects, the Société, whose members 
were in general much more favourable towards inoculation than those of the Faculty 
of Medicine, was established to facilitate centralised disease control, rather than 
entrust the health of French individuals to their regional intendants. 
Smallpox, however, was not the only motivation for the founding of the 
Academy. Indeed, its founding story exemplifies the close connection between 
epizootics and epidemics in the period. As Caroline Hannaway notes, the controller-
general Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781), inspired by the physiocrats and 
with the advice of the academician and future medical commissioner Félix Vicq 
d’Azyr, set up the Société in the wake of an outbreak of the cattle plague, or 
Rinderpest, in 1774.190 Turgot charged Vicq d’Azyr with the direction of a 
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commission that would both fight the outbreak and collect information that would help 
them to prevent future epizootics. The commission was assisted by students from the 
veterinary schools that had recently been set up in Lyon (1761) and Alfort near Paris 
(1764), thus underscoring the fact that state bureaucrats were increasingly focused on 
collecting knowledge that would help them to prevent future outbreaks.191 The result 
of Vicq d’Azyr’s missions was published in 1776 as Exposé des moyens curatifs et 
préservatifs qui peuvent être employés contre les maladies pestilentielles des bêtes à 
cornes.192 For Vicq d’Azyr (as well as for Turgot), the Rinderpest outbreak proved 
that merely local measures targeting particular bodies only were ineffective in fighting 
the disease. What was needed instead, they argued, was careful observation of regular 
disease patterns in both animals and humans, thus enabling savants and farmers to 
anticipate, rather than merely combat outbreaks.193 He recommended that in the event 
of an outbreak, all affected animals should be killed and affected areas cordoned off 
from trade routes. Vicq d’Azyr argued that Rinderpest should be considered in the 
same manner as the human plague, a consideration that would lead him to advocate 
for the institutionalisation of comparative medicine and anatomy. However, in 
addition to adhoc measures that mirrored the plague measures instituted by the 
absolutist state from the middle of the seventeenth century onward,194 Vicq d’Azyr 
also drew parallels with the smallpox. Indeed, physicians and curious farmers had 
experimented with inoculation cattle throughout Europe from the mid-century 
onwards.195  
Building on the debates on the smallpox, the academician studied, among other 
things, the effectiveness of inoculation (the procedure had failed in most of his test 
cases) as well as the differences in symptoms, duration and severity of the illness in 
different regions, which depended, among other factors, on climate and 
‘atmosphere’.196  By gaining knowledge of the ‘lois ordinaires’ of healthy and diseased 
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animal and human populations as they interacted with their environment, the savants 
of the Academy of Medicine thus concerned themselves with collective, rather than 
with individual bodies. As with the smallpox debates, it was not always easy to 
convince farmers to sacrifice their cattle for the health of the population of the wider 
territory. Peasants continued to smuggle infected animals out of cordoned off areas, 
and others dug up dead animals to sell their hides.197 Nevertheless, Vicq d’Azyr was 
convinced of the importance of his studies for controlling, if not eradicating, the 
disease. His observations, as Brantz puts it, were supposed to transform the ‘threat’ of 
cattle plague into a predictable, calculable ‘risk’. Just as with human populations, 
veterinary doctors thus saw it as their task to manage animal populations in health and 
disease. In sum, physicians, whether they treated animals or humans, became 
concerned in the eighteenth century with treating not just individual ‘patients’, but 
entire population bodies. 
 
4. Seeing Insect Pests as ‘Populations’ 
The focus on the body of the population as opposed to on particular bodies as 
highlighted by medical literature pervades fields of knowledge in the eighteenth 
century that have not hitherto been considered to use the concept of the population. 
Insects, like cattle, were a fundamental element in France’s agricultural economy. 
Even more so than cattle, however, insects could be conceptualised as populations, 
given that they appeared in large ‘swarms’. My aim in this section is to discuss how 
state officials, writers of practical rural oeconomy manuals and articles wrote of insect 
pests and their elimination in terms echoing medical and political economic writings 
on the human population. I will argue that writings on pest control conceptualised the 
insects as a collective body which depended on and transformed the territory on which 
it lived; they conceptualised the insects, in other words, as populations. As we will 
see, writings on pest control reflect and make use of parallel developments in 
apparently distant scholarly fields, particularly human and veterinary medicine and 
political economy. Questions and concerns of writers attempting to eradicate insect 
pests, either on behalf of the state administration or in the form of advice to individual 
farmers, interacted with wider scientific, political and even moral questions and 
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concerns.198 While the topic of pest control might appear excessively narrow or of a 
purely technical nature, in the eighteenth-century texts on pest control formed part of 
a wider project to ‘improve’ the land and people of the French monarchy. Furthermore, 
as this chapter demonstrates, they reflected and put into practice a way of thinking 
about communities that is encapsulated in the new term ‘population’. While the texts 
by political economists, medical writers and naturalists or agronomists discussed in 
this chapter are usually seen as distinct fields, they are linked by their 
conceptualisation of the collective as a population.  
Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur (1683-1757), whom we already encountered in 
the previous chapters, did much to define what was meant by the laws of animal 
bodies. Although he did not, as far as I can ascertain, employ the term ‘population’ in 
his descriptions of insects, many of what would soon become the key elements of the 
population discourse in the field of political economy are present in his Mémoires pour 
servir à l’histoire des insectes (1734–1742). Modern entomologists concerned with 
insect pest control have claimed Réaumur as forefather to their discipline, given that 
he ‘probably gave the earliest published recommendation for biological pest 
suppression’ on the basis of the ‘dynamics of natural population’.199 For Réaumur, that 
is, insects could only be understood in relation to the dynamic variables of the territory 
they inhabited. Studying caterpillars that attack fruits and grains, for example, 
Réaumur described issues such as the insects’ natural enemies; the probable effects of 
climate on their population numbers; what they eat and during which season and how 
manipulation of these food sources could affect the birth and death rates of harmful 
insects. Réaumur has recently been studied as the exemplary eighteenth-century 
observer of ‘nature’.200  
His attentive observations, however, need to be considered in the light of his 
role as one of the most influential members of the Paris Académie des sciences, 
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founded in 1666 by the minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) in order to increase 
France’s financial and natural resources.201 Réaumur was certainly not a disinterested 
and curious observer, but working from the perspective of an academician funded by 
the state (and interested in increasing the state’s funding for the Academy’s mission).  
This is manifest also in his volumes and articles on insects, produced over the course 
of almost his entire career at the Académie. In the preface to the first volume of his 
Mémoires, the naturalist thus promised his readers that knowledge of insects would 
not only provide a pleasurable pastime and a means of worshipping the creator through 
his creations, but also the means to augment ‘les biens réels’.202 Among other possible 
applications of a natural history of insects, Réaumur singles out the possibility of using 
natural historical knowledge to prevent insect pests from ravaging harvests and thus 
preventing the Crown’s subjects from receiving adequate food supplies:  
 
La conservation des grains est un des plus grands objets que puissant se 
proposer ceux qui gouvernent des Etats; leur attention & leur zele pour le bien 
du genre humain ne seroient-ils pas dignes d’éloges, s’ils excitoient, par des 
recompenses promises, à découvrir le secret de défendre nos bleds contre les 
insectes qui y font de si grand ravages, lorsqu’ils se sont introduits dans les 
greniers, qui y réduisent les plus gros tas de grains à n’être plus que des tas 
d’un son léger ! De pareils secrets ne sçauroient être trouvés que par ceux qui 
étudieront bien ces insectes.203 
 
The study of insects, then, was, according to Réaumur, a significant contribution 
towards the task of government, thought to consist in the cultivation and accumulation 
of resources.204 The naturalist thus used this traditional principle of government to 
argue for the importance of state-funded (‘des recompenses’) knowledge 
production.205 In a country as dependent on agriculture as eighteenth-century France, 
reducing the often considerable damages done by crop-devouring insects, Réaumur 
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could describe his research into the ‘mœurs’ and anatomy of their bodies as a matter 
of national political-economic importance. 
One aspect of the natural history of insects that made (and makes) it 
particularly plausible to think of them in terms of a population were the high fertility 
rates of most species, and particularly of those feeding on human crops. They thus 
allowed their observers to find an example in nature of an aggregate of large numbers 
of individuals and to test methods for controlling their numbers and their movements 
across the territory. In a nation as dependent on agricultural produce as eighteenth-
century France, savants at the Académie des sciences – working for the state – were 
alert to the effects of insect fertility. In the introduction to the second volume of his 
insect memoirs, Réaumur announced detailed observations on a particularly ravenous 
insect:  
une singularité dont nous nous sommes mal trouvés, & qui seul méritoit que 
nous fissions un article particulier de ces chenilles, c’est que, quoiqu’elles 
m’eussent toûjours paru assés rares, elles se sont multipliées prodigieusement 
en 1735. elles ont fait d’étranges ravages dans une grande partie du Royaume, 
& sur-tout aux environs de Paris, où elles ont dévoré des champs entiers de 
légumes.206 
The case of crop-devouring caterpillars thus seemed a particularly apt field of 
exploration for an observer as intent on contributing to national prosperity as 
Réaumur: knowledge of the reasons for increases in fertility and techniques for 
manipulating them promised higher yields for human farmers. He recognised, 
however, that there was never just one factor involved, but that the number of insects 
depended on a range of external factors such as temperature, humidity, the number of 
enemy specimens, or the availability of an insect’s preferred food. The plague of 1735 
was caused, Réaumur argued, by particularly unfortunate weather patterns favourable 
to the pests and hostile to their diseases and enemies.  
This represents a shift from earlier considerations of insect plagues, even by 
Réaumur’s immediate predecessors. Sheila Wille, in an article on British writings on 
the ichneumon fly, argues that it was not until the late 1790s that naturalists began to 
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advocate intervention in the balance of nature; before then, they trusted that 
Providence would equilibrate insect populations.207 The English natural theologian 
William Derham (1657-1735), for instance, in his efforts to explain every detail in 
nature as created by God for the benefit of mankind, considered the sudden 
proliferation of harmful insects a punishment for man’s sinful infraction of God’s 
laws: ‘That as to Man, those Creatures are not without their great Uses, particularly in 
the Cure of some of the most stubborn and sinful Men. And I am apt to think that the 
Nations which know not God, are the most annoy’d with those noxious Reptiles, and 
other pernicious Creatures.’208 As a consequence, for Derham there was little man 
could do to prevent such scourges.  
In France, on the other hand, observers were, at least from the early century 
onwards, proposing methods for managing, if not eliminating, insect pests. In doing 
so, they echoed the greater emphasis on state control on the part of French political 
economist in comparison to their English counterparts.209 As naturalists diminished 
God’s role in nature to the establishment of fixed laws, they retained Derhams’s 
insistence on natural balances. Nature, they argued, constituted a self-regulating 
system with checks and balances, such as the relationship between prey and predator. 
Nevertheless, they admitted that this balance was fragile and that its hospitality to 
humans fluctuated.210 Similarly to writings on plague epidemics, in explanations of 
insect plagues, such as the one mentioned by Réaumur, both abundance and scarcity 
occurred naturally, not because of God’s direct interventions but because of the laws 
of correlation between different variables. The language employed by Réaumur does 
echo Biblical, or mythological, descriptions of insect plagues: the animals cause 
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‘prodigious’ and ‘strange’ ravages.211 However, Réaumur’s purpose in his description 
of the noxious animals is, precisely, to explain the outbreak as the consequence of a 
concurrence of factors that conceivably occur at regular intervals, and thus as the 
consequence of ‘les lois ordinaires de la nature’. As insect infestations came to be 
considered a natural, regularly occurring phenomenon, they thus also became a 
phenomenon that could be rationally managed. 
Réaumur’s research on insects remained the reference point for most 
subsequent investigations of insects in the Enlightenment period, even as observers 
turned to piecemeal investigations of individual insect species, rather than attempting 
anything as ambitious as the academician’s project.212 From the 1750s onwards, both 
state-funded academicians and ‘curious’ individuals multiplied observations of both 
useful (discussed in more detail in the next chapter) and harmful insects. Réaumur’s 
insistence on the usefulness of observations of animal bodies was easily absorbed into 
the vogue for practical literature on agronomy, defined by one if its most important 
historians as a scientific movement emerging in the 1750s.213 Agronomists built on an 
older literature dealing with the rational improvement of one’s estate, of which Olivier 
de Serre’s often republished Théâtre de l’agriculture (1611) is the most successful and 
influential example.214 As Chandra Mukerji has argued, De Serres’ techniques for 
‘improving’ all aspects of rural estates served the construction of ‘a “second nature” 
to improve the abundance and value of estate lands.’215 Similarly, proponents of 
agronomic reform advocated for more rational and thus more productive methods of 
agricultural practice.216  
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The rise in interest in pest control forms part of this larger vogue for texts on 
the enlightened ‘improvement’ of the land. Particularly in the wake of the publication 
in French of Jethro Tull’s work, an English agronomist translated by none other than 
the comte de Buffon, French writers began experimenting with and publishing on 
topics such as farming equipment, crop rotation or, as we will see in the next chapter, 
beekeeping. These writings would form what would soon be known as ‘agronomia’, 
or the vogue for enlightened agricultural practices that were aimed at the economic 
regeneration of France according to the model of the supposedly much more 
enlightened English agricultural industry.217 The texts discussed in this section were 
written either for the benefits of individual landowners, as in the case of most articles 
in the proliferating agronomic journals, or, like Réaumur’s Mémoires, for the benefit 
of administrators concerned with the wealth and well-being of the state as a whole. 
Despite these different perspectives, however, most authors of mid-eighteenth-century 
texts on insect pests proclaimed for themselves a role in improving not only their own 
land, but the land and people of France as a whole; as the editors of the Journal 
economique stated in the preface to their first issue, the journal would give ‘d'avis 
capables de fournir des nouveaux secours à ceux qui s'y adonnent et de les mettre en 
état d'accroître de plus en plus le bien général en travaillant à leurs fortunes 
particulières.’218 As we will see, authors emphasised that outbreaks of insect 
infestations were rarely confined to individual gardens, and that the actions of one 
landowner or gardener could have implications for the oeconomy of France as a whole. 
Some twenty years after Réaumur’s experiments with caterpillars, as the 
physiocratic movement was in full swing, the academicians Duhamel Du Monceau 
and Mathieu Tillet were commissioned by the Academy of Sciences to carry out 
investigations on the cause of a particularly devastating insect plague in the province 
of Angoumois (today’s Charente).219 The region’s provincial intendant had called for 
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help from experts in natural history from the capital since a species of moth – still 
today called the ‘Angoumois grain moth’ – had become so widespread in the region 
as to threaten entire harvests of grain.220 Using a whole battery of experimental and 
observational techniques, the two Parisian naturalists set out to determine the causes 
of the increase in the moth’s population and to find methods for controlling the damage 
done by the insects. Methods for controlling harmful insects shared in the same 
‘knowledge substrate’ on theories and practices of government as political economic 
writings. The observations of naturalists helped produce new ways of managing the 
insect bodies via the manipulation of the variables determining their lives; the term 
‘government’ is particularly appropriate here because observers admitted that even 
scientifically informed pest control could never eliminate, only ever reduce crop-
devouring insect populations. As they developed methods of ‘rationally’ combatting 
insect plagues, savants emphasised that the individual’s perspective was not sufficient 
to eradicate the plague, even if diligent farmers would benefit, at least temporarily, 
from applying the recommended methods. In the same decades as the intendents began 
to seek centralised sources of support in controlling epizootics, Duhamel’s and Tillet’s 
treatise served not only to instruct local officials about how to react to acute outbreaks. 
Rather, the systematic study of the ‘history’ of the insect in question and the authors’ 
detailed description of its anatomy, reproduction and behaviours were intended to 
further understanding of how the pest spread and thus possibly to prevent it from doing 
so.221 
In the case of insect pests, particularly in the writings of state employees like 
Duhamel and Tillet, however, the impossibility of containing the rapidly reproducing 
insects prompted considerations of the interests of entire regions, as opposed to merely 
the individual farmer.222 Keith Tribe has argued that seventeenth-century texts on rural 
oeconomy considered the farm in isolation, in no way connecting it to the wider 
concerns of the nation.223 In the eighteenth century, on the other hand, rural 
oeconomists appealed to the self-interest of the farmer, now conceived of as an 
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inextricable element in ‘a series of exchanges’.224 In pest control texts of the eighteenth 
century, accordingly, we find one of the most important aspects that would come to 
define the concept of population: rather than consider the outbreaks of insect plagues 
as singular events, savants and authors of practical rural oeconomy manuals 
represented insect pests as a constant risk that could not be completely eradicated. Like 
practitioners of medicine – both human and veterinary – shifted from a discourse of 
cure to a discourse of prevention, the first writers to propose ‘rational’ measures of 
pest control urged their audiences to factor harmful insects into their farming plans.225  
One of the first experiments the two academicians carried out was an 
adaptation of Réaumur’s realisation that temperature directly influenced an insect’s 
lifespan. In order to determine the conditions under which the crop-devouring 
caterpillars were most likely to flourish and to gauge the weather’s influence on the 
numbers of the dangerous insects, Duhamel and Tillet set up a series of vases, each 
housing a caterpillar, and subjected them to different temperatures.226 The two 
naturalists were interested not only in the effect of the external temperature on 
breeding rates, but took into account the way in which the insect’s bodily temperature 
reacted to its surroundings. In particular, they had noticed that grains infected with 
insects produced more heat, thus surmising that hot and humid weather enabled the 
caterpillars to generate more heat themselves and thus procreate particularly fast:   
 
Peut-être aussi cette grande chaleur des grains remplis de chenilles, vient-elle 
de l’humidité que produisent ces insectes, & qu’il en résulte une fermentation 
capable de faire éclore les œufs, de faire croître les chenilles, d’avancer leurs 
métamorphoses & de faire sortir les papillons, en même temps qu’elle 
endommage les grains.227  
 
Studying the insects’ body temperature, the weather in the months before they bred, 
and the temperature inside the granary, the men could thus determine the conditions 
that allowed the caterpillars to breed at particularly high rates. Although they could 
not, of course, influence the weather, knowledge of the conditions best suited to meet 
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the insect’s needs did help them determine when attempts to eliminate them would be 
most favourable; the population could not be fully controlled, but it could be 
managed.228 Thus, Duhamel and Tillet admitted that their enlightened method for 
preserving the grain from hungry insects could not completely prevent the loss of 
grains, but only cut them down to about one fifth.229  
As we have seen, physicians in the period showed a renewed interest in the 
effect on health of environmental factors such as airs or the weather. Similarly, 
Duhamel’s and Tillet’s tests on the association between temperature and reproduction 
of the Angoumois moth constituted an attempt at mapping the association between 
climates and insect pests so that regional administrators and farmers could prepare, 
and possibly prevent, outbreaks. In another experiment described in Duhamel’s and 
Tillet’s treatise, a local helper and ‘zealous citizen’ planted seven wheat grains in 
crystal containers; a mere 27 days later he had observed the butterflies hatch. The 
Parisian naturalists, treating the local as a mere provider of observational facts rather 
than as a naturalist in his own right, used his observations to calculate the insect’s 
fertility rate. They estimated that out of the seven insects (each grain could only house 
one insect) three would be female, which could in turn give birth to 180 new 
caterpillars; if temperatures would remain high until the end of September, this meant 
that the approximately 90 new females could give birth to a staggering 5400 
caterpillars.230 Studying the insects’ body temperature, the weather in the months 
before they bred, and the temperature inside the granary, the men could thus determine 
the conditions that allowed the caterpillars to breed at particularly high rates. Although 
they could not, of course, influence the weather, knowledge of the conditions best 
suited to meet the insect’s ‘needs’ did help them determine when attempts to eliminate 
them would be most favourable. Clearly, it made little sense trying to kill insects on 
one’s small plot of land, and Duhamel and Tillet admitted that their enlightened 
method for preserving the grain from hungry insects could not completely prevent the 
loss of grains, but only cut them down to about one fifth.231 The pests, in other words, 
could not be fully controlled, but they could be managed.232 Just as political economic 
texts urged governors to respect the natural passions of the population instead of 
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suppressing them, that is, Duhamel and Tillet argued that those trying to control insect 
pests should base their efforts on knowledge of their natural needs. 
As a solution to the problem of the moths’ enormous fecundity, Duhamel and 
Tillet proposed ovens in which the insects would be killed but the grains preserved. 
Hard-working farmers could do much to reduce the damage by using these ovens, 
while lazy ones would suffer the consequences of neglecting these measures through 
significantly diminished harvests, and would thus ultimately accept that using the 
ovens was in their self-interest. However, given that it was in the interest of the 
common good that the neglectful farmers acted in their own best interest immediately 
rather than once the damage was done, Duhamel argued that the state’s ‘police’ should 
force neglectful farmers to exterminate the moths in their fields and granaries so that 
they wouldn’t attack those of their more conscientious neighbours.233 Self-interest was 
a powerful motivation for most farmers, but self-interests did not regulate themselves. 
The farmers, that is, required the help and supervision of savants for controlling those 
subjects who did not understand either their own, or the commonwealth’s, interests.  
Réaumur, Duhamel and Tillet wrote their works in their capacity as state-
funded savants, who saw it as their task to reduce the damage done by insects not just 
on the fields of individual farmers, but rather as they affected France as a whole. As 
we saw in Duhamel’s and Tillet’s treatise, the particular and the common interest did 
not always harmonise; where individual farmers refused to comply with the 
instructions deemed by the savants to be most advantageous to the common good, it 
became the task of the ‘police’, or state administration, to ensure that they could not 
harm the larger population.234  In addition to publications like Duhamel’s and Tillet’s, 
written with the intention of ensuring food supplies for the French population, 
publicly-minded individuals, often landowners themselves, began to experiment with, 
and share, new methods for ‘enlightened’ pest control. Members of the propertied, 
middling elite who sought to better both their own social position and regenerate 
French competitiveness, thus began to publish observations in the growing number of 
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agricultural or ‘oeconomic’ journals.235 Like the publications of the Académie, these 
writings do not only deal with insect plagues as and when they erupt, advising to solve 
them by eliminating the animals individually, but also consider the pests as a constant 
risk that needed to be managed by considering the insects not as individual bodies, but 
as a ‘population’ with its own natural laws. 
One of the most important avenues for sharing theories and practices for 
improving land and people was the Journal oeconomique, the first of about half a 
dozen periodicals dealing with ‘oeconomic’ matters from the 1750s onwards.236 
Published between 1751 and 1772, the Journal’s editors and contributors aimed to 
inform a readership of rural landowners on how to improve their ‘oeconomic’ 
activities, or, as the editors promised in the first volume ‘un recueil de mémoires 
récents sur l'agriculture, les arts et le commerce’.237 Insects featured frequently in its 
pages, either in their useful form (new techniques of beekeeping or silkworm rearing) 
or, just as often, as the harmful enemies of the dedicated oeconomist.238 As such, the 
Journal was aimed not at giving advice to state administrators, but to individual 
readers.  
Following articles on combatting the ‘chenilles de choux’ (April 1751), garden 
insects (June 1751) and even bookworms (August 1751), the Journal featured one of 
its hitherto most extensive pieces on managing insect pests in November 1752. Goyon 
de la Plombanie (also spelt Plombanye), the author of the article, would later publish 
a two-volume agronomist text titled  La France agricole et marchande (1762), a work 
that combined arguments for the revival of the supposedly decadent French agriculture 
with descriptions of ingenious practical inventions, including a national ‘credit 
society’ to ensure the circulation of money, new ploughs and even a chariot driven by 
a ‘machine à feu’.239  Even more pertinent to the argument of this chapter, de la 
Plombanie published, more than a decade after his article on insect pests, a political 
economic work on how to increase both numbers and well-being of the French 
population, titled L’homme en société, ou Nouvelles vues politiques et économiques 
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237 Journal oeconomique, Janvier 1751, p. 6. 
238 The Journal succeeded in attracting this readership: regional economic societies met to read its issues 
together; Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, p. 85. 
239 Henri Goyon de la Plombanie, La France agricole et marchande, 2 vols (Avignon: Antoine-Chrétien 
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pour porter la population au plus haut degré en France (1763).240 This text defined 
population, and the happiness of its members as the object of political economic 
knowledge. This could be achieved by increasing population numbers, though that 
alone would not suffice. Instead, de la Plombanie echoed Mandeville, as well as the 
vitalist theorists of physical bodies, in his claim that the happiness of the population 
depended on the harmony emerging from men’s varying interests. The task of the 
sovereign was, as a consequence, to harness the different variables affecting the 
population, or as de la Plombanie put it, ‘savoir mettre à profit les différens genies de 
tous ses sujets, saisir tous les avantages que lui offrent le climat, les qualités du terrein, 
sa situation respective avec les peuples de son voisinage’.241 As an early iteration of 
this more general project for a renewal of French political oeconomy, de la Plombanie 
used the Journal oeconomique as an outlet to emphasise the importance of effective 
pest control. As in the case of human epidemics, writers concerned with insect 
‘attacks’ frequently blamed ‘bad air’ or ‘miasmas’ for the spread of insect pests. 
According to this explanation, bad health – whether of plants or of humans – was 
caused by a blockage in air circulation. Thus, the Swiss physician Auguste Tissot 
argued that smallpox epidemics were caused primarily by ‘infected air’.242 Echoing 
this emphasis on preventing ‘stagnant air’, De la Plombanie suggested that in order to 
prevent caterpillars from spoiling grains, rural ‘oeconomists’ should install windmills 
on their granaries: ‘ainsi l’air étant renouvellé par le movement continuel du 
ventilateur, le bled se trouvera toujours rafraîchi; ce qui le préservera contre la 
fermentation, & par conséquent empêchera les œufs des charansons d’éclore’.243 De 
la Plombanie’s instructions for fellow ‘oeconomists’ are based on the idea that the 
natural oeconomy – whether of human or animal bodies, individually or in the 
aggregate – required constant circulation between its parts.244 Just as political 
economic texts argued that a healthy population was based on the free circulation of 
goods, people, money and even air, de la Plombanie claimed that a lack of circulation 
would prevent insects from reproducing. Thus, in addition to advising his readers on 
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242 Eriksen,‘Cure or Protection,’ p. 529. 
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how to ensure sufficient air flow in their granaries, he also suggests that they build a 
well for preserving the grain for periods longer than a year. To do so, he writes, readers 
should build a circular well, surrounded by a solid circular wall and a hemispherical 
vault; the vault would, in turn, carry a second wall allowing just the right amount of 
air to circulate.245 This also echoes Quesnay’s ideas on public health, published in his 
medical texts;246 ill health on the level of the population, Quesnay had claimed, could 
be explained by blockages in France’s natural order that could only be alleviated by 
the intervention and care of savants operating on behalf of national, rather than 
regional or corporate, interests.247 De la Plombanie’s advice, then, consists in 
preventing insects from proliferating by ensuring that the farmer’s fields or granaries 
correspond to the way in which the oeconomy of nature, just as the political oeconomy 
of exchange, is organised: on the basis of constant circulation.248 
Another agronomic article on the question of how to reduce the damage done 
by insects to crops also suggests the use of a ‘ventilator’ in one’s granaries, arguing 
that air circulation works better to kill the insects than the traditional method of 
burning the grains.249 Published in a  report on the winning answer to the prize contest 
of the agricultural society of Limoges by a Monsieur de Joyeuse, in the first volume 
of the Journal de chimie, d'histoire naturelle et des arts (1777), the advice given by 
de Joyeuse summarises many of the concerns of earlier writers.250 Like Duhamel and 
Tillet, the self-proclaimed agronomist emphasises that pest control is a matter that 
concerns not just the individual farmer, but entire communities. He claimed that small-
scale ‘gardeners’ should be able to easily combat the insects; his concern, instead, was 
with ‘l’apprivoisement d’une ville, d’un hôpital, d’une armée, de la marine, &c.’ The 
emphasis on ‘le grand’ rather than ‘les petits détails’ applies not only to the size of the 
land to be freed from insects, but also to the way in which the harmful animals 
themselves are to be considered and managed. Whereas Pierre-Joseph Buc’hoz, for 
example, in his treatise Histoire des insectes nusibiles à l’homme, aux bestiaux, a 
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l’agriculture et au jardinage, addressed explicitly to ‘jardiniers’, recommended 
finding and killing each harmful caterpillar individually, de Joyeuse argued that such 
an approach was not feasible on the larger scale. Rather than seeking out individual 
insect specimen, de Joyeuse’s advice in the Journal (as well as by the other prize 
entries – and by Duhamel and Tillet) focused on treating the territory as a whole. He 
used, that is, observations of the insects’ natural histories to develop methods for 
preventing, rather than combating, the outbreak of insect plagues. One of the 
recommended strategies, for instance, used knowledge of the weevils’ mating habits 
to target them during mating season, thus preventing ‘les dégats qu’ils auroient causé 
au bled, en détruisant les populateurs avant le tems de la ponte.’251 By contrast, 
Buc’hoz counselled his readership of gardeners to search their plants for specimen and 
then squash them.252 As we move from small-scale farming or gardening to plans for 
supplying entire communities, the insect pests threatening the supplies were 
considered not as individual specimens but as, we might say, populations, and 
knowledge of their natural histories became the basis for methods of controlling them. 
These descriptions of crop-devouring insects rendered visible, and thus 
supposedly ‘true’, the idea that bodies could be more easily managed when considered 
as a ‘population’ with its own natural laws of vitality and mortality. This idea, perhaps, 
was unacceptable to the peasants who refused to have their methods controlled by 
Parisian observers. As naturalists demonstrated that the quantity of insects depended 
on factors such as the availability of their chosen foodstuff, the climate, or the quantity 
of their enemies, they had, essentially, shown how to think of the collective – whether 
of insects or of humans – as a natural entity, with its own natural laws of fertility, 
mortality, health or life expectancy. Writers concerned with insect pests had also 
pointed out that insect populations could never be fully eliminated, only managed; an 
idea that was central to the doctrines on the government of humans put forward in 
texts on political economy and medicine.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the parallels between texts on the management of insect 
and human populations in regard to the ‘health’ of population and the avoidance of 
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epidemics and insect pests Most importantly, in texts on both rural and political 
oeconomy we have observed a shift in the management of the bodies to be governed, 
be they animal or human. Physiocratic political economists, agronomists as well as 
medical writers advocated a focus not on individual bodies but on considering them 
as elements of an aggregate body, with its own natural laws and regularities. In the 
case of managing invasive insects, this meant preventively heating grain or installing 
ventilators in granaries; in the case of the political economists it meant providing the 
framework within which French subjects could follow their natural interests, rather 
than employing measures targeting individual subjects.253 As ‘population’ 
increasingly became the focus of writings on government, the same concerns with the 
relationship between territory, subsistence, anatomical constitution and population 
numbers animated writers in both fields, and they thus developed similar theories and 
practices of governance. This does not necessarily mean that the authors analysed here 
had read and thus directly influenced each other’s works. It means, instead, that 
‘population’ became a fundamental building block structuring their shared knowledge 
substrate. 
In a study on failed projects of high-modernist state-planning, sociologist 
James C. Scott argues that administrators from the eighteenth century onwards began 
to standardise and rationalise complex customs and practices in order to ‘make the 
terrain, its products, and its workforce more legible – and hence manipulable – from 
above and from the center.’254 Interestingly, he uses the ‘homely analogy’ of the 
transformation of the beehive in the eighteenth century as an introductory illustration 
for his argument on how previously ‘illegible hieroglyphs’ were transformed by early-
modern administrators into ‘a legible and administratively more convenient format’. 
As I have suggested throughout this dissertation, however, in the eighteenth century 
the beehive or the ant hill served as more than an analogy. As this chapter has argued, 
the management of invasive insect bodies was one in area in which new techniques 
for ‘making legible’ were thought through and applied. Eighteenth-century naturalist 
and agronomists thus used insect populations – composed of hundreds of individuals 
– to both explore new ideas on how to govern a large ‘population’ and to provide a 
                                                 
253 Ann Firth gives a useful analysis of this theoretical shift in British political economy; see Firth, 
‘From Oeconomy’. 
254 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed, Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 2. 
 187 
 
visible example to state administrators and their fellow citizens of how these ideas 
‘worked’ in nature. The next chapter will turn to beekeeping manuals in order to 
explore how their authors promoted new enlightened methods of ‘governing’ 
honeybees. Unlike Scott, it will not read the enlightened hive as a mere analogy, but 
will show that it served both as a means of training citizens to accept ‘population’ as 
the new target (and means) of government and, through the increased production of 
wax and honey, as a real contribution to the wealth of the state. 
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Chapter Five. Political Economy in Action: The Government of Circulation in 
Beekeeping Manuals, Natural History and Enlightened Agronomy 
1. Introduction 
In his famous Travels to France 1787, 1788, 1789 (published in 1792), the British 
observer Arthur Young reported on a meeting of French revolutionary agronomists, 
noting the close association between political and agricultural reform:  
 
The 9th. At breakfast this morning in the Thuilleries. Mons. Desmarets, of the 
Academy of Sciences, brought a Memoire presenté par la Societé Royale 
d'Agriculture, a l'Assemblée Nationale, on the means of improving the 
agriculture of France; in which, among other things, they recommend great 
attention to bees, to panification, and to the obstetrick art. On the establishment 
of a free and patriotic government, to which the national agriculture might look 
for new and halcyon days, these were objects doubtless of the first importance. 
 
Young singles out three areas of priority for French revolutionary reformers. Firstly, 
‘Panification’, or the art of making bread out of different substances, expressed the 
revolutionary call for equality as the right of every citizen to the same quality bread.1 
Secondly, ‘The obstetrick art’ provided ways to control survival and reproduction of 
the population rationally.2 To the modern reader, subsistence and reproduction will 
seem natural priorities for a revolutionary government attempting to stabilise its 
regime. The third area, beekeeping, might seem more surprising, especially since 
Konrad Sprengel’s (1750-1816) discovery of bees’ role in the pollination of plants was 
not published until 1793 and received rather coldly by his contemporaries.3 However, 
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as this chapter demonstrates, beekeeping had been held up during the late eighteenth 
century as a way of providing food, medicine, luxury goods, work and a model for 
good government.4  
This chapter considers how Enlightenment writers conceived of the relation 
between working bodies, the territory and the productivity of the whole through the 
observation of insects, focusing in particular on beekeeping manuals published 
between 1740 and 1780. During this period, the publication of beekeeping treatises 
skyrocketed; not by coincidence, it is also the period during which astonishing 
numbers of texts on political economy, understood as the art of governing and 
increasing the state’s wealth, were written.5 The chapter argues that texts on 
beekeeping ‒ often called ‘le gouvernement des abeilles’ ‒ were an important means 
of disseminating new ideas of government based on respecting the ‘naturalness’ of the 
(bee) population rather than on the sovereign will of the ‘governor’, as had been the 
case in images of the hive as model monarchies from Aristotle onwards. French texts 
on labouring insects taught their readers, in the mainland and in the colonies, the new 
relationship to their absolutist ruler that the realisation of these theories of governance 
required. As these treatises reshaped the bee or ant from a loyal subject into a 
productive contributor to its society, human readers, too, were taught that they were 
no longer subjects simply obeying decrees from above, but should see themselves as 
part of an interconnected, circulating and productive ‘whole’.  
As we will see from the descriptions of bee hives and ant colonies, the main 
principle driving these systems was circulation. Circulation had become central to 
nascent theories of government in the eighteenth century, though it had first emerged 
at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth as the question of how to 
execute the sovereign’s strict regulations.6 Faced with increasingly free, international 
trade and population growth, political thinkers began to propose ways of opening up 
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city walls, as well as its juridical, economic and administrative structures.7 Over the 
course of the eighteenth century, rather than enabling the modification of goods, 
people and natural processes according to the sovereign will, writers began to 
understand circulation as the framework that allowed that allowed goods, bodies and 
their needs to enter into exchanges with one another and thus to self-equilibrate.8 The 
task of government was to keep the ‘economic machine’ running without interruption, 
ensuring the circulation of goods, people, money and natural resources. As Stuart 
Elden has shown in his work on the ‘birth’ of the modern conception of space, 
eighteenth-century administrators and urban planners replaced the older model of the 
‘segregated town’ with the idea of a ‘milieu’; the aim of governing over the territory, 
that is, became to connect cities and rural areas to allow for the circulation of goods, 
people, and even, for health reasons, air.9 Political economists of various stripes agreed 
on the crucial role of circulation in a ‘healthy’ body politic. In a 1754 article for the 
Journal oeconomique, defending the free grain trade, the marquis d’Argens argued 
that ‘il est surtout d’une nécessité indispensable de ne jamais arrêter la circulation 
intérieure, pour éviter tout appareil public, tout sujet de murmures, d’alarmes et de 
désordres.’10  
Circulation came to be seen as a ‘natural’ feature of good government, and 
metaphors based on natural phenomena (most famously the circulation of blood) 
abounded;11 Quesnay’s collaborator Mirabeau, for example, compared his master’s 
Tableau économique to a system of canals : ‘Cette circulation a, comme toutes les 
autres, des regles exactes de flux & de reflux, qui empêchent également & 
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l’épuisement des canaux & leur engorgement.’12 Chandra Mukerji has demonstrated 
that the Canal du Midi, constructed under Colbert from the 1660s onwards, 
transformed the nature of politics into what she calls ‘impersonal rule’: through the 
Canal, the King demonstrated his power over the territory to replace older ‘patrimonial 
politics’ with the power of the state.13 In the eighteenth century, she notes, publications 
on canals and waterways proliferated,14 reflecting, we might add, the increasing 
concern with the possibility for exchange of people and goods. Mirabeau’s analogy 
between the circulation of water and circulation in the economic sense thus underlines 
not only the fundamental importance of circulation to physiocratic political economy, 
but also the way in which circulation connected the natural and the political elements 
of the French state. 
In what follows, I will demonstrate that this logic of circulation as the 
connection between territory, population, money and goods subtends writings on 
insects, where we might not have expected it. I begin with an analysis of apicultural 
treatises, and in particular two of the most-discussed areas of innovation. Attempts to 
find the best methods for harvesting honey and wax and for building the best hives 
will thus be shown to be attempts to ensure circulation of bees, air and produce in the 
hive. This will be followed by a discussion of the way in which labour was reconceived 
in the circulating body politic, using descriptions of ant and bee workers as a window 
onto this issue. The chapter ends with an examination of how the product of the bees’ 
work was reconceived in relation to the work of female and colonial subjects. Bees as 
a natural resource were thus thought to connect French agronomists to the household 
as well as to the empire’s most remote corners. The enlightened hive thus improved 
not only the French mainland, but its emerging global empire too.  
 
2. The Image of the Beehive as a Political Metaphor 
The use of bees as symbols for political organisation from Classical times onwards 
has, of course, been studied by literary scholars as well as by historians. Scholars of 
the early modern period and of the eighteenth century have been particularly interested 
in the representations of gender in descriptions of the hive, in the wake of Jan 
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Swammerdam’s discovery of the true sex of the queen bee. Jeffrey Merrick has 
analysed the ‘gender politics of the bee hive’, arguing that early modern texts on bees 
were used ‘to ratify patriarchal values’.15 Cultural historian Dror Wahrman has shown 
how allegories of the bee hive in eighteenth-century British texts reflect the 
transformation of women’s role in the household oeconomy. He argues that the 
replacement of the image of the Amazon queen with that of the mother reflects a 
growing concern after 1780 with limiting women’s power within the rigid boundaries 
of motherhood.16 According to Wahrman, writings on bees record a wider ‘cultural 
revolution’, as they begin to portray the queen bee now longer as an aristocratic 
Amazon queen but increasingly as a mother. This, he argues, mirrors a shift away from 
the ‘looseness and playfulness’ of gender categories in the first three quarters of the 
century to a deterministic view of masculinity and femininity, now thought to be 
unchanging.17 Deirdre Coleman, on the contrary, argues that representations of the bee 
hive do not show the ‘clear pattern’ from regality to motherhood suggested by 
Wahrman, but instead serve as an expression of the instability of often contradictory 
gender roles in the late eighteenth century.18 Closer to our purposes, Kevin Bourque, 
in an article on the representation of the bee in the Encyclopédie, argues that the 
articles ‘Ruche’ and ‘Abeille’ rewrite the hive from an image of monarchy in order to 
support emerging republican discourses.19 Arguing that bees came to stand in as 
republican symbols, Bourque quotes a fascinating passage from Jaucourt’s 
Encyclopédie article ‘Zone’:  
 
Pourquoi dérober la ruche pesante, & massacrer dans leur demeure ses 
habitans? Pourquoi l'enlever dans l'ombre de la nuit favorable aux crimes, pour 
la placer sur le soufre, tandis que ce peuple innocent s'occupoit de ses soins 
publics dans ses cellules de cire, & projettoit des plans d'économie pour le 
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triste hyver? Tranquille & content de l'abondance de ses trésors, tout-à-coup la 
vapeur noire monte de tous côtés, & cette tendre espece accoutumée à de plus 
douces odeurs, tombant en monceau par milliers de ses domes mielleux, 
s'entasse sur la poussiere. Race utile! étoit - ce pour cette fin que vous voliez 
au printems de fleurs en fleurs? étoit - ce pour mériter ce sort barbare que vous 
braviez les chaleurs de l'été, & que dans cet automne même vous avez erré sans 
relâche, & sans perdre un seul rayon du soleil? Homme cruel, maitre 
tyrannique! combien de tems la nature prosternée gémira - t - elle sous ton 
sceptre de fer? Tu pouvois emprunter de ces foibles animaux leur nourriture 
d'ambroisie; tu devois par reconnoissance les mettre à - couvert des vents du 
nord, & quand la saison devient dure, leur offrir quelque portion de leur bien. 
Mais je me lasse de parler à un ingrat qui ne rougit point de l'être, & qui le sera 
jusqu'au tombeau.20  
 
Bourque is right, of course, to read Jaucourt’s discussion of the bee, itself a rather free 
translation of James Thomson’s (1700-1748) The Seasons (1730), as a critique of the 
absolutist monarchy. However, more than a full-scale defence of republicanism, the 
passage represents a critique of tyranny as a specific kind of absolutist rule, given that 
the critique of tyranny and the ensuing right of the people to disobey was a trope in 
Republican discourses, but also in texts defending the (non-tyrannical) monarchy.21 
Jaucourt is describing, after all, a ruler who assumes the right to kill his insect-subjects 
instead of fostering their well-being. Given the interest in bees as representatives of a 
new and more productive social order as expressed in beekeeping treatises, it is 
interesting to note Jaucourt’s choice of analogy for his critique of the monarchy.  
Unenlightened beekeepers are figured as tyrants, while good governors use 
more ‘humane’ methods, not because of the bees’ inherent right to life, but because of 
principles of economic efficiency. At the heart of the critique of killing bees we find 
the idea that over-regulation causes a decline in their economic productivity. Jaucourt 
is not implying that man should no longer be the ‘master’ of bees, but rather that he 
should govern them in a rational, calculating way, aimed at their life rather than death 
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21 See Hammersley, Republicans, particularly pp. 198-200; Peter R. Campbell, ‘Absolute Monarchy’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of the Ancien Régime, ed. by William Doyle (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), pp. 11–28. 
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(and human profit).22 Killing productive insects thereby becomes the ultimate act of 
the tyrant understood as the opposite of the enlightened governor, as the metaphor of 
darkness pervading the passage (’dans l’ombre de la nuit’, ‘la vapeur noire’) makes 
clear. The hard-working bees are ‘oeconomical’ in the original sense of the word: as 
good householders, they make ‘des plans économiques’ to survive the winter. 
However, in order to do so they need the space – physical as well as metaphorical – to 
follow their drive to work hard. It is no coincidence that Jaucourt’s bees appear in an 
article on the geographical subject of ‘zones tempérées’. The treatment of the bees on 
the part of the tyrant is particularly scandalous considering how their work makes the 
land productive, as does the farmer harvesting grain in the paragraph following the 
description of the bees. Taking the lives of so many workers is thus even worse in the 
areas blessed with what for Jaucourt is the perfect climate, favourable to agricultural 
production: the ‘zones tempérées’ which include, above all, France: ‘Enfin, il n'est 
point sur la terre de température plus heureuse & plus favorable que celle d'une partie 
de l'Espagne, de l'Italie, & sur-tout de la France.’  The ruler should ensure the well-
being of bees and agricultural workers, then, because they harness the natural 
resources of his territory and thus increase the wealth of all members of the 
community. 
Though Bourque describes Jaucourt’s critique of bee-killing practices as a 
move towards a republican ideology, this leitmotif of the ‘enlightened’ hive comes 
from texts written by authors of beekeeping treatises who, far from being radical 
republicans, intended their work as contributions to the strength of the monarchy.23 
The remainder of the chapter will read not the subservive articles of the Encyclopédie, 
but rather ‘patriotic’ beekeeping treatises which formulated and disseminated a theory 
of government focused on the well-being of a productive ‘population’, but within the 
framework of monarchy. 
 
3. Beekeeping, Agronomy and Political Economy 
Before moving on to a discussion of the political meaning of beekeeping treatises, a 
brief explanation of the genre is required. In the eighteenth century, beekeeping ‒ or 
                                                 
22 Hence Montesquieu’s comment about kings learning to act in their interests rather than on the 
prompting of their passions; see Hirschman, Passions. 
23 On the social standing of these authors, see Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, Introduction. 
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at least writings about beekeeping ‒ represented an important point of intersection of 
agronomy, or the ‘oeconomy’ of the rural household, natural and the wider political 
economic ideas on theories and practices of government.24 Treatises on beekeeping 
were produced at a particularly high rate in the second half of the eighteenth century 
and French language apicultural treatises were sold in destinations all over Europe, 
from Belgium, Italy and Sweden to Portugal and Russia.25  This trend was part of the 
more general vogue for agronomic texts  of the mid-eighteenth century, described by 
John Shovlin as an attempt by the ‘middling nobility’ to reclaim its moral and 
economic roles.26 This category included ‘provincial nobles of modest means, […] part 
of the non-noble elite drawing its income mainly from land, the professions, and office 
holding’, who sought to further both their own interests, and, so they claimed, those 
of nation, by improving agricultural productivity.27 Thus, even though most of the 
beekeeping treatises discussed in this chapter were addressed to private landowners, 
they framed their advice as contributions to the prosperity of France as a whole. Civic-
minded writers of beekeeping treatises thereby concurred with the judgement of the 
academician Duhamel Du Monceau, who argued that beekeeping could provide a 
much-needed boost to France’s weath: ‘Il est très-intéressant pour l’Etat, 1°. 
d'apprendre aux paysans à conserver les abeilles en prenant leur miel: 2°. de les exciter 
à en élever le plus qu’il est possible.’22 Bees were good targets for agricultural 
improvers, as they had an important economic role to play in the eighteenth century: 
their honey was the basis for medical remedies, and their wax was a crucial made into 
candles, ointments and cosmetics.28 As Jaucourt put it in his article for the 
Encyclopédie:  
 
                                                 
24 A ‘lieu de rencontre’ of different sciences (though he does not explain which) as André Bourde puts 
it in his classic three-volume work on agronomy, still the most authoritative account of this eighteenth-
century field of knowledge. Bourde, I, p. 15. 
25 Simon Burrows and Mark Curran, ‘The French Book Trade in Enlightenment Europe Project, 1769-
1794, Browse Keyword: Beekeeping’, The French Book Trade in Enlightenment Europe Project, 1769-
1794 
<http://fbtee.uws.edu.au/stn/interface/query_books.php?t=keyword&e=rawsales&id=k0081&g=every
where&d1=01&m1=01&y1=1769&d2=31&m2=12&y2=1794&d=table> [accessed 24 March 2016]. 
26 Shovlin, Political Economy. 
27 Shovlin, Political Economy, p. 8. 
22 Henri-Louis Duhamel Du Monceau, Ecole d’agriculture (Paris: les frères Estienne, 1759), p. 91. 
28 André J. Bourde, Agronomies et agronomes en France au XVIIIe siècle, 3 vols (Paris: SEVPEN, 
1967), II, pp. 894–95.  
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Elle est devenue d'une si grande nécessité dans plusieurs arts, dans plusieurs 
métiers, & dans la vie domestique, que le débit qui s'en fait est presque 
incroyable; sur-tout aujourd'hui qu'elle n'est plus uniquement réservése pour 
l'autel & pour le Louvre, & que tout le monde s'éclaire avec des bougies, 
l'Europe ne fournit point assez de cire pour le besoin qu'on en a.29 
 
Furthermore, honey, still the main sweetener in France, was presented as a more 
‘natural’ alternative to sugar, the production of which depended heavily on slave 
labour overseas.30 While the production, consumption and re-exportation of sugar in 
France steadily and massively increased over the course of the eighteenth century, the 
French sugar trade was heavily affected by both the War of the Austrian Succession 
(1740-1748) and the Seven Years War (1754–1763). The British sugar trade, by 
contrast, benefited from these wars, as British merchants rushed to fill the void in sugar 
supply opened up on the European continent by the reduction in French colonial 
commerce. The growing interest in beekeeping was thus entangled with discourses 
about both the competition with Britain and France’s own efforts to establish her 
colonial empire. As we will see, rather than suggesting the replacement of sugar with 
honey produced in the mainland, beekeeping treatises instead constructed what they 
considered a more ‘natural’ (and thus supposedly morally just) form of colonial 
relations. 
What we see exemplified in beekeeping treatises is the use of observations of 
insects as a technology for disseminating ideas on a government aimed not only at the 
citizens’ subjection via the traditional technologies of absolutist sovereignty (such as 
laws, regulations, torture), but at the management of their bodies in order to make 
them more productive.31 They can thus be read, I suggest, as educating their readers 
into accepting the new ideas on government based on rendering populations more 
productive. Apicultural treatises, written for landowners overseeing large estates, 
taught their readers to recognise and pursue their enlightened self-interest. The 
                                                 
29 Louis de Jaucourt, ‘Cire’, Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers, ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, (University of Chicago:  ARTFL 
Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2016 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe) 
<http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu> 
30 Robert Stein, ‘The French Sugar Business in the Eighteenth Century: A Quantitative Study’, Business 
History, 22.1 (1980), 3–17. 
31 On natural history as means to improve the individual, see Emma Spary, ‘Political, Natural and 
Bodily Economies’. 
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methods for enlightened beekeeping described in eighteenth-century manuals thus 
formed the hive into a model of enlightened government of insect populations; through 
the increased profits generated, they demonstrated to their readers the advantages of 
their new ideas on government. The connection between the economic activity of 
beekeeping and the education of the new citizen, who considered him- or herself 
responsible for the prosperity of the whole, is rendered explicit from the very titles of 
many eighteenth-century apicultural manuals. The art of beekeeping is thus often 
referred to as ‘l’éducation des abeilles’ or ‘l’éducation économique des abeilles’,32 and 
treatises discussed the best ‘Maniere d’élever des abeilles’.33 As the old admiration for 
the very human-like virtues of bees was transformed by a new concern for using 
experience and observation of the insects to maximise their output of honey and wax, 
so too did writers of beekeeping treatises proudly proclaim to have found methods for 
improving not only the labouring bodies of the bees, but also of the peasants 
responsible for looking after them.  
Thus, authors of beekeeping treatises thus offered advice not only on how to 
educate bees, but also on how to educate those who kept them.34 Writers of beekeeping 
manuals considered themselves mediators between the ‘nature’ to which their 
observations gave them direct access to and what they considered the unlearned 
agricultural workers whose labour made ‘nature’ profitable. They were responsible, 
that is, for making the knowledge created by observation circulate among all those 
who might benefit from it. One writer claimed in his preface that the key to increasing 
profits by improving beekeeping was to convince not the peasants who already kept 
bees, but rich landowners.35 Eventually, he argued, peasants would emulate them 
because their drive for profit would lead them to imitate the new methods:  
 
Il est en effet d’expérience constante, que quoique souvent très-bouchés pour 
les choses de raisonnement, pour les choses même qu’on leur a démontré être 
                                                 
32 Jacques Joseph Ducarne de Blangy, Traité de l’éducation économique des abeilles: où se trouve aussi 
leur histoire naturelle : avec figures (Paris: Gueffier, 1771), I. 
33 Noël Chomel, Dictionnaire oeconomique [...] Ouvrage composé orginairement par M. Noel Chomel, 
curé des S. Vincent à Lyon. Nouvelle Édition, entièrement corrigée, et très-considérabelment 
augmentée, par M. De La Marre (Paris: Ganeau; Bauche; les Frères Estienne; d’Houry, 1767), I, p. 578. 
34 On the importance of education of the lower classes for enlightened political economies, see Chisick, 
Limits; Vardi, Physiocrats p. 72. 
35 On the elitism of agronomists, see Steven L. Kaplan, pp. 119–25; Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the 
French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 154–56; Gillispie, pp. 368–87. 
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les plus avantageuses, ils sont très-habiles à imiter ce qui rapporte du profit, 
pourvû qu’on leur donne l’exemple.36 
 
The language the author (a nobleman named Guillaume Louis Formanoir De Palteau) 
employs here is revealing of the way in which he conceived of his role. The 
unenlightened poor are closed to reason, he argues, but can be ‘unblocked’ by the 
savant who knows that the key to converting them to rationality lies with their natural 
self-interest. Criticisms of De Palteau’s hive pointed to his failure to take into account 
the peasants’ needs, interests, and budgets, despite being well adapted to the bees’ 
instincts. but his critics agreed with him that literate, rich landowners should read their 
manuals and then transmit their newly gained knowledge by practising what they 
preached, inciting the poorer farmers to imitate them. 37 As Pierre-Louis Massac put it 
in the preface to his work on wooden hives, addressed to the ‘chers habitans des 
campagnes’:38 ‘c'est à nous à vous développer ces objets, c'est à vous à les mettre en 
pratique. Profitez donc de nos études, & de nos lumières’.39 As Nira Kaplan has shown, 
the concept of emulation was transformed to mean not simply imitation of the selfless 
virtues of the Classical heroes (an important aspect of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century pedagogy, particularly among Jesuits) but the increased drive, fostered by 
competition, to social productivity.40  In this endeavour to claim the right to govern 
over those supposedly unable to use their reason, the rational agronomists found a 
particularly germane topic in bees, whose government, as we will see, represented a 
point in case.  
De Palteau’s critics agreed that his hive construction had failed to fulfil its, 
since building it was not within the budget of poorer countryside dwellers. It was not, 
in other words, adapted to the interests of poorer farmers who stood to benefit most 
from productive hives. Proving the superiority of one’s own hive model over that of 
one’s predecessors was, of course, also a marketing strategy, but it also shows the way 
                                                 
36 Guillaume Louis Formanoir de Palteau, Nouvelle construction de ruches de bois, avec la façon d’y 
gouverner les abeilles (Metz: Joseph Collignon, 1756), p. xiii. 
37 This criticism is another link between agronomists and the physiocrats, who were also accused of 
ignoring the needs of the poor. See Florence Magnot-Ogilvy, ‘A Body without a Voice: A Literary 
Approach to Linguet’s Opposition to the physiocrats over the Free Trade in Grain’, The European 
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 22.3 (2015), 420–44. 
38 Massac, Mémoire sur les abeilles, p. 12. 
39 Massac, Mémoire sur les abeilles, p. 21. 
40 Nira Kaplan, ‘Virtuous Competition among Citizens: Emulation in Politics and Pedagogy during the 
French Revolution’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 36.2 (2003), 241–48. 
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in which these agronomist authors understood the concept of improvement as aimed 
both at animal bodies and human workers. The most important promise made by these 
manuals, then, was not simply that readers would learn how to increase their honey 
and wax production. Rather, the treatises suggested that the improvements they 
proposed would make visible a utopian government which connected animals, their 
natural products, beekeepers, and consumers, in a productive whole.41   
 
4. Technologies of Government for Enlightened Beekeepers  
4.1. How to Build the Perfect Hive  
Much of the debate on the matter of beekeeping focused on the question of how to 
construct the perfect home for the bees so that they would be able to supply as much 
honey and wax as possible. The question of the perfect hive was not just a technical 
issue; it was a practical manifestation of the idea that the main task of a good governor 
was to provide the framework best suited to the natural historical characteristics of the 
insect ‘population’.42 Considering this, it is not surprising that the spatial arrangement 
of the hive was a crucial target of the beekeeper’s intervention. Many of the treatises 
even make this their central issue, as can be gleaned from titles such as Mémoire sur 
la manière de gouverner les abeilles dans les nouvelles ruches de bois43  or Culture 
des abeilles, ou, Méthode expérimentale et raisonnée sur les moyens de tirer meilleur 
parti des abeilles par une construction de ruches mieux assorties à leur instinct.44 
Despite their seemingly specialised titles, these works contained an extensive survey 
of many aspects of beekeeping, beyond the best hive construction. The fact that their 
titles should choose to focus on this issue, however, suggests that it this was a central 
question requiring reform in the eyes of enlightened beekeepers. Determining the 
                                                 
41 What we might conceptualise as a ‘state’. For a concise overview of discussions over the emergence 
of the modern ‘state’, see Elden, The Birth of Territory, pp. 321–23. 
42 As Stuart Elden has shown, from the mid-seventeenth-century onwards, ‘politics was fundamentally 
conceived as operating with discrete, bounded spaces under the control of a group of people, usually 
the state’. However, before the middle decades of the eighteenth century, the concern of the absolutist 
ruler was above all with the control and extension of the territory itself. By contrast, with the emergence 
of the new concept of the ‘population’ as the main focus of government, territory was thought of 
predominantly in relation to this new entity; its government now depended on understanding and 
managing the changing relations between population and territory. See Elden, Birth of Territory, esp. 
pp. 328-329.  
43 Pierre-Louis Massac, Mémoire sur la manière de gouverner les abeilles dans les nouvelles ruches de 
bois (Paris: Ganeau, 1766). 
44 François Xavier Duchet, Culture des abeilles, ou, Méthode expérimentale et raisonnée sur les moyens 
de tirer meilleur parti des abeilles par une construction de ruches mieux assorties à leur instinct: avec 
une dissertation nouvelle sur l’origine de la cire (Vevey : P.A. Chenebié, 1771). 
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shape and material of the hive that would suit the bees’ ‘instincts’ was a matter of the 
author’s technical ingenuity, but also of his ability to apply the methods of natural 
history  ̶  long-term observation and experimentation  ̶  to apiculture. As the titles of 
beekeeping manuals indicate, the knowledge of insects frequently seems to shade into 
knowledge of humans. Bees, like men, had to be ‘governed’ or ‘educated’, preferably 
in ‘oeconomic’ fashion, and their hives had to be adapted to their natural ‘instincts’.  
What we see with beekeeping manuals, then, is a transformation of the old 
allegories of the political hive into a physical territory where principles of government 
could be both observed and enacted. Most new models of the hive promised their 
governors that they would allow the bees to circulate freely and thus never cease to 
produce. Just as importantly, these models offered the possibility to observe every 
corner and to intervene whenever an element of the hive did not contribute to, or even 
obstructed, the (re)productivity of the population as a whole. The enlightened hive, 
that is, was completlety transparent to beekeeperd and, consequently, could be asily 
managed by them. As one writer described the advantages of his model of the hive:  
 
Nos cultivateurs, en découvrant l’intérieur des ruches, sont à portée de voir et 
d’examiner leurs besoins, les accidens et les maux qui peuvent les affliger: les 
propriétaires des autres ruches, au contraire, gouvernent les leurs à tâtons, sans 
rien voir distinctement de ce qui leur est nécessaire, et ne peuvent faire que des 
conjectures sur l’état de leurs maladies.45 
 
The governors of these kinds of hives thus had total knowledge of needs, health and 
well-being of their insect populations, which allowed them to intervene only when 
absolutely necessary.46 As the author of this treatise promised, his hive would prevent 
illnesses, prolong the bees’ lives and allow them to work uninterrupted through all 
four seasons.47 This promise of absolute control through minimal intervention clearly 
echoes the physiocrats’ project for the ideal human government. Quesnay had dreamed 
of a government capable of observing the entirety of French territory and, as a 
                                                 
45 Abbé della Rocca, Traité complet sur les abeilles, avec une méthode nouvelle de les gouverner telle 
qu’elle se pratique à Syra, île de l’Archipel. Précédé d’un précis historique et économique de cette île, 
3 vols (Paris: De L’Imprimerie de Monsieur, Bleuet père, 1790), III, pp. 52–53. 
46 Rocca, Traité des abeilles, vol. 3, p. 55. By making the hive visible to the beekeeper, Della Rocca 
thus advocates the principle of legibility that for political scientist James Scott is the necessary 
precondition for the formation of the modern state: James C. Scott, Seeing like a State. 
47 Rocca, Traité des abeilles, vol. 3, p. 53. 
 201 
 
consequence, ordering the governed space in such a way that it allowed a constant 
flow of goods, people and natural objects, each according to their own instincts and 
natural needs. Beekeepers, on the other hand, claimed to have created the perfect hive, 
in which bees could move as freely as their instincts told them to do. 
One of the most important characteristics that distinguished a hive based on 
enlightened observation from its supposed earlier traditional counterpart was its ability 
to adapt to variations in bee population, both in a single hive over time and between 
hives. Agronomists invented various contraptions to get around what they saw as the 
traditional hives’ rigidity, which made it hard for beekeepers to see inside the hive and 
forced them to open the entire hive instead of allowing them to intervene in selected 
sections of the hive only. Olivier de Serres, author of the extremely popular rustic 
oeconomy manual Théâtre de l’agriculture, the first edition of which was published 
in 1600, recommended wooden hives built all in one piece.48 He justified this idea by 
arguing that wild bees usually live in tree trunks, a model of hive construction that 
would become the stereotype of the unenlightened hive that a true agronomic improver 
would reject.49 De Serre’s model of the hive, however, presented a crucial 
disadvantage: it only had one opening and hence required the beekeeper to disturb the 
entire population if he wanted to examine its health or harvest their produce. De 
Palteau, whose apicultural manual was quoted by most subsequent writers, proposed 
to improve De Serres’ model with a hive made from oak wood, with three separately 
detachable boxes (‘hausses’), with a hole in each box to enable the bees to easily 
migrate from one to the other. The key to the success of De Palteau’s hive, that is, was 
the fact that the bees could circulate freely through the hive. The enlightened hive, as 
proposed by De Palteau, was designed so that the beekeeper could both see and 
manage the entire at one glance. One of the main advantages of his construction, he 
argued, was the ease with which the beekeeper could harvest the insects’ produce. 
Rather than having to disturb the entire bee population when doing any manoeuvre at 
all, from cleaning the hive to taking the honey, the detachable boxes enable the 
beekeeper to make the bees migrate to one box while he or she was tinkering with 
another. The beekeeper did not need to interrupt the bees’ work even at the time of the 
harvest, thus making increased profits whilst intervening less in the bees’ life. 
                                                 
48 On De Serres and the older tradition of mesnagement, see Mukerji, Impossible Engineering, pp. 23–
25. 
49 Serres, Théâtre, p. 382. 
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In addition to enabling the beekeeper to supervise all corners of the hive and 
to harvest the insects’ produce without interrupting their work flow, another crucial 
selling point put forward by enlightened inventors revolved around the bees’ health.  
The Levantine priest and traveller Della Rocca, for instance, argued that the 
superiority of his hive was based on its many holes, which allowed air to circulate, 
preventing infections:  
 
cette manière de poser les ruches droits en forme de cloches, ou autrement, 
fermées de tous côtés, n’y ayant qu’un passage, quelque grand qu’il soit, dans 
leur partie inférieure, ne vaut rien; elle est faite précisément pour y mettre 
l’infection, pour la hâter, et pour la conserver longtemps; mais au contraire la 
position horizontale des nôtres, les trous que nous y faisons autour du 
couvercle antérieur, et ceux mêmes que nous pouvons faire à celui de derrière, 
empêcheront toujours que l’air ne s’y corrompe; le mouvement des abeilles et 
de leurs aîles, favorisé par ces ouvertures, y produira une circulation d’air 
presque continuelle; 50 
 
In the enlightened hive proposed by Della Rocca, the circulation of air was created by 
the movement of the wings of freely circulating bees, which in turn assured healthy 
bodies, an uninterrupted workflow and more profit for their human governors. 
Beekeeping thus became the perfect exercise in enlightened political economy, as all 
bodies involved in economic production, from the very air to the insects and the 
beekeepers, were supposedly given the possibility to fulfil their natural potential to 
flourish; as one writer puts it, the best hive construction would fulfil the ‘conditions 
requises pour le bien des abeilles & pour les faire prospérer’ and guarantee ‘la 
commodité de l’oeconome’.51 The enlightened hive was thus commercially useful, but 
also represented a space where the utopia of a society where people and goods could 
circulate freely and without obstruction seemed realisable.  
 
4.2 The Honey Harvest 
                                                 
50 Rocca, Traité des abeilles, vol. 3, pp. 53-55. On the importance of air circulation in eighteenth-
century medical theory, see Eltlin, ‘L’air dans l’urbanisme des lumières’; Hannaway, ‘Environment and 
Miasmata’. 
51 Société oeconomique de Berne, Encyclopédie oeconomique ou système général: 1° d’oeconomie 
rustique 2° d’oeconomie domestique 3° d’oeconomie politique (Yverdon, 1771), X, p. 28. 
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However different the structure or content of their works, authors of beekeeping 
treatises all concurred in according a central role to the process of harvesting the 
insects’ produce. The enlightened, well-informed beekeeper knew how to take only 
‘leur superflu’, as if bees were producing honey beyond what they could consume just 
so as to share it with their human keepers.52 The reason for the centrality of this issue 
is seemingly obvious: if writers want to increase revenues through beekeeping, the 
moment of the harvest is clearly crucial. The rhetoric used to discuss supposedly 
innovative practices, however, points to a much more far-reaching project underlying 
the development of new techniques for harvesting the bees’ produce. Taking the 
product of the bees’ hard labour without harming –rather improving – their bodies 
exemplified the ideal of enlightened government, respectful of the needs of its 
population but nevertheless harnessing them to increase the wealth of the state. In the 
writings of reform-minded agronomists, harvesting the bees’ produce is described not 
only as a self-interested activity, but as a duty; if the insects are left with too much of 
their own produce, readers of beekeeping treatises are admonished, they will transform 
from productive workers into idle insects, as the excess produce will block storage 
space and thus production. These lazy insects contrasted with the self-presentation of 
the agronomists, who fashioned themselves as enemies of both noble idleness, fuelled 
by luxury, and the idleness of the poor, at a time when living off charity instead of 
ome’s own labour was considered both a crime in itself and a school for worse 
crimes.53 Echoing these mid-century debates about the potential dangers of idleness, 
Noël Chomel argued in his Dictionnaire oeconomique that taking away the bees’ 
‘superflu’ not only helped the human governor, but also kept the bees healthy and thus 
rendered them more productive: 
 
Ce qu’on enleve de la sorte aux abeilles, dans un tems où elles peuvent le 
remplacer assez vite, est un superflu ; dont le retranchement les met plus à 
l’aise, leur donne lieu de faire de nouvel ouvrage ; & peut-être même contribue 
à leur santé.54 
 
                                                 
52 Palteau, Nouvelle construction, p. 398. 
53 On the luxury debates, see chapters 1 and 2. On debates about the idleness of the poor, see Thomas 
McStay Adams, Bureaucrats and Beggars: French Social Policy in the Age of the Enlightenment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
54 art. ‘Mouche,’ in Chomel, I, p. 597. 
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Superfluous honey and wax, in other words, block the productive flow of the hive; by 
removing just the right amount of produce, the beekeeper ensures that the insects are 
motivated enough to continue to cycle of productivity, but also that they are provided 
with enough subsistence in order to be able to do so. On the one hand, then, the 
production of superfluous produce is necessary for the exchange between bees and 
beekeepers to be possible, on the other hand removing the produce beyond what’s 
necessary for the upkeep of the hive would interrupt the cycle of productivity. 
Beekeeping treatises thereby mirrored very closely contemporaneous theories of 
political economy positing that the origin of modern civilised ‘économie’ was located 
in the balance between need and superfluity.55  Enlightened beekeeping also echoed 
the heated debates on the dangers of luxury, considered as a danger to this balance.56 
Lessons in enlightened honey-harvesting unambiguously represent a lesson in 
enlightened government: they teach their readers that good governors do not intervene 
directly in their subjects’ lives, but know how to maximise their productivity.  
Authors describe the superiority of their new techniques by asserting that these 
do not interrupt the course of the insects’ productive lives. As the bees happily go 
about producing more honey and wax, the beekeeper thus benefits from their work 
without the insects even noticing. What is more, they insist that by removing just the 
right amount of produce, the bees become even more productive. In particular, authors 
throughout the century vigorously rejected a method for harvesting the insects’ 
produce by suffocating the insects by burning them to death. They referred to it as 
‘barbarous’ and thus the opposite of an enlightened practice based on the principles of 
natural history. Every single apicultural author, throughout the last two thirds of the 
century, lamented the persistence of this practice, which they attributed to the 
stubbornness of illiterate farmers.57 Given the repeated insistence on the futility of the 
                                                 
55 See, for example, Melon’s image of three islands, each of which produce only one item (grain, wine, 
wool); only because the islands lack something will all three begin to exchange and produce 
competitively. See Jean François Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (Amsterdam: François 
Changuion, 1735), pp. 1–14. Another example of this understanding of the relationship between the 
superfluous and the necessary can be found in L’ami de l’homme, where Mirabeau argues that 
commerce distributes the superfluous to where it is necessary; Victor de Riquetti marquis de Mirabeau, 
L’ami des hommes, Ou traité de la population (La Haye: Benjamin Gibert, 1759), IV, p. 75. See also 
Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation State in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), esp. 30-37. 
56 Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury’; Berg and Elizabeth Eger; John 
Shovlin, ‘The Cultural Politics of Luxury in Eighteenth-Century France’, French Historical Studies, 
23.4 (2000), 577–606; Pierre Rétat, ‘Luxe’, Dix-huitième siècle, 26.1 (1994), 79–88. 
57 On enlightened views of the illiterate, see Chisick, Limits. 
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practice, it seems strange that any reader after the 1750s would still need to be warned 
against it. The repetition of the condemnation of this practice seems to have been less 
a reminder to beekeepers interested in the best methods for harvesting honey than a 
confirmation for reform-minded landowners and agronomists of the importance of 
their own knowledge of natural historical facts as opposed to that of poorer peasants. 
Killing off one’s hive thus became an emblematic example for the unenlightened 
blocking of nature’s flow and of the older idea and practice of sovereignty as rule over 
life and death of the subject. It was also a reminder of the superiority of formalised 
knowledge and scientific observations and experiments rather than of the knowledge 
of illiterate practitioners, even if the former relied on the latter.58  
As the physiocrats and other political economists worked hard to convince 
their fellow citizens and administrators that regulations of the grain trade represented 
such a blockage,59 the example of the hive, based on the same idea of nature as a system 
of circulation, had become widespread. One text in which we can begin to track this 
recurring rhetorical reminder is Louis Liger’s La Nouvelle maison rustique (first 
published in 1700), a comprehensive handbook on how to run a rural estate that was 
so successful that it went through countless editions, official and pirated, throughout 
the century.60 While the second edition (1701) of Liger’s handbook still endorses 
killing the bees as a possible, though not preferable, strategy for harvesting their 
produce, when we turn to the sixth edition, published in 1749, we find that the editors 
unequivocally condemn the practice as ‘une barbarie’.61 Other authors echoed Liger’s 
judgement. This barbarous practice was possible, they argued, only because the 
principles of beekeeping had not followed naturalists’ discoveries on the ‘nature’ of 
bees. As the Swiss writer Duchet put it in his Culture des abeilles, it was only because 
beekeepers had not yet adapted their practices to the bees’ ‘génie’  ̶  meaning their 
instincts, needs and behaviours  ̶  that beekeeping could have been considered an 
unprofitable activity: ‘Tout dépend donc de connoitre & de feconder cet instinct 
                                                 
58 Another example of enlightened expert ‘discoveries’ based on the knowledge of the illiterate are the 
colonial botanists who used indigenous informants without acknowledging their contribution: 
Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World. 
59 Riskin, Sensibility, pp. 128–33. 
60 On Liger, see Bourde, Agronomie, vol. 1, pp. 55-57; E. C. Spary, Feeding France, pp. 21–25. 
61 Louis Liger, La Nouvelle maison rustique, ou Économie générale de tous les biens de campagne, 
donnée ci-devant au public par le sieur Ligier ["sic"]. 6e édition, augmentée considérablement et mise 
en meilleur ordre, avec la Vertu des simples, l’Apoticairerie et les décisions du droit françois sur les 
matières rurales, 6th edn (Paris: Saugrain fils, 1749), p. 464. 
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naturel, c'est le vrai & unique moyen de faire tout aller à souhait.’62 Echoing 
contemporary political economists, beekeeping treatises suggested that enabling 
insects freely to follow their natural instincts, made apparent through observation, 
could increase revenue. Killing the bees was thus described as a failure to let the nature 
of bees take its course, both out of greed and out of ignorance of the natural facts of 
insects.  
 
5. The Idea of Circulation Through the Labour of Insects 
5.1. Naturalising Insect Work and Human Labour 
To understand how natural historical practices helped conceptualise ‘work’ as the 
result of productive wholes interconnecting goods, populations in space in the 
eighteenth century, there is no better example than descriptions of the insect that had 
been used for centuries as a symbol for hard labour: the ant. In Proverbs 6:6 Solomon 
sent the sluggard to the ants to learn how to work, while Pliny praised their diligence, 
memory and indefatigable labour.63 In his memoir on these insects and their highly 
organised communities (unpublished during his lifetime), Réaumur set out to combat 
what he considered the naïve anthropomorphism of pre-seventeenth-century writers.64  
He thus began his memoir with a list of all the sublime moral qualities attributed to 
ants by Pliny and his successors. After almost two pages of examples, he summarises 
his complaints: 
 
Mais on ne s’en est pas tenu à admirer ce qu’elles nous permettent de voir. On 
a cherché a [sic] interpréter à leur avantage toutes leurs actions, celles mêmes 
dont les motifs sont le moins pénétrables.65 
 
In other words, the natural history of ants is in need of renewal because Réaumur’s 
predecessors did not know how to observe. Yet, despite his protestations, Réaumur 
did not debunk the myth of the hard-working ant. On the contrary, he used the practices 
of the enlightened observer to put them on a firmer grounding. The ant that Réaumur 
                                                 
62 Duchet, Culture des abeilles, p. 7. 
63 David Badke, ‘Ant’, The Medieval Bestiary, 2011 <http://www.bestiary.ca> [accessed 8 September 
2016]. 
64 René-Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, Histoire des fourmis, ed. by E.-L. Bouvier and Charles Pérez 
(Paris: Paul Lechevalier, 1928). 
65 Réaumur, Fourmis, p. 10. 
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claimed to have made visible was thus no longer the Solomonic ant teaching the 
individual the importance of hard work, but an insect that embodied the ‘naturalness’ 
of the perfectly disciplined worker contributing to the wealth of her nation.  This 
implied a reconception of the idea of ‘work’ itself. The ants’ hard ‘work’ no longer 
required moral virtues such as ‘donner de charitables secours à leurs malades’ or strict 
laws punishing those who refuse to spend their time wisely.66 Instead, ‘work’ was 
connected to the two fundamental laws of collective animal life: the drive to reproduce 
and to produce means for subsistence: ‘c’est le bien général de leur espèce qui les 
anime.’67 
What Réaumur claimed to be visible to the attentive naturalist, in other words, 
were no longer the virtues of the individual ant (including her dedication to the 
common good), but her contribution to the production and reproduction of her colony, 
in which the labouring ants, their food and building materials constantly circulated. 
Jean Ehrard has argued that the depictions of labourers in the Encyclopédie served to 
render their actions perfectly transparent and hence manageable to enlightened factory 
owners in towns, thus sharply contrasting with the supposed secrecy of the urban 
workers organised in guilds.68 In his work on the arts and crafts, most of it unpublished 
during his lifetime, Réaumur too had argued that knowledge needed to circulate and 
not be kept secret by selfish guilded labourers.69 Unlike the secretive human labourers, 
ants could be observed by enlightened naturalists. Although, of course, descriptions 
of ant labour would not help managers of human craftsmen, they did underscore the 
importance of circulation as the natural mechanism leading to the productivity of a 
population. 
                                                 
66 Réaumur, Fourmis, pp. 13-14. 
67 Réaumur, Fourmis, p. 100. The cliché of the tireless ant has recently been disproven. It seems that 
ants take hundreds of short ‘naps’ throughout their working lives, resulting in 9.4 hours of sleep per day 
for the queens and 4.8 hours for the workers. Deby L. Cassill and others, ‘Polyphasic Wake/Sleep 
Episodes in the Fire Ant, Solenopsis Invicta’, Journal of Insect Behavior, 22.4 (2009), 313. 
68 Jean Ehrard, ‘La main du travailleur, la plume du philosophe’, Milieux, 19/20 (1984), 47–53. 
69 He wrote, for example: ‘Outre qu’un amour de la liberté porte à souhaiter qu’il soit permis aux 
hommes de faire ce sur quoi ils ont naturellement autant de droit que les autres, c’est que si les 
établissements se font de la sorte plus lentement d’une manière moins brillante, ils se feront d’une 
manière plus utile au Public. Comment s’assurer d’une societé qui ne soit pas trop avide de gain ? C’est 
le grand inconvenient des Privileges, qui d’ailleurs lient les mains à ceux qui n’en ont pas obtenu de 
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perfectionner les nouvelles inventions. Ce n’est pas que les particuliers n’aïent pour le profit une ardeur 
égale à celle de Compagnies ; mais la crainte que leurs voisins ne vendent plus qu’eux, l’envie d’attirer 
le Marchand, leur fait donner à meilleur marché.’ ’Préface’, René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, L’ 
Art de convertir le fer forgé en acier et l’art d’adoucir le fer fondu, ou de faire des ouvrages de fer 
fondu aussi finis que de fer forgé (Paris: Michel Brunet, 1722), unpaginated. 
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In contrast to Aelian’s supposedly naïve anthropomorphisms, Réaumur limits 
himself to the outsider’s perspective, watching the anthill from above. His preferred 
technology for observing the ants thereby literally muted the animals’ conversations 
transcribed by Aelian: Réaumur used various glass containers to force the insects to 
perform their work of production and reproduction under his very eyes. These 
containers include glass bells used for plants and other everyday objects, but the 
naturalist’s preferred observatory were the transparent hives he had built for observing 
bees, enclosed by another pane of glass to prevent the ants from escaping.70 These 
hives had the advantage of separate drawers, each of which the naturalist could open 
and observe individually without disturbing the ants’ industrious workings. Indeed, 
the fact the ants were unaware of the presence of the observer was crucial to the 
advantage of the glass hives:  
 
Les connoissances de ces insectes, s’ils ont des connoissances, ne vont pas 
jusques à sçavoir que ces volets et ces carreaux si commodément disposés 
n’ont pas été mis là pour eux ; ils ne prévoyent pas que leurs établissements ne 
sçauroient être de longue durée que tout y sera bouleversée par le premier 
curieux qui viendra ouvrir les volets.71 
 
The naturalist had created a space perfectly transparent to the omniscient observer’s 
gaze without the observed animals even noticing his presence. Just as the Creator of 
the natural laws of the ants’ society was invisible but omnipresent, the naturalist could 
observe the insects unnoticed. One of the most important myths for Réaumur to 
disprove was that of the ants’ habit of storing food for the winter.72 This, the naturalist 
argued, was unnecessary: the ants were productive when the weather allowed it, but 
as soon as it became too cold, they would stop moving and hence did not require food. 
Productivity, Réaumur observed, meant circulation, not accumulation of food. The 
only time he observed the ants in his glass hive move the grains he had prepared for 
them was when these blocked their paths: ‘[les fourmis] n’ont déplacé que ceux qui 
embarroissient les passages’.73 
                                                 
70 Réaumur, Fourmis, pp. 28-29. 
71 Réaumur, Fourmis, pp. 28-29. 
72 Réaumur, Fourmis, pp. 32-35. In fact, while it is true that the species observed by Réaumur do not 
store grains, the Mediterranean ants observed by classical writers do. Réaumur, Fourmis, p. 32, fn. 2. 
73 Réaumur, Fourmis, p. 33. 
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The crucial importance of circulation was reflected too in the ants’ 
construction of their nests. These, as Réaumur’s glass hives had enabled him to see, 
were not the spacious palaces described the ancients but a space designed exclusively 
for the (re)production and circulation of food and workers:  
 
Ce sont des villes qui ne sont composées que de rues couvertes, ou si nous nous 
contentons de comparer les fourmillères à des édifices destinés à contenir 
beaucoup d’habitants, (elles) sont uniquement composés d’escaliers qui se 
croisent les uns les autres et les endroits les plus spacieux de chaque 
fourmillère sont très petits et peuvent être comparés au palliers des 
escaliers[.]74 
 
Like the bee cells described in chapter two, Réaumur’s ant nests wasted no space or 
material; even seemingly empty holes contribute to the circulation of producers and 
produce: ‘Aucune de ces cavités n’est aveugle, elles communiquent toutes les unes 
avec les autres’.75  
Through deconstruction of unenlightened moral lessons and their replacement 
with descriptions of his own observations of his transparent glass hives, Réaumur 
could thus find in ants the disciplined workers he desired for his own society: efficient 
bodies, tireless work (without intervention from the queen), and communal spaces that 
served production as efficiently as possible. Assuming no intentions other than the 
(re)production of the species, Réaumur had thus been able to observe and explain ants’ 
behaviours in a way his predecessors, interested in invisible morality as well as visible 
behaviours, had been unable and unwilling to do. Réaumur did not simply go to the 
ant to teach his readers about the value of hard work. By reconstructing the image of 
the hard-working ant through the means of enlightened observation, he could also 
observe how the production functioned in a large society organised not by a sovereign 
(the queen does not play an important role in his observations), but by the supreme 
sovereign, nature herself.  
In his summary of the natural historical knowledge up to early decades of the 
eighteenth century, the abbé Pluche (1688-1761) made the link between observing 
                                                 
74 Réaumur, Fourmis, p. 24. 
75 Réaumur, Fourmis, pp. 26-27. 
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insects and observing workers even more explicit. His Spectacle de la nature, ou 
Entretiens sur les particularités de l'histoire naturelle qui ont paru les plus propres à 
rendre les jeunes gens curieux et à leur former l'esprit (first editions published in 
1732-1742), a compendium of nine volumes on the marvels of nature used as examples 
of God’s greatness, was, according to the classic study by Daniel Mornet on the 
contents of eighteenth-century private libraries, one of the most successful texts 
published during the entire century.76 It was written as a pedagogical dialogue between 
a young noble man, a young noble mother who hosts him during his school holidays 
and the educated local prior. The dialogues' main character, whose schooling is 
complemented by walks in the countryside leading to conversations on natural 
phenomena, is taught how to find, observe and dissect insects. In the middle of a 
conversation about spiders, his hostess recounts how her own son benefited from his 
training in the seemingly innocent art of observation as it taught him how to observe 
the artisans working for him and thus judge the quality of their products: ‘Il suivoit un 
Tireur d'or, un Imprimeur, un Horloger, & un Teinturier des quinze jours & trois 
semaines: il donnoit autant au Menuisier & au Serrurier, encore plus au Charpentier. 
Il ne quittoit point son homme, qu'il ne l'eût vû dans toutes les attitudes & dans toutes 
les entreprises de sa profession.’77 The young gentleman follows all the rules of natural 
historical that he had learned whilst looking at insects: he divides the production 
process into its various steps and the worker himself into a series of postures.78 As his 
mother proudly recounts, the skill of observation enables the young nobleman to 
closely control those who work for him: ‘Un ouvrier fripon ne le trompera pas: mais 
il sait aussi rendre justice à l’ouvrage d’un habile maître.’79 The art of observing insects 
could thus directly be used as a tool for the disciplining of workers.  
The lavish attention Pluche pays to artisans and their crafts in his Spectacle de 
la nature, is thus not only a sign of his progressive, enlightened outlook, as Cynthia 
                                                 
76 Daniel Mornet, ‘Les enseignements des bibliothèques privées (1750-1780)’, Revue d’Histoire 
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Koepp has argued.80 Pluche’s nobleman has learnt from his training in natural history 
how to keep his workers under constant surveillance; both employer and employee are 
thus perfect examples of the disciplinary structure of the French absolutist state up 
until the mid-eighteenth century.81 Pluche’s descriptions of ants are equally focused 
on the obedience of that insect to ‘ses loix & sa police’ and his ant community follows 
a rigid code of rules and regulations. 82 Their paths from the nest to the food source, 
for instance, are described by Pluche as tightly regulated (though less so when the food 
is outside rather than indoors): ‘pour y aller & pour en revenir, la marche est réglée. 
Tout le monde a ordre de se rassembler par un même sentier. Ces ordres sont moins 
sévères, & il y a liberté de courir, quand elles trouvent du gibier dans la campagne.’83 
Although Réaumur and Pluche agreed on the orderliness of the natural oeconomy, as 
illustrated in the bodies and ‘moeurs’ of insects, their descriptions of ants are two 
different examples of theories of government, the first focused on the discipline of 
workers, and the second on the well-being of the ‘population’. While Pluche argued 
that ants and workers needed strict policing, what Réaumur finds fascinating about 
them are not their ‘police’ but, precisely, the way in which they are organised into an 
orderly whole in the apparent absence of a disciplining sovereign. 
 
5.2 The Circulation of Worker Bees 
Ants, like bees, then, helped imagine and put into practice ways of governing which 
were centred on knowledge of the bodies governed. While historians focusing on 
images of the queen bee have shown that representations of the hive moved from 
figuring it as the perfect monarchy to descriptions of the bee republic, the problem of 
circulation shifts our focus from the queen to her workers. Bees had long been a 
symbol for hard work (’diligentes ouvrieres’ writes one eighteenth-century fabulist),84 
but their industriousness was usually taken as a sign of loyalty and subjection to their 
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king or queen. Now, eighteenth-century writers depicted bees no longer as symbols of 
simple diligence, but as examples of the capacity of natural bodies to increase their 
productivity. Bees were no longer simply symbols of hard though also mechanical and 
unchanging work; since they could be understood to have progressed from a wild life 
in tree trunks to a civilised existence in productivity-enhancing human-built hives, 
they were also living proof for the idea that work was not a stable category, with each 
group within the hive invariably fulfilling the same tasks to the same extent, but 
subject to ‘improvement’.  
In her analysis of the plates for the Descriptions des arts et métiers, Geraldine 
Sheridan has argued that the depictions of women highlight what the accompanying 
text omits: the fact that female labourers were an absolutely integral part of French 
economic production. Though women were necessary for the production of goods, 
they were increasingly excised from writings on production. At the same time, the 
value of their reproductive labour was increasingly highlighted.85 While Sheridan 
argues that visual depictions of labour processes belied the absence of female workers 
in written texts, descriptions of workers in the beehive might serve as another 
unexpected location for discussions of the importance of female labour. While the 
queen, as Wahrman has shown, was gradually reduced to her reproductive function, 
the sterile female workers of the hive were represented as ideal productive bodies. The 
preceding discussion on the notion of circulation in natural and political bodies thus 
opens up an additional perspective on Wahrman’s ‘cultural revolution’ as observed 
through the females in the beehive. Not only might we question Wahrman’s claims 
regarding the suddenness of this shift  ̶  after all, Réaumur’s memoirs are already 
peppered with references to both the bees’ maternal instincts and their role as leader 
of the hive  ̶  Wahrman is certainly right to point out the increasing emphasis on the 
queen’s role as the hive’s sole mother. Women’s bodies and their reproductive labour 
reflected the (re)productivity of nature, not by coincidence still often represented as a 
female figure.86 By giving birth, that is, women ensured that ‘the economic machine’ 
did not experience blockages in her reproductive cycle.  
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This role of women as safeguards of economic circulation is evident already 
in Réaumur’s experiments from the 1740s. He had shown that even the value of the 
queen (a single mother rather than a good wife) depended on her productive 
contribution to the hive. In one telling experiment, the naturalist decided to remove 
the queen without immediately replacing her. The results suggested that the queen’s 
role in the hive was indeed a crucial one, but in no way that of a lawgiver. As soon as 
he deprived his bees of their sovereign, they ceased to work, instead consuming the 
honey and wax that remained in the hive and that they collected out in the fields. As 
soon as the queen was lost, the workers ceased to exist as a community, instead 
breaking into a multitude of  idle individuals who ‘se contentent de vivre au jour la 
journée, d’aller prendre leurs repas dans la campagne, sans s’embarrasser de faire des 
provisions dans la ruche.’87 Since the experiment showed that the worker bees accepted 
any fertile queen, this suggested that their loyalty depended not on her inborn dignities, 
but simply on the health of her reproductive organs; or, in other words, on her capacity 
for reproductive labour. The absence of a fertile female thus ground the honey 
production in the hive to a halt, dissolving the bee community into atomised, self-
interested individuals. Réaumur’s observations on economic circulation in the bee 
hive mirrored the concerns of writers in the later decades of the century also in his 
suggestion that the body of the queen be monitored so as to prevent blockages in the 
economic machine of the hive.  
This was echoed in gynaecological texts. As scholars have pointed out, texts 
such as Diderot’s article ‘Accoucheuse’ worked to delegitimise the work of female 
midwives in order to strengthen the role of the male surgeon.88 Diderot’s main critique 
is that the midwives fail to observe the female body and accept its nature: ‘L'art des 
accouchemens ne convient que lorsqu'il y a quelque obstacle: mais ces femmes 
n'attendent pas le tems de la nature; ‘elles déchirent l'oeuf, & elles arrachent l'enfant 
avant que la femme ait de vraies douleurs.’ Unlike the good beekeeper described by 
Réaumur, the midwife intervenes instead of paying attention to possible blockages. 
The Encyclopédie’s medical articles, on the other hand, detail the ways in which 
(male) doctors should observe the female body, and in particular the circulation of 
fluids. Women’s refusal to breastfeed could thus be reimagined as an unnatural 
                                                 
87 Réaumur, Mémoires, vol. 5, pp. 274-275. 
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blocking of the body’s circulatory apparatus;89 as the doctor Barthez writes in his 
article ‘Femme’: 
 
Si l'accouchée ne peut ou, ce qui n'est que trop ordinaire, ne veut pas être 
nourrice, il faudra bien mettre sur son sein & contre l'intention de la nature, des 
remedes propres à faire évader le lait; mais si l'accouchée est assez sage pour 
vouloir nourrir son fruit, on se contentera de lui tenir la gorge couverte avec 
des linges doux & mollets: alors la mere nourrice observera seulement 
d'attendre quatre ou cinq jours, avant que de donner le teton à son enfant 
 
Thus, the principle of circulation at the heart of eighteenth-century physiological 
theories of the role of fluids in the body as well as in the political economic models of 
the economy pervaded accounts of the amazingly productive and reproductive bodies 
of bees, further substantiating the naturalness of the enlightened ideas of the female 
body.90 At a time of supposed population decline, women were, as Londa Schiebinger 
has shown, increasingly reduced to their biological and hence reproductive sex.91 
Schiebinger argues that the term ‘mammal’ was chosen ‘alongside and in step with 
political realignments undermining women's public power and attaching a new value 
to women's domestic roles.’92 In a period that looked to nature for models of social 
organisation, queen bees thus served as another useful image for underscoring the 
importance of women’s reproductive act. 
Like the queen, the rest of the hive’s individuals were reconfigured as defined 
by their contribution to the productivity of their society. Most of the historical work 
has focused on the figure of the queen, but notions of the sterile females within the 
hive reflected cultural shifts as well. This is evident from their very name: whereas 
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earlier writers referred to them above all as ‘females’ (sometimes also as males) in the 
eighteenth-century most writers called them ‘ouvrieres’, insisting on the idea that their 
sterility aside, they fulfilled the majority of tasks in the hive, from building and 
cleaning the cells to collecting honey and defending the hive from outside enemies. In 
his Natural History, Pliny had explained that the hive consisted in the king, the 
‘genuine bees’ and the drones. He thus distinguished the different types of bees by 
their anatomy: the king, who was ‘larger’; the bees and the drones, their ‘slaves’, 
whose stingless and weak nature allowed ‘the bees [to] exercise over them a rigorous 
authority, compel them to take the foremost rank in their labours, and if they show any 
sluggishness, punish them without mercy’.93 Closer to our period, Jan Swammerdam 
still referred to the workers mostly as ‘common bees’. Their role in the hive was 
defined not in relation to production, but to reproduction: ‘the common Bees have no 
ovary, and therefore, like women who have lived virgins till they are past child-
bearing, serve only the purpose of labour in the oeconomy of the whole body. These 
are thus by nature rendered incapable of doing any other business but that of 
nourishing and educating the young off-spring.’94 In Swammerdam’s description, the 
bee’s labour is not a positive description that somehow defines the bee, but a chore, 
carried out only because she is incapable of reproduction as the true purpose of any 
living being. By contrast, Réaumur’s introduction to the hive’s social groups stresses 
the value of the bees’ work: ‘Les premiéres sont celles que tout le monde connoît; leur 
nombre est sans comparaison plus grand que celui des autres; elles sont uniquement 
nées pour le travail; tout celui de la ruche roule sur elles, aussi les nommons-nous les 
ouvriéres.’95 Here there is no sense that the worker bees are defined by a lack of 
fertility; instead, their biological conditioning to work is both their primary and thus 
name-giving characteristic and a positive feature. 
Both the reproductive labour of the queen and the productive labour of her 
workers were essential to the economy of the hive as a whole; this contrasted, of 
course, with the fate of the greedy drones. In a recent study of early-modern vermin, 
Lucinda Cole suggests that the analogy of Robinson Crusoe’s island colony as a ‘great 
hive’ points to the ‘sacrificial economy’ at the roots of the modern imperialist state: 
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‘The famed efficiency of the hive, its legendary industry, depends (according to 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century naturalists) on the systematic extermination of 
hungry members whose use-value has been expended.’96 Beekeeping treatises, in 
addition to providing an example in nature of the sacrifice of those who have lost their 
‘use-value’, both made visible the necessity of sacrificing the unproductive elements 
of the population and instructions on how to do so , or rather, how to let the bees do it 
themselves. The practice of killing the bees could thereby come to stand for 
unenlightened government because unlike the targeted massacre of the drones it took 
into account only the ease and convenience of the governor, not the well-being of the 
insect population. Eighteenth-century beekeepers, on the other hand, argued that 
enlightened government of bees required helping the insects in their massacre if, and 
only if, the bees themselves had not managed to do so. Enlightened apiculturists were 
fascinated by the peculiar role played by the male drones. As one treatise describes 
them: ‘Chaque couvain en fournit à peu près quatre cens. Après que le dernier couvain 
de l’été est éclos, ils fécondent la Mere pour la derniere fois. Aussitôt les Abeilles 
ouvrieres les tuent, & les jettent hors de la Ruche.’97 Although the fact that the female 
worker bees of a hive killed all the males once the mating process was completed 
troubled assumptions about the role of docile women and of mothers, authors 
reminded their readers that the drones’ survival threatened the hive. In his pedagogical 
dialogue, De Palteau explained at length the necessity of the massacre. His narrator 
Ariste thus described the first weeks of their short lives as a life of idleness reminiscent 
of critiques of unproductive eighteenth-century nobles, getting up at eleven in the 
morning and leaving the hive only for ‘des parties de plaisirs & de divertissemens, ou 
tout au plus une preparation à un bon repas en gagnant de l’appétit par le grand air & 
un exercice modéré.’98 The descriptions of this extravagant life style of noble idleness 
made the killing of the drones at the end of the mating season (late July) to prevent 
them from consuming the hive’s resources needed for the winter seem justifiable. 
Some drones apparently even committed suicide. For Ariste, the drones’ death was a 
necessary act of self-sacrifice: ‘Le bien public exige ce sacrifice.’99 If too many drones 
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escaped the workers and refused to commit suicide, the hive was almost certainly 
going to die, either because they consumed too much of its resources or because they 
caused infectious diseases.100  In such a case of failure of the bees’ self-protective 
mechanism, the beekeeper, having observed the hive carefully, should intervene: 
‘vous pourrez utilement pendant tout ce mois [d’août] vous amuser à tuer avec des 
pinces, tous les faux-bourdons qui vous tomberont sous la main.’101 The task of the 
beekeeper was to ensure, through constant observation, that the hive’s cycle of 
production and reproduction was never interrupted. The killing of the bees as 
supposedly practised by the unenlightened thus comes to represent an interruption of 
this cycle. The enlightened beekeeper knew that in most cases he did not need to kill 
the bees: instead, the working bee population killed the drones as soon as they had 
made their contribution to the task. Unlike their human governor, the bees knew 
exactly which elements of their hive to kill and at what moment (before the winter). 
Authors’ frequent repetition of a clear-cut case where natural historical 
research could disprove the long experience of traditional farm labourers did not 
simply serve the purpose of enlightening their readers on the harmfulness of killing 
bees (at least by the end of the century, probably would have known already). It was 
not just the practice itself that authors of beekeeping treatises were transmitting, but 
also the lesson that an enlightened governor intervened as little as possible in the lives 
of his insect population. They also taught that to be a citizen meant being productive, 
or risk the fate of the lazy drones. 
 
5.3 Beekeeping and Colonialism 
Scholars have noted that the hive could serve as a model for colonial government, as 
Lucinda Cole argues it did in Robinson Crusoe. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, too, shows 
how the colonial experience of the English in America transformed political analogies 
of the hive and contributed to arguments in favour of self-government of the colonies: 
‘Just as bees swarmed from the over-full hive to take up productive roles in a new 
model of the old hive, a new plantation was indeed like a swarm. As a replica of the 
parent hive it was not an extension, but a separate society.’102 
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In French treatises on beekeeping practices overseas, the hive was more than 
a model for political organisation of the colonies. Instead, their authors used their 
natural historical studies of the differing characters of colonial and mainland bees to 
argue for differences in their human inhabitants. Articles on beekeeping practices in 
the colonies can be found in several journals and books on overseas countries. As part 
of larger-scale projects to survey the natural history of colonial people, plants and 
animals, bees are mentioned as evidence for the immense variety of behaviours and 
anatomies within the same animals depending on the climate.103 Historians of 
eighteenth-century colonialism have shown that colonial subjects were frequently 
portrayed as passive and idle, living off what Nature gave freely rather than using their 
hands and minds to transform and improve her produce. Patrick Carroll, in a study on 
the role of the sciences in the formation of the British Empire, shows how, as early as 
the mid-seventeenth century, the Boate brothers described the native Irish as too lazy 
to improve their lands, arguing that their ‘passivity in the face of nature’ demonstrated 
that they were ‘barbaric’.104  Through their supposedly empirical study of the natural 
history of the Irish, English colonisers as masters of agricultural and industrial 
improvement and thus more civilised saw themselves as justified to transform both the 
uncivilised minds of the Irish and the physical nature of their land.105 The association 
between a civilised mind, improving hands and colonial power also applies to the case 
of eighteenth-century France. Just as writers concerned with human variability 
asserted, following a theory most famously expressed by Montesquieu, that climate 
and other geographical factors significantly influenced the socio-political structures, 
norms, national ‘character’ and ‘moeurs’ of a people, naturalists often had recourse to 
the hot climate as an explanation for the differences between European and colonial 
bees.106 The latter, they claimed, were smaller, weaker and less productive. Some of 
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them did not even possess a sting, and if they did, its force was significantly weaker 
than that of a French bee.107 In a report on beekeeping on the Isle de Bourbon (present-
day La Réunion), for example, the Journal de physique stated that bees there  
 
sont de même nature que celles de France, mais moins grosses & plus longues. 
Elles ne sont jamais engourdies par le froid à l’isle de Bourbon; ils y trouvent 
toujours des fleurs, & cependant elles ne travaillent pas toute l’année. […] Les 
abeilles sont peu actives, ce qui dépend peut-être de la trop grande chaleur du 
climat.108  
 
As a consequence, naturalists and agronomists suggested introducing the much more 
productive European bee species to the French Isles. The abbé Della Rocca even 
claimed that this project had been successfully carried out in Louisiana and Cuba.109 
He proposed beekeeping as a technique for the improvement of the people and land of 
the colonies, by which he meant an increase in commercial goods produced for the 
benefit of Europeans, both in the colonies and at home. He lamented the lack of 
artificial hives in the Caribbean despite the fact that the native inhabitants depended 
on the bees’ produce and praised the English settlers who had introduced bees to Cuba 
as models everywhere to be followed.110 For Della Rocca bees were ideal contributors 
to a globalised natural and political economy. The nature of the lazy colonial bee 
populations seemed to be beyond improvement. Once replaced by productive 
European species, introduced by European settlers, the most hard-working kinds of 
bees would produce enough honey and wax to cover not only the needs of the 
inhabitants of the colonies, but also for exportation back to the homeland. The 
European bee population, in other words, realised the natural productivity of the 
colonial territory. What this meant for the native bees was never specified.  
The imperial overtones of reports on bees in the colonies are even clearer in 
discussions of the beekeeping practices of the native (human) inhabitants. In addition 
to the natural history of the bees themselves, the author of the Journal de physique 
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article included a report from a M. de la Nux, correspondent of the Académie des 
sciences, on the invention of a new hive based on the beekeeping practices of the 
island’s native inhabitants. De la Nux’s hive takes inspiration from the hives built by 
the ‘sauvages’ of the island, who house their bees in hollowed-out tree trunks which 
they either carve out themselves or find hollowed out in nature. The article makes it 
very explicit, however, that the native beekeeping practices only provided the 
inspiration for de la Nux’s hive, who developed it according to his own experiments 
and observations and after having read De Palteau’s and other French writers’ 
manuals. The native beekeepers, like the Irish described by Carroll and like the lazy 
native bees, simply take what they find, while the Frenchman uses his knowledge and 
reasoning power to improve both the bees’ natural productivity and the naïve practices 
of the ‘sauvages’.  
Bees were imagined to improve the life of the colonised in other ways, too. 
While demand for wax increased over the course of the century, honey lost its role as 
the most widely used sweetener. As historians of France’s colonial relations have 
noted, the country dramatically increased its production and consumption of sugar in 
its Caribbean colonies (predominantly in Saint-Domingue, but also in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe), with the amounts of sugar registered in French ports tripling every 60 
years between 1670 and 1790.111 Because of the labour intensity of sugar production, 
it was closely tied to the slave trade, which, in turn, gave rise to criticism of the 
treatment of slaves in the sugar industry. The Rousseauist writer Gaspard Guillard de 
Beaurieu (1728-1795), author of a text using the natural history of insects to turn 
young readers into moral citizens, linked his critique of civilisation and its hunger for 
luxury goods to the inhumane treatment of slaves abroad.112 He suggested that instead 
of importing sugar, European consumers should ‘return’ to using honey as the more 
‘natural’ product: ‘nous prouverons combien il seroit plus avantageux à tous égards, 
de substituer le miel au sucre, & d'employer les Nègres, avec plus d'humanité à d'autres 
travaux’.113 
One such occupation, we might surmise, could be the government of bees. The 
treatment of bees hereby mirrors the treatment of the slaves: as even as Rousseauist 
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an author like Beaurieu agreed, using bees to produce honey, though not in the insects’ 
‘nature’, was not morally wrong in itself, as long as beekeepers did not use ‘inhumane’ 
practices like their routine killing. As ‘Nature’ seemed to demonstrate by increasing 
the beekeeper’s revenue, such practices were not only cruel but also against the bees’ 
natural laws. This argument from natural-historically inspired agriculture is transposed 
onto the management of slaves: it is not the government of the French over the Haitians 
that is deemed wrong, but only their misguided, unproductive and ‘unnatural’ 
employment in the sugar industry.  
The natural history of bees, then, served as a lesson on how to manage and 
improve those labouring in the service of the improver; by using natural history, 
writers argued, landowners could learn, on the one hand, how to increase their 
financial revenues, and, on the other hand, how to treat their insect and human 
labourers in a fashion that seemed morally just.114  
 
6. Conclusion 
The particular appeal of bees lay in their usefulness as both metaphors and literal 
contributors, through their honey and wax, to the wealth and prosperity of the nation. 
Bees helped imagine a community that did not rely primarily on an absolute sovereign, 
nor on an absent God, for its cohesion, but on a productive population. Eighteenth-
century beekeeping treatises reminds us of the two-faced nature of Enlightenment 
projects for improvement: though authors loudly professed their intention to help 
improve the lot of France’s poor, insisting on the importance, even nobility, of 
agriculture, they simultaneously worked to ensure that they would depend on their 
rational knowledge. In the treatises examined, natural knowledge of bees served as the  
basis for their ‘government’ and as an early model for thinking about humans as 
natural bodies, rather than as legal subjects. As enlightened improvers dreamed of 
governing a space where animals, humans, commodities and physical entities such as 
air could circulate freely, it is clear that they did not envision the abandonment of 
hierarchies. Though they promised that all bodies involved would be able to pursue 
their interest, they also insisted that native Caribbeans, poor labourers, rich landowners 
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and rational agronomists could never have the same interests.  With the help of social 
insects, that is, political economists and agronomist conceptualised – and to put into 
practice – a political economy based on the idea of the ‘naturalness’ of those to be 
governed.  
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Chapter Six. Conclusion and Outlook 
In a passage of the Salons of 1769, Diderot addresses several of the issues that have 
been central to this dissertation. Diderot writes: 
 
J’ai bien peur, mon ami, que la prédiction du grand chancelier d’Angleterre ne 
soit sur le point de s’accomplir en France; c’est que la philosophie, la poésie, 
les sciences et les beaux arts tendent à leur déclin du moment où, chez un 
peuple, les têtes, tournées vers les objets d’intérêt, s’occupent 
d’administration, de commerce, d’agriculture, d’importation, d’exportation et 
de finance.[…] On disserte, on examine, on sent peu, on raisonne beaucoup, 
on mesure tout au niveau scrupuleux de la logique, de la méthode et même de 
la vérité; et que voulez-vous que des arts qui ont tous pour base l’exagération 
et le mensonge, deviennent parmi des hommes sans cesse occupés de réalités 
et ennemis par état des fantômes de l’imagination, que leur souffle fait 
disparaître? C’est une belle chose que la science économique; mais elle nous 
abrutira.115 
 
In this fascinating passage, Diderot laments the rise of the kind of empirical knowledge 
of which Francis Bacon, the ‘grand chancelier’, was thought by Enlightenment writers 
to be the founding father. Knowledge, Diderot asserts, has been reduced to useful 
knowledge; the practitioners of the useful ‘science économique’ have become so 
rational that they have abandoned the imagination and sensibility that makes them 
truly human, rather than mere ‘brutes’. The philosophe thus reminds of the close 
association in the eighteenth century between competing conceptions of the pursuit of 
knowledge, political economic concerns and the differences between humans and 
animals. Diderot opposes two images of the human. The first is the one brought 
forward by the representatives of ‘science économique’, who reduce themselves to 
being calculating, interest-driven ‘brutes’. Like the geometrically-minded bees we 
encountered in chapter two, Diderot’s economic scientists are supremely rational 
beings, able to recognise and pursue their material interests. Echoing Buffon’s critique 
of Réaumur’s mathematically skilled bees, Diderot describes them as machine-like 
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animals: they are rational, but their single-minded pursuit of their interests suggests 
that they have abandoned the liberty to be irrational. In opposition to these animalised 
calculators, Diderot describes artists and savants who, we might say, exploit their 
humanity to the fullest. They feel, and they use their (often irrational) imagination. 
This extract from Diderot’s Salons thus summarises some of the opposing conceptions 
of individual bodies and minds and social wholes that we have encountered in the 
preceding chapters. Political economists and conservative naturalists increasingly 
presented a conception of the human as interest-driven and rationally calculating, a 
conception that echoed descriptions of hard-working bees calculating the most 
efficient use of materials for their constantly productive hives. Their critics, on the 
other hand, emphasised not the bees’ geometrical talent, but their ability to feel and to 
respond to one another’s movements.  
While Diderot and the naturalist Georges Leclerc de Buffon, avidly read by 
Diderot, at times emphasised human uniqueness, arguing that insects differed from 
humans in that they could not use their creative, if occasionally dangerously irrational, 
imagination, they also showed that both human and animal sociability was the product 
not of geometric calculations, but of sensibility. Radical thinkers like Diderot or 
Buffon, but also the medical writers of the Montpellier School that we encountered in 
chapter three, thus stressed the differences between man and insect in their conception 
of the imaginative individual, but also their closeness to animal societies such as bee 
swarms when they conceptualised the workings of sensibility. Political economists 
and agronomists, on the other hand, though they shared these thinkers’ conception of 
social bodies as more than the sum of their parts, were not interested, as Diderot 
criticised, in their irrational, imaginative elements. Instead, they looked to animal 
bodies in order to learn how to order and govern them. The discussions of insects that 
I have traced in the preceding chapters have been shown to contribute not only material 
to the emerging global networks of commodity exchange, nor just empirical evidence 
for political ideas, but also a conceptual model of the social order that linked humans, 
animals and ‘nature’ to understand how society should be governed (or governs itself 
with the help of natural checks and balances). Discussions of insects contributed to 
this endeavour by helping imagine how natural bodies – insect as well as human, 
individual as well as social – could fall within the purview of government. 
As we have seen, one conception of society emerging in the eighteenth century 
was that of the social whole as a ‘population’. ‘Population’, as this dissertation has 
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demonstrated, is not a way of thinking about human or animal communities that arises 
‘naturally’ from aggregations of large groups, but the historically and geographically 
specific construct through which governmental power has been thought to operated, 
at least in France, since the eighteenth century. As naturalists and political economists 
wove humans, animals and other natural resources into one continuous whole, to be 
governed, controlled and improved by the state, they thus made possible subsequent 
conceptions and practices of an ‘economy’ based on the government of natural bodies. 
Why this transformation in the conceptualisation of the object of government should 
have occurred is a question that lies beyond the purview of this dissertation. The 
concept emerged as part of much wider transformations of the socio-political 
landscape; any explanation would thus likely have to involve an unwieldy number of 
factors. The aim of this dissertation has been less to explain why what Foucault termed 
‘biopower’ might have emerged in the period; instead the thesis has analysed how a 
series of texts grappled with the question of the social order demonstrate the 
connection between Enlightenment discourses of (human) political economy and of 
the nature of animals, and to show at the centre of both was a concern with the 
relationship between individual and collective bodies. The thesis has thereby shown 
that areas of knowledge that might seem distinct to the twenty-first-century mind were, 
in the eighteenth century, connected by a common nexus of questions around animal 
nature and its difference from human nature; these discussions, in turn, allowed 
thinkers to devise new definitions of the social order.  
In the first chapter, we saw that Diderot was not the only one among the 
philosophes to warn against reducing the individual - human or animal - to the 
universal rules of self-interest. With Diderot’s critique, written at a time when the 
population discourse was in full swing, we thus come full circle from Emilie Du 
Châtelet’s early-eighteenth-century interpretation of the differences between humans 
and animals, and the relationship the bodily passions and reason. Though only eleven 
years younger than Emilie Du Châtelet, the differences between the take on the 
emerging political economy of the rich noblewoman and the son of a cutler from 
Langres is striking. While both objected to the idea of subsuming individuals under a 
scientifically observable and calculable abstraction such as ‘the population’, they did 
so for different reasons. For Du Châtelet, the pursuit of happiness could never be 
universal, for it depended on material and intellectual resources that could only ever 
be accessible to a tiny elite.  
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Chapter two further has interrogated new conceptions of human and animal 
individuals. It shows that the Enlightenment construction of the rational self took place 
also in discussions of the nature of insects. One the hand, the geometrical skills of 
bees, as we have seen, could thus serve either as a reminder of the rational order 
according to which a providential God had arranged the human as well as the natural 
(including the insect) world. Those thinkers, on the other hand, who conceived of the 
human self not only as rational, but also as sensitive, reduced the geometry of the hive 
to the result of automatic programming, emphasising instead that the complex social 
formation of the hive is the result of the interactions between sensible bodies. 
Chapter three has explored how eighteenth-century writers described the way 
in which individual bodies, whether they thought of them as natural or social, primarily 
rational or sensitive, could come together to form harmonious wholes. In this chapter, 
debates about the newly discovered polyp and the order of the bee swarm have been 
taken as examples for discussions around the organisation of natural bodies.  
Chapter four has analysed one conception of ordered wholes that became 
increasingly dominant in the second half of the century: the idea that bodies in the 
aggregate formed a ‘population’. It examines the parallels between changing 
approaches to insect pest control, health epidemics and the Physiocratic concept of the 
population to argue that there were strong parallels in which both animal and human 
populations were thought of and governed.  
The final chapter has shown how the concept of population, natural historical 
investigations of insects and the Enlightenment concern with improvement were taken 
up by writers of beekeeping treatises in the latter half of the century. These authors 
did not belong to either the intellectual circles of the French capital or the high nobility, 
but that had absorbed the spirit of improvement and reform. Partly as a way of re-
enforcing the importance of their own role as provincial, newly enriched 
landowners,116 partly, we can assume, out of a genuine desire to improve the lot of the 
labouring poor, their beekeeping treatises employed the concept of circulation to 
describe and put into action a theory of government that, by respecting nature’s 
dictates, harmoniously combined and rendered productive insects, the plants they fed 
on, farmers and their land, landowners and consumers. Diderot, though also a 
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proponent of a government that would respect the natural limits of humans, animals 
and even plants, perceived that this conception of nature as geared towards 
productivity reduced men to ‘machines’ or animals (’les abrutira’). As we have seen, 
this reduction was also crucial to both the rise of the state administration in France and 
the growing colonial enterprise abroad. Agronomists’ efforts to increase the 
productivity of their honeybees, whether at home or in the colonies, led them to export 
European, supposedly more ‘hard-working’ species as well as European, enlightened 
beekeeping methods, and to import honey produced abroad. Beekeeping is only one 
example of how insects in the eighteenth century strengthened the ties between 
colonies and colonisers, linking often very distant ecosystems. Just like beekeeping, 
efforts to revive and enhance sericulture, or attempts to break the Spanish monopoly 
on cochineal, benefited colonisers and colonised in unequal ways and transformed 
landscapes as well networks of knowledge and trade.6 Much more is known about 
colonial plant trade even though insects evidently played a significant role in the 
formation and consolidation of European empires7, both as resources and as living 
proof of the beneficial connection between the political economies of Europe and 
overseas. 
By offering the first sustained investigation of the links between discussions 
of insects, of the human individual and of theories of social wholes and the best ways 
to govern them, this dissertation has contributed to the growing body of studies by 
scholars in the humanities on the roles of animals, and in particular of insects, in 
constructing human social orders. Rather than consider the ‘animal’ as the inevitable 
counterpart of the ‘human’, however, it has emphasised that animals and our 
relationships with them need to be understood historically. While human-animal 
scholars reflexively locate the construction of the rational human subject, whose 
animality has been suppressed, in the Enlightenment, it is clear that the situation was 
much more complex. Enlightenment writers thus indeed stressed human uniqueness, 
whether they found it with the faculties of reason or imagination. At the same time, 
however, the same thinkers also explicitly and purposefully brought animals and 
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humans closer together. More conservative writers thus saw in animals an example of 
the rational order that governed over all bodies, human ones included. More radical 
writers, on the other hand, emphasised not a shared rationality, but a shared sensibility, 
which they saw as the basis for human and animal sociality. In the eighteenth century, 
animals also began to be used as a means for developing nascent methods for 
governing human bodies as a ‘population’, as well as for controlling the animal bodies 
that became crucial contributors to the functioning and prosperity of human societies. 
Retracing how eighteenth-century observers used animals to develop and make 
‘visible’ the idea of the ‘population’, the thesis has thus, through the lens of the insect, 
given a new picture of the emergence of the modern state which uses ‘population’ as 
its main basis for government.  
My account has focused on the middle decades of the eighteenth century and 
ends before the years of the French Revolution. The connection between the 
observation of animals and theories of how to govern the population does not end 
there, however. On the contrary, the new political and institutional situation brought 
the ‘population’ as a technology for governing on the basis of physiological 
assumptions about ‘human nature’ – determined on the basis of observation of animals 
– to the forefront.  
I would like to use the remainder of this conclusion to sketch briefly the 
relation between knowledge of animals and knowledge of how to govern human 
individuals and groups it has traced would go on to dominate political, economic and 
cultural theories. The upheavals of the Revolution accelerated the developments 
whose foundations I have analysed in the preceding pages. In the attempts of the new 
revolutionary regime to devise a government based not on the old feudal hierarchies 
but on the natural laws of the human species, population became the foundational 
concept through which they hoped to understand and govern France’s citizens.117 The 
statistical accounts of the population that the Physiocrats could only dream of were 
thus finally realised and the first full census took place under Napoleon in 1802. At 
the same time, the scientific study of animals’ behaviours and anatomy continued to 
flourish. Even at the height of the Revolution, authorities invested heavily in making 
public the natural history collections at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, which 
                                                 
117 See in particular Joshua Cole, The Power of Large Numbers: Population, Politics, and Gender in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
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opened in 1793.118 Historians have examined the political function of the new Muséum 
and its elaborate displays as an instrument for public instruction; showing animals and 
plants was meant to persuade the public of the capacity of the new regime to transform 
and regenerate the natural and social worlds.119 
As eighteenth-century fields of knowledge separated increasingly into 
professionalised, clearly demarcated disciplines,120 students of animal and human 
societies respectively grew increasingly wary of accounts that explicitly used one field 
to explain or influence the other. The new discipline of biology, however, continued 
to support reconceptions of the human political, social and economic orders. 
Sometimes in subtle, sometimes in more open ways, animals provided models of or 
evidence for particular ways of governing human bodies. Social scientists continued 
to work on the basis of the concept of the ‘naturalness’ of the subjects of their science, 
while biologists continued to infer human ‘nature’ from animal, and insect, 
observations.121 Natural history and biology in their many guises continue, to this day, 
to contribute to the formation of new technologies of liberal governmentality.122 As 
naturalists began to complicate contemporary conceptions of animals as either God’s 
messengers or as machines, and as they outlined ways in which even the vilest insects 
could be made useful and productive to the state as a whole, they simultaneously made 
it possible to think of men as infinitely more complex animals to be governed and 
controlled on the basis of similar methods. Throughout the nineteenth century, public 
administrators as well as social scientists made population control - in the forms of 
public hygiene, crime statistics, worries about over- and underpopulation - their 
central goal.123 At the same time, biologists put forward theories of the evolution of 
the human species which could be used to support the expansion of commerce - at 
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home and in all corners of the Empire - as a tool for improving biological as well as 
social bodies.124 Biological research thus continued to provide ways of experimenting 
with the question of how to reconcile individual and social bodies. In that sense, much 
of the Physiocrats’ project, despite its initial failures, far outlived its theorists. 
Despite the fact that the notion of ‘population’ as a political tool and its links 
with understandings of animal beings emerged in the eighteenth century, eighteenth 
and twentieth or twenty-first century uses of both the term and the tool are, of course, 
not identical. While it now seems ‘natural’ to us that governments should want to 
collect statistical information about the numbers, health, the birth and death rates, of 
their citizens, other aspects of the nexus between the natural sciences, theories of 
government and population have been lost with the changing historical circumstances. 
In particular, eighteenth-century theorists such as Quesnay, Mirabeau or the countless 
authors of agronomical texts insisted that their work brought genuine improvement to 
all strata of the population, as well as to the natural resources, animate and inanimate, 
of the state’s territory. Of course, as we have seen, and as historians have frequently 
pointed out, the new eighteenth century tools for the government of self and others 
had ambiguous effects (and intentions). Enlightened practices for agricultural 
improvement, for example, brought a more comfortable life to many farmers. At the 
same time, as the example of beekeeping treatises has shown, the discourse and 
practices of improvement enabled writers and privileged landowners to treat their 
labourers as natural resources and thus exploit them further; filling the few hours of 
leisure time of property-less labourers with the manufacturing of bee hives, for 
instance, might improve the productivity of the farm, but not necessarily the lot of the 
workers, bee or human.125 It has even been shown that the modern honey-bee body has 
gradually been transformed by the practices of her human keepers to lead a more 
productive but also shortened life.126 This ambiguity between improving the lot of 
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some while threatening the survival of others has, of course, only sharpened in our 
post-colonial world of environmental, social and financial crises. The circulation of 
goods, humans, animals and natural resources aimed at improving the lot of 
individuals and groups projected by Enlightenment improvers has thus been 
transformed by neoliberal post-war economists into a network of marketable values, 
maintained through the management and manipulation of the biological body of the 
‘population’. Exactly how the biological sciences from the nineteenth century onward 
have shaped, and have been shaped by, this transformation of political-economic 
theories is a matter that leaves us with open questions for future investigations.  
Furthermore, despite rapid technological advances, insects continue to inform 
agricultural and scientific practices as well as understandings of human individuals 
and cultures. Insect pests continue to threaten the human food supply and insect 
vectors still cause world-wide epidemics, at the same as we become increasingly aware 
of the role of many insects - most famously crop-pollinating bees -  in the maintenance 
of the fragile balance between human, animal or plant ecologies. Technologies 
continue to be developed in the context of pest control, but used for, and sometimes 
even driven by, military purposes or profits for multi-national firms. Similarly, we 
might argue that even as broad a social movement as environmentalism was influenced 
in no small part by the realisation that insects could not simply be eradicated through 
the use of synthetic chemicals,127 but that even the most harmful species point to 
ecological processes that we do not fully understand. In that sense, environmentalists 
have inherited the perception of Enlightenment improvers that human well-being 
depended on taking into account the natural facts of humans and non-humans alike. 
Much has changed in research on animal life since Réaumur’s investigations into the 
‘moeurs’ of caterpillars or the mother instincts of spiders, but nevertheless we continue 
to turn to the insect world to further our understanding of ourselves. Evolution has of 
course replaced Providence as the framework through which the connection between 
insects and humans is perceived, but scientists and their readers continue to assume 
the possibility of learning about and controlling our own human behaviours, desires 
and relationships by studying our very distant evolutionary cousins. In order to 
overcome the problem of the massive scale of the human brain in the study 
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functioning, for example, scientists are investigating the honey-bee brain as a small-
scale model to help them understand decision-making and subjective consciousness.128 
At the same time, their colleagues funded by the US military complex are using bees 
to gain an edge in their empire-building ‘war on terror’.129  
One aim of this dissertation has been to show that insects have been mobilised 
for governing humans as well as animals. Observing insect life mattered in the 
eighteenth century because of the historically specific purpose of reshaping sovereign 
power so as to take into account the needs and passions of ‘natural’ human bodies. As 
naturalists peered down their microscopes to observe the ‘nature’ of insects, they thus 
learned how to observe and govern human ‘nature’. Political economic goals shaped 
observations of bodies in ‘nature’, but these observations, in turn, shaped the meaning 
of ‘human nature’. The search of such a ‘nature’, was, at least in the eighteenth 
century, closely linked to the exercise of power.  
 Reading some of the eighteenth-century scientific, literary and political-
economic texts that have made it possible to conceive of humans and insects as bound 
together by natural as well as socio-economic processes can thus help us understand 
that neither the association itself nor the political economies to which it has contributed 
are ‘natural’ or unchangeable. While perceiving the link between insects and humans 
was as crucial to the maintenance of the balance of nature in the eighteenth century as 
it is to containing our present-day environmental crisis, we should not forget that the 
way we conceive of and shape this perceived link is inseparable from the theory of 
government in which is firmly embedded. 
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